Wright v. Haslam et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/11/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

GLENN RODNEY WRIGHT,
A/K/A RODNEY G. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOVERNOR BILL HASLAM,
PILOT/FLYING J, MEMPHIS GOVERNMENT,
WAYS & MEANS, NASA, and COGIC CHURCH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-1042
Judge Trauger

MEMORNANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Glenn Rodney Wright has filed a pro se complaint in this action (ECF No. 1). The plaintiff
proceeds in forma pauperis.
I.

Factual Allegations
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges as follows:
I am being stalked job-to-job, house-to-house, travel center-to-travel center by U.S.
Techno Satellite – Division Wartime Disarment [sic] Laser and reading satellite by the
Memphis Government & the Church of God in Christ, (Memphis), and burnt multiple
times daily with readouts taken on my ears until my eardrums burst. Some C.I.A. Agent
sent a YouTube and e-mail message describing it (www.petermooring.nl). I can’t keep
jobs & I’m homeless [due] to being governally [sic] stalked.

(ECF No. 1, at 2.)
The plaintiff names as defendants Governor Bill Haslam, Pilot/Flying J Travel Center in Knoxville,
Tennessee, the “Memphis TN Government,” Ways & Means, N.A.S.A., and the C.O.G.I.C. Church in
Memphis, Tennessee. He appears to request only equitable relief:
a. Want to go to the Supreme Court for a Notification of Action Act amend[ment] to the
Eavesdropping Satellite
b. Why a Voc-Rehab Recipient (me). I want the people brought forward; the Memphis
Sheriff, Police
c. And the C.O.G.I.C. Members brought forward to be ask why they are stalking me.
(ECF No. 1, at 3.)

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II.

Standard of Review
Having granted the plaintiff’s application to proceed as a pauper, the court must conduct an initial

review of the complaint and dismiss it sua sponte, prior to service on the defendant, if it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In reviewing the complaint, the
court is mindful that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than the formal pleadings prepared by attorneys. Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir.
2012). The court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). However, the leniency afforded to pro se
plaintiffs is not boundless, and they “are not automatically entitled to take every case to trial.” Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se
pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law,” and, ultimately, those who proceed
without counsel must still comply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases. Durante v. Fairlane
Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006); Whitson v. Union Boiler Co., 47 F. App’x 757, 759 (6th
Cir. 2002).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that, in assessing whether a pro se complaint states a claim on
which relief may be granted, the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–57 (2007), must be applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.2010). “Accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
III.

Discussion
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by

Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted);
see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“Federal courts are not courts

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of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the
statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The character of the
controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory
grant of jurisdiction.”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires pleadings to contain, inter alia, “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.” The plaintiff has provided no such statement in this
case, so the court must attempt to discern it from the complaint.
It does not appear that the court has jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 1332, which are
the only jurisdictional statutes relevant here. Under § 1331 (governing “federal question” jurisdiction),“[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” The plaintiff’s complaint references neither the Constitution nor any
discernible federal statute. In the section of the form complaint asking the plaintiff to “[s]tate the grounds
for filing this case in Federal Court (included federal statutes and/or U.S. Constitutional provisions, if you
know them,” the plaintiff invokes: “Modern Day Widespread Harassment, by Satellite; Emancipation
Proclamation – Sedition Act[, and] Forced Unlawful Surveillance.” (ECF No. 1, at 1.) The Emancipation
Proclamation, issued by President Lincoln on September 22, 1862, had the effect of emancipating all
slaves held in any Confederate state and clearly has no application here. The court is unaware of any
federal anti-sedition act that permits a private right of action, and the plaintiff’s other references are not to
any cognizable federal laws. Thus, the court lacks federal-question jurisdiction over this matter.
The court also lacks diversity jurisdiction, which is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 over
cases between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Under this statute, “there must be
complete diversity such that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” V & M Star, LP v.
Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 355 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The complaint in this case does not
allege complete diversity of citizenship, and nothing of record suggests it is present. Indeed, just the
opposite appears true. The plaintiff acknowledges that he is a resident of Memphis and therefore a citizen
of Tennessee. (ECF No. 1, at 1). Governor Haslam is also a citizen of Tennessee, as is the C.O.G.I.C.

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Church and the “Memphis Government.” Thus, there is not complete diversity among the parties, and the
exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 would be inappropriate. See V. & M Star, 596 F.3d at 355.
There being no other apparent basis for the exercise of this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, this
case must be dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order is filed herewith.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge