Rutledge v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 7/22/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CHARLES RUTLEDGE,

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Plaintiff,
v.
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTION, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:13-cv-00703
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff is an inmate housed at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in
Nashville, Tennessee. He brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against a number of defendants, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by terminating
him from his prison job. (Docket No. 1).
I.

Prison Litigation Reform Act Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the courts are required to dismiss a

prisoner’s complaint if it is determined to be frivolous, malicious, or if it fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous and warrants
dismissal when the claims “lack[] an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); see Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Claims lack an arguable
basis in law or fact if they contain factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional, or if they are
based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. Id. at 327-28; Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d
863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1990).

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II.

Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
III.

Allegations in the Complaint
The plaintiff alleges that, while incarcerated at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution,

he held the paid position of “intake job” from October 2011 to September 2012 for which he earned
sixty dollars ($60) a month. The plaintiff alleges that he performed his job well and achieved a
lower security status as a result of his job performance. According to the plaintiff, in September
2012, the plaintiff was terminated from his prison job without a hearing or warning from his
supervisor. The plaintiff alleges that he was terminated due to the false complaints of another
inmate who was angry with the plaintiff for having reprimanded the inmate for spilling paint. The
plaintiff also alleges that Tennessee Department of Corrections Policy “505.07 pages 15 #6 (A &
C)” was not followed when the plaintiff’s job was terminated. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 6-7).
IV.

Analysis of Section 1983 Claim
The plaintiff asserts that the defendants terminated him from his job without justification and

without providing the plaintiff with the proper documentation and procedure in violation of the due
process clause. However, “[w]ithout a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal

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procedural due process claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir.
2007)(citing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)). In Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining when
a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the due process
clause. According to the Sandin Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only
when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or when a deprivation imposes
an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998);
Rimmer–Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995).
The Sixth Circuit consistently has found that prisoners have no constitutionally protected
liberty interest in prison employment under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dellis v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (district court properly dismissed as frivolous the
plaintiff's claim that he was fired from his prison job); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th
Cir.1989) (no constitutional right to prison employment); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th
Cir.1987) (“[N]o prisoner has a constitutional right to a particular job or to any job”); Carter v.
Tucker, No. 03–5021, 2003 WL 21518730, at *2 (6th Cir. July 1, 2003) (same). Morever, “as the
Constitution and federal law do not create a property right for inmates in a job, they likewise do not
create a property right to wages for work performed by inmates.” Carter, 2003 WL 21518730, at
*2 (citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) and James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d
627, 629–30 (3d Cir.1989)). Thus, the plaintiff here has no constitutionally protected liberty interest
in his prison intake job.

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Further, because the plaintiff has no liberty interest in his prison employment, he cannot
show that any false information was relied upon to a constitutionally significant degree. See, e.g.,
Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04–2335, 2006 WL 45275, at * 1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) (“[E]ven if the
Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did not violate any liberty
interest protected by the United States Constitution.”); Echlin v. Boland, No. 03–2309, 2004 WL
2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action to challenge the
information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in parole); see also
Draughn v. Green, No. 97–1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999) (in order for the
due process clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner's file must be relied on to a
constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95–1778, 1996 WL 636140, at * 1 (6th
Cir. Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a prison file);
Carson v. Little, No. 88–1505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989) (inaccurate
information in an inmate's file does not amount to a constitutional violation).
The plaintiff also claims that the defendants did not follow TDOC policies when they
terminated his prison employment.

Procedural requirements alone do not create a substantive

liberty interest, and mere violation of such procedures is not a constitutional violation. Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983); Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir.1996) (“there is a
fundamental logical flaw in viewing the process as a substantive end in itself”); Harrill v. Blount
County, Tenn., 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1995) (state law cannot create a federal constitutional
right); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 508 (6th Cir.1985) (violation of state law does not by itself
constitute deprivation of due process). After Sandin, it is clear that mandatory language in prison
regulations does not create a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Rimmer–Bey v.

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Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, to the extent that the complaint asserts that the
defendants did not comply with TDOC regulations in connection with the termination of the
plaintiff’s prison job, the plaintiff has not suffered any deprivation of due process because of such
noncompliance.
For all these reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff fails to state a due process claim arising
from the termination of his prison employment, from the allegedly false information upon which that
termination rested, or from the defendants’ failure to follow their own policies.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). As such, his
complaint will be dismissed.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge

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