Mattice v. Social Security Administration

Filing 13

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 10) be DENIED and the Commissioner's decision AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 9/10/2014. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MICHAEL L. MATTICE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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No. 3:13-01441
Judge Nixon/Brown

To: The Honorable John T. Nixon, Senior United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) for judicial review of the
final decision of the Social Security Administration (“the SSA”), through its Commissioner (“the
Commissioner”), denying plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title
II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d). For the reasons explained
below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the record (Doc.
10) be DENIED and the Commissioner’s decision AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on May 15, 2013 alleging a disability onset date of
March 29, 2013. (Doc. 8, p. 156)1 Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to work because of a major
depressive disorder, severe depressive disorder, social anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), etc. (Doc. 8, p. 160) Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on July 8, 2013 and again upon
reconsideration on July 24, 2013. (Doc. 8, pp. 73-76, 78-80)

1

References to page numbers in the Administrative Record (Doc. 8) are to the page numbers that appear in
bold in the lower right corner of each page.

Plaintiff filed a request on July 30, 2013 for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (Doc. 8, pp. 81-82) A hearing was held on August 30, 2013 in Nashville before ALJ David
A. Ettinger. (Doc. 8, pp. 24-43) Vocational expert (VE) Kenneth N. Anchor testified at the hearing.
(Doc. 8, pp. 39-42)
The ALJ entered an unfavorable decision on October 1, 2013. (Doc. 8, pp. 8-23) Plaintiff
filed a request with the Appeals Council on November 12, 2013 to review the ALJ’s decision. (Doc.
8, p. 7) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request on November 20, 2013, whereupon the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 8, pp. 1-6)
Counsel brought this action on plaintiff’s behalf on December 20, 2013. (Doc. 1) Plaintiff
filed a motion for judgment on the administrative record on April 2, 2014. (Doc. 10) The
Commissioner responded on April 30, 2014.2 (Doc. 12) Plaintiff did not file a reply. This matter
is now properly before the court.
II. REVIEW OF THE RECORD3
A. Medical Evidence
Plaintiff was a walk-in patient at the Vilseck Army Health Clinic in Germany on July 23,
2009. (Doc. 8, p. 377) He had been “discharged from a German Psychiatric Hospital on Monday
20 July following an OD on Saturday 18 July 2009.” (Doc. 8, p. 377) Plaintiff attempted suicide
by taking Morphine tablets after drinking. (Doc. 8, p. 378) Dr. Terry Moody, Ph.D., diagnosed
plaintiff with “Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode” and “Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia.”
(Doc. 8, p. 379)

2

Neither party numbered the pages in their pleadings (Docs. 10-12). The pages referred to in these documents
are those assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system.
3

Plaintiff raises two claims of error in these proceedings, both of which pertain to his diagnosed depressive
disorder. The review of the record below is tailored to those claims of error.

2

Plaintiff was admitted to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (RMC) in Germany
approximately two years later on May 21, 2011. (Doc. 8, pp. 382-83) Plaintiff had “developed
thoughts of suicide,” and paramedics took him to the hospital. (Doc. 8, p. 382) He was discharged
from RMC Landstuhl on May 23, 2011 for further treatment at Vilseck. (Doc. 8, p. 383)
Plaintiff transferred from Germany to Ft. Campbell where he reported for duty on October
8, 2012. (Doc. 8, p. 267) He presented Blanchfield Army Community Hospital for medical “inprocessing” on October 15, 2012. (Doc. 8, pp. 272-75) Plaintiff reported that he had been “feeling
‘good’” “since he was placed on Abilify and the dosage . . . increased to 25mg,” and he denied
having any current suicidal ideations (SI), or having had any within the previous 90 days. (Doc. 8,
pp. 272-73) Plaintiff reported that he “fe[lt] ready to deploy . . . [and] . . . denied any behavioral
health concerns . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 273) Plaintiff continued in-processing the next day, at which time
he repeated he was “doing well, better than he ha[d] been in a long time” and that, although he had
a “passive” SI the prior weekend, he denied any current SI. (Doc. 8, p. 279) Plaintiff also reported
that he continued to “deal with deployment related symptoms of nightmares,” and experienced
“anxiety with fireworks, artillery . . . crowds and being hyper alert.” (Doc. 8, p. 279)
Nurse Practitioner (NP) Joel McPherson treated plaintiff numerous times at Ft. Campbell for
mental health issues from November 8, 2012 to June 14, 2013. (Doc. 8, pp. 227-41, 245-47, 258-71,
276-77, 318-21, 326-27) Plaintiff reported on November 8th that he currently felt “good” and denied
any SI. (Doc. 8, p. 267) Plaintiff also reported that, although he was able to get only “4-5 hours of
broken sleep nightly,” he no longer had “nightmares.” (Doc. 8, p. 267) Plaintiff reported further
that he “was having difficulty with low energy, poor concentration . . . problems completing
task[s],” and that he had to take a nap every afternoon. (Doc. 8, pp. 267-68)
On December 11, 2012, plaintiff characterized fatigue as his primary problem. (Doc. 8, pp.

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264-66) He reported to NP McPherson that he was “‘tired all the time,’” and that he had been
“constantly tired for over a year.” (Doc. 8, p. 264) Plaintiff again denied any SI, and reported that
Abilify was “very helpful with relieving depression.”4 (Doc. 8, p. 264)
Plaintiff presented to NP McPherson on January 9, 2012 for side effects from having
“stopped” Abilify.5 (Doc. 8, p. 261) Plaintiff reported that he had been “on Celexa for years” and
that it did “a good job of regulating emotions.” (Doc. 8, p. 261) Plaintiff also reported that he did
not “get irritated too easily,” but that he continued “to be tired,” and liked “to nap after work.”
(Doc. 8, p. 261) Plaintiff claimed that fatigue had “always been a problem.” (Doc. 8, p. 261)
Plaintiff was seen by NP McPherson for anxiety on February 5, 2013. (Doc. 8, p. 258)
Plaintiff complained that, although everything was going well in general, that particular day was
“very anxitizing.” (Doc. 8, p. 258) Plaintiff expressed his view that he did not have the “knowledge
or confidence” of “his peers,” that his expectations were “unrealistic,” that he had “no plans” after
the Army, and that he felt being discharged would be a demotion. (Doc. 8, p. 259)
Dr. Joann Quintero, Ph.D., whose treatment of plaintiff is discussed below at pp. 7-10,
reviewed plaintiff’s medical records on February 19, 2013 at the request of the Brigade Surgeon who
“suggested’ that plaintiff “may be best served with an MEB [Medical Evaluation Board].” (Doc.
8, p. 255) Dr. Quintero concurred in the Brigade Surgeon’s suggestion based on her review of the
records.6 (Doc. 8, p. 255)
On February 26, 2013, plaintiff reported to NP McPherson that he was “doing well” and had

4

The record reads that plaintiff “tapered Abilify to stay active military.” (Doc. 8, p. 264)

5

The January 9, 2013 record shows that “Abilify was stopped” “about 4 weeks” prior, i.e., on December 11th,
not just reduced as the term “tapered” in n. 4 above implies. (Doc. 8, p. 261)
6

Plaintiff’s case was referred formally to the MEB on March 29, 2013 for “MAJOR DEPRESSIVE
DISORDER.” (Doc. 8, p. 391)

4

“no acute concerns.” (Doc. 8, p. 277) Plaintiff also reported that he was not having any problems
with his medications. (Doc. 8, p. 277)
On March 27, 2013, plaintiff reported to NP McPherson that he felt depressed, and that he
slept “all the time.” (Doc. 8, p. 245) Plaintiff also stated that “he will be on MEB,” and that he was
“very anxious” about life after the Army because he had no idea of what he could do. (Doc. 8, p.
245) NP McPherson ordered that plaintiff resume taking Abilify. (Doc. 8, p. 246)
Plaintiff reported to NP McPherson on April 10, 2013 that, although he continued to be
depressed, he had not had SI visual images since resuming Abilify. (Doc. 8, p. 238) Plaintiff also
reported that he was “sleepy much of the time,”and that he ate “if hungry.” (Doc. 8, p. 238)
Plaintiff stated that he was afraid “something bad will happen,” especially when driving, that he was
“very anxious,” that he was easily startled by “by people walking up on him” and “loud noises,” and
that his disturbing thoughts were triggered by such things as a “box on the road side, being in
crowds, loud noises, [and] fireworks . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 239) Plaintiff also reported that his
depression had increased “since being notified he will be getting out of the [A]rmy.” (Doc. 8, p.
239)
On April 24, 2013, plaintiff reported to NP McPherson that Celexa and Abilify “work[ed]
well together to help control his depression and thoughts of suicide,” and the combination of Celexa
and Ability was “‘just right.’” (Doc. 8, p. 233) Plaintiff reported that, although his medication
caused him to be “very tired in the mornings,” he was “better after 0700.” (Doc. 8, p. 233) Plaintiff
reported further that his SI were no longer “daily occurrences” and, whereas they previously had
been “intense,” they now were “fleeting.” (Doc. 8, p. 233)
Plaintiff reported on April 29, 2013 that his anxiety was much better with Gabapentin,
although it caused fatigue. (Doc. 8, p. 276) Plaintiff told NP McPherson that he took the

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Gabapentin with his other prescription medications before going to bed at night “to take advantage
of the associated drowsiness” and to avoid being drowsy the next day. (Doc. 8, p. 276)
On May 2, 2013, plaintiff reported to NP McPherson that he continued to have “problems
with concentration and focus,” that he had “difficulty” completing tasks, or simple tasks that he did
not like, and that he would have “several task[s] going at one time with difficulty finishing any of
them.” (Doc. 8, p. 231) Plaintiff reported that, although he was “tired much of the day,” he had
enrolled in an associates program, but was having “difficulty with attention,” and that before he
joined the Army, he had “difficulty with fidgety and impulsive be[h]avior, but not so much now.”
(Doc. 8, p. 231)
Plaintiff reported to NP McPherson on May 10, 2012: “I’m perfect now.” (Doc. 8, p. 227)
Plaintiff reported further that, although he still was having “intrusive thoughts” about twice weekly,
and nightmares “concerning battle” about three times a month, he otherwise was “doing ‘great,’
sleeping well, [and] eating well three meals a day.” (Doc. 8, p. 227) On June 6, 2013, plaintiff
again reported that he was “eating and sleeping well.” (Doc. 8, p. 326)
Plaintiff presented to NP McPherson with “uncontrolled anxiety” on June 14, 2013. (Doc.
8, p. 318) Plaintiff reported that he had “received his unfit memo” and that “[t]ransitional leave
[wa]s to start in 3 months.” (Doc. 8, p. 318) Plaintiff reported again that he got very anxious when
he received bad news, or was “among groups of people,” that he got anxious and irritated easily
especially when in traffic and at home, and that he continued to have frequent SI. (Doc. 8, pp. 31819) NP McPherson noted that plaintiff was “a little down due to an upcoming 24hr shift.” (Doc.
8, p. 319)
Plaintiff carried the diagnosis of moderate recurrent major depression throughout his
treatment by NP McPherson described above. (Doc. 8, pp. 227, 231, 233, 238, 245, 258, 261, 264,

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267, 276-77, 318, 326) Despite plaintiff’s reported ups and downs with SI, depression, and anxiety,
NP McPherson consistently assessed plaintiff as having“[n]o significant risk” of committing suicide.
(Doc. 8, pp. 229, 235, 240, 259, 262, 265, 270, 320) Although NP McPherson characterized
plaintiff’s mood variously during this period as “euthymic,”7 “tired,” “good,” “down,” “depressed,”
“dysphoric,”8 and “Bla,” he consistently assessed plaintiff’s “behavior” as “cooperative and
appropriate,” his thought process as “logical and organized,” his thought content without “evidence
of psychosis or delusional thinking,” his “concentration” as “good,” his “attention” as “alert,” and
that he was “oriented” as to person, place, time, and circumstances (Ox4). (Doc. 8, pp. 228, 231,
234, 239-40, 246, 259, 265, 269, 319)
Dr. Quintero treated plaintiff numerous times during the period March 22 to July 26, 2013.
(Doc. 8, pp. 242-44, 248, 249-53, 254-55, 287-301, 307, 308-09, 313-17, 322-25, 328-35, 345-48,
539-42) Plaintiff first presented to Dr. Quintero on March 22, 2013 on referral from the MEB.
(Doc. 8, pp. 249, 251) Plaintiff stated that “he would like to stay in the Army [for the] structure and
financial security for his son.” (Doc. 8, p. 251) Plaintiff acknowledged “3 prior psychiatric
hospitalizations and past suicide attempt . . . .”9 (Doc. 8, p. 251) He also stated that he had no intent
to commit suicide because, among other things, he had a son who needed him, a sentiment repeated
throughout Dr. Quintero’s subsequent records. (Doc. 8, pp. 251, 292, 295, 309, 314, 323, 329, 333)
On March 25, 2013, plaintiff reported to Dr. Quintero that he had not had any recent SI.
(Doc. 8, p. 248) He added, however, that he was “pretty sad and depressed when he learned of the
MEB,” and that he “had a few panic attacks over the weekend.” (Doc. 8, p. 248)
7

Euthymic – “state of mental tranquility and well-being; neither depressed nor manic.” Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 655 (32nd ed. 2012).
8

Dysphonic – “difficulty in speaking . . . .” Dorland’s at 579.

9

Only two hospitalizations are indicated in the record.

7

Plaintiff presented with “depression” on April 1, 2013 (Doc. 8, p. 242), and with “increasing
depression and anxiety” on April 10, 2013 (Doc. 8, p. 299). Plaintiff reported on April 10th that he
had experienced “increased panic attacks” two weeks earlier. (Doc. 8, p.. 299)
Plaintiff reported to Dr. Quintero on April 24, 2013 that “his depression [wa]s increasing,”
that he had experienced an “increase in his suicidal visions” the day before that “were the worst”
he ever had experienced. (Doc. 8, p. 295) Plaintiff believed that the “stressor” was that he had
“nothing to do all day at work,” that he did “not feel useful,” and that he “literally walk[ed] around
all day . . . find[ing] ways to spend his time . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 295) Dr. Quintero made the specific
note that plaintiff’s “affect” was “incongruent” with his “mood,” i.e., that, although “he reported
being depressed, his affect appeared happy, he was smiling and joking.” (Doc. 8, p. 295) Dr.
Quintero also noted that plaintiff was looking forward to his future after the Army, another oftrepeated observation in her records. (Doc. 8, pp. 244, 293, 297, 300, 309, 314, 323, 329, 333, 348,
355, 541)
On May 15, 2013, plaintiff reported that he had experienced problems with anger “his whole
life,” but that he had “gotten much better” managing it over the years. (Doc. 8, p. 289) Dr. Quintero
reported that plaintiff was “compliant with meds and therapy,” and “ha[d] been stable for many
months . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 288) Dr. Quintero made specific note that, although plaintiff reported
anger issues, he did not report any problems with colleagues. (Doc. 8, p. 288)
On May 22, 2013, plaintiff represented that he wanted to work after the Army, but was afraid
his anxiety was so bad he will not be able to. (Doc. 8, p. 346) He stated that he thought of suicide
“because he ha[d] ‘done nothing worthwhile,’” that he had failed at everything he had done, and that
he considered suicide the “ultimate escape if things get too bad.” (Doc. 8, p. 346) The “ultimate
escape” theme also is repeated throughout Dr. Quintero’s records. (Doc. 8, pp. 322, 332, 346)

8

Plaintiff also reported that, since “he cannot do his job in the Army, he has a ‘pointless existence.’”
(Doc. 8, p. 346) Finally, plaintiff expressed anxiety and that, the further he was from home, the
more anxious he became. (Doc. 8, p. 346)
Dr. Quintero telephoned plaintiff on May 24, 2013 for a “safety check.” (Doc. 8, p. 345)
Plaintiff reported that he and his wife were “doing well.” (Doc. 8, p. 345) Dr. Quintero noted that,
although plaintiff had “a difficult time” the day before with SI, he had been “camping . . . with his
wife and kids,” his “Affect/Mood sounded better,” and he reported that “he was doing just fine.”
(Doc. 8, p. 345) On May 30, 2013, plaintiff reported to Dr. Quintero that he “continue[d] to have
thoughts of suicide.” (Doc. 8, p. 332)
Plaintiff presented to Dr. Quintero on June 5, 2013, accompanied by his wife. (Doc. 8, p.
328) Plaintiff’s wife “admitted that she was worried about him” a few weeks earlier when he was
having a panic attack, because she was at work and “could not do anything to help him.” (Doc. 8,
p. 328) On June 12, 2013, Plaintiff reported, “now that he is getting out of the Army, his no longer
useful to anyone and . . . maybe he should move up his ‘suicide age.’” (Doc. 8, p. 322) On June 25,
2013, plaintiff reported that “today is a good day” and that he felt “pretty good.” (Doc. 8, p. 313)
On July 9, 2013, plaintiff presented with depression and chronic thoughts of suicide. (Doc.
8, p. 308) On July 26, 2013, plaintiff reported to Dr. Quintero that he was “doing okay.” (Doc. 8,
p. 539) Plaintiff denied any suicide ideations that day. (Doc. 8, p. 539) Plaintiff also reported that
he and his wife were moving, that he was having to do “most of the cleaning of the old house and
setting up of the new house” which “frustrated him, but acknowledged that he understood his wife
could not help because of her work schedule. (Doc. 8, p. 539)
Plaintiff carried the diagnosis of moderate recurrent major depression throughout the time
Dr. Quintero treated him. (Doc. 8, pp. 243, 249, 252, 255, 292, 296, 299, 308, 314, 323, 328, 347,

9

540) Despite plaintiff’s reported bouts with SI, depression, and anxiety, Dr. Quintero consistently
assessed plaintiff’s suicide risk as “mild” to “moderate.” (Doc. 8, pp. 243, 292, 296, 300, 309, 314,
323, 329, 333, 346, 541) Although Dr. Quintero characterized plaintiff’s “mood” during this period
variously as “slightly depressed,” “euthymic,” “calm,” “anxious,” depressed,” “frustrated,” “happy,”
“dysphonic,” and “unhappy,” and his corresponding “affect” as “normal,” “broad,” “congruent,”
“incongruent,” “full ranging,” and “sad,” she consistently assessed plaintiff’s “attitude” as “[n]ot
abnormal,” and both his “thought process” and “thought content” as “not impaired.” (Doc. 8, pp.
242, 251-52, 291, 295, 313, 322, 332, 347, 539)
The MEB issued its report on April 29, 2013. (Doc. 8, pp. 371-76) The MEB’s general
assessment is quoted below:
[Staff Sergeant] Mattice’s depression results in decreased motivation
and decreased confidence. As such, his ability to lead is decreased.
His symptoms are exacerbated by high stress environments including
combat related activities. His symptoms of dizziness and syncope are
also heightened during times of physical exertion. He is taking
multiple medications which cause drowsiness, [and which] could
potentially impact his decision making abilities and limit his duty
day. Per the functions of his profile, his depression limits him from
having a weapon and he could not safely live in an austere
environment without worsening his condition.
(Doc. 8, p. 375) The MEB concluded that plaintiff was not “able to return to active duty soldiering,”
and that he would “continue to require counseling and medication for his symptoms of depression.”
(Doc. 8, p. 375) The findings of the MEB were approved on May 15, 2013. (Doc. 8, p. 373)
Plaintiff’s case was referred to the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES), a joint
Veterans Affairs/Department of Defense (VA/DOD) disability evaluation board. (Doc. 8, pp. 391,
507) Dr. Aileen McAlister, M.D., B.S., examined plaintiff on April 18, 2013 in response to the
MEB’s referral.

(Doc. 8, pp. 461-79)

Dr. McAlister determined that plaintiff’s

limitations/restrictions with respect to activities of daily living ranged from “none” to “slight” in
10

eight of the ten categories assessed, but “moderate” in the areas of “shopping” and “other
recreational activities. (Doc. 8, p. 472)
Dr. McAlister noted that plaintiff was currently employed full time in the Army, that he had
not reported lost time in the past previous months, and he “pull[s] staff duty with no difficulty.”
(Doc. 8, p. 475) Dr. McAlister also answered “No” to the question, “IS THERE TOTAL
OCCUPATIONAL AND SOCIAL IMPAIRMENT DUE TO MENTAL DISORDER SIGNS AND
SYMPTOMS,”but “Yes” to the question, “DO MENTAL DISORDER SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS
RESULT IN DEFICIENCIES IN . . . FAMILY RELATIONS . . . [and] . . . MOOD . . . ?” (Doc.
8, p. 478) Dr. McAlister concluded by noting:
This soldier . . . require[d] contin[u]ed med management and
consistent psychotherapy to function in the Army since 2009. He
would need similar structure and continued psychotherapy and med
management to function outside the military setting. Without such
structure and support in place for at least 12 months following
discharge from the Army, there is a greater than 50% probability that
he would have reduced reliability and productivity in any
occupational environment.
(Doc. 8, p. 479)10 The ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. McAlister’s opinion. (Doc. 8, p. 18)
Dr. Rebecca Joslin, Ed.D., a non-examining State Agency psychological consultant,
completed a Medically Determinable Impairments and Severity (MDI) assessment on July 1, 2013.
(Doc. 8, pp. 49-50) Dr. Joslin reported in the MDI that, in the context of the paragraph B criteria,
plaintiff had “moderate” restrictions in activities of daily living, “moderate” difficulties in
maintaining social functioning, “moderate” difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,

10

The VA reported its estimate of plaintiff’s VA benefits on June 15, 2013. (Doc. 8, pp. 555-72) The VA
proposed fifty percent disability for plaintiff’s “Major Depressive Disorder.” (Doc. 8, p. 567) The Magistrate Judge
notes for the record that the Commissioner is not bound by the VA’s disability determination. See LiRiccia v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 549 Fed.Appx. 377 at * 9, 2013 WL 6570777 (6th Cir. 2013)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504; Stewart v.
Heckler, 730 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir.1984)).

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or pace, and that there had been “[o]ne or [o]wo” episodes of decompensation of extended duration.
(Doc. 8, p. 49-50) Dr. Joslin also reported that the evidence did “not establish the presence of the
‘C’ criteria.” (Doc. 8, p. 50)
Dr. Joslin reported in the accompanying mental residual functional capacity (RFC)
assessment that plaintiff had limitations/restrictions in his ability to sustain concentration and
persistence, i.e., moderate limitations/restrictions in his ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods, in his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and in his ability to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Doc. 8, p. 52) Dr.
Joslin also noted, however, that plaintiff was “able to maintain attention, concentration, persistence
and pace with approp[riate] breaks despite periods of increased signs and s[ymptom]s.” (Doc. 8,
p. 52)(emphasis added)
Dr. Joslin also determined that plaintiff had social interaction limitations/restrictions, i.e.,
marked limitations in his ability to interact appropriately with the general public, and moderate
limitations in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors, as well as in his ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them
or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (Doc. 8, pp. 52-53) Dr. Joslin concluded that plaintiff “should
not interact directly with the general public, that feedback should be given in a “supportive manner,”
and that he was able to interact with coworkers an supervisors on an “occasional basis.” (Doc. 8,
p. 53)
Finally, Dr. Joslin determined that plaintiff had adaptation limitations/restrictions, i.e., that
he had moderate limitations in his ability to respond to changes in the work setting. (Doc. 8, p. 53)
Dr. Joslin noted, however, that plaintiff was “able to adapt to infrequent changes in the workplace.”

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(Doc. 8, p. 53)
Dr. C. Warren Thompson, Ph.D., affirmed Dr. Joslin’s assessment on July 23, 2013. (Doc.
8, pp. 62-67) The ALJ “accept[ed] the opinions of Dr. Joslin and Dr. Thompson.” (Doc. 8, p. 18)
B. Transcript of the Hearing
Plaintiff testified upon questioning by counsel that he had been an infantryman in Iraq, after
which he began to develop “depressive-type issues” in 2009. (Doc. 8, p. 29) He was assigned to
support the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) in Germany after he tried to commit suicide,11 but was
“unable to function” in that assignment due to severe depression. (Doc. 8, p. 30) Plaintiff also
testified that since being assigned to Ft. Campbell, he goes to the base in the morning, goes home,
and “do[es]n’t do anything.” (Doc. 8, p. 30)
Plaintiff testified that he transferred to Ft. Campbell in 2008 at his request to be closer to his
son. (Doc. 8, p. 31) After returning to “doing combat-related stuff,” plaintiff became so “stressed
out” that the decision was made to assign him to the WTU. (Doc. 8, pp. 31-32)
Plaintiff testified that, although there “are times when he do[es] well . . . he consistently . .
. [has] . . . daily . . . suicidal idea[]tions. . . . [but] . . . [s]ome days are better than others.” (Doc. 8,
p. 32) He admitted having denied SI to counselors in the past, because he “wanted to stay in the
Army. . . .” (Doc. 8, pp. 32-33)
Plaintiff testified that he liked the structure offered by the Army, and he did not know what
he would do if he had to get out because he was unable to “deal with the people.” (Doc. 8, p. 33)
Plaintiff clarified that, although he no longer felt like he belonged, “the structure” of the Army made
“everything just a little bit better . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 33)

11

Plaintiff testified that he was “committed to a hospital in Germany for two weeks” after his suicide attempt.
There is no documented medical evidence in the record that plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks.

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Plaintiff testified that he was in “better moods” some days than others. (Doc. 8, p. 33)
Plaintiff testified further that, even on good days, having to “look people in the eye [wa]s really
hard,” but on bad days he had to leave work, because he would be “crying,” “shaking,” “twitching.”
(Doc. 8, pp. 33-34) When counsel asked how many bad days he had, plaintiff replied: “That
depends . . . I could have a bad day for a straight week, where I’m just crying my eyes out all week,
or I could go a week where I’m fine . . . or I just think about killing myself . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 34)
Plaintiff testified upon questioning by the ALJ that he had been enrolled in a University of
Phoenix online program in 2009, but that he quit because he was “unable to concentrate” and make
“passing grades.” (Doc. 8, pp. 35-36) The ALJ asked plaintiff if he had any in-patient psychiatric
care since he was in the hospital in Germany in 2009. (Doc. 8, p. 38) Plaintiff answered, “No,”
adding: “I don’t have to go to work . . . [s]o instead of being . . . [an] . . . in-patient, I just stay at
home . . . with my wife.” (Doc. 8, p. 38)
At the conclusion of counsel’s brief redirect, the ALJ posed the following hypothetical to
the VE:
[C]onsider a hypothetical worker, who was 31 years old and
graduated from high school, who had the same work experience as
Mr. Mattice, who was able to work at all exertional levels, except that
the hypothetical worker was limited to simple, repetitive work, was
not able to maintain attention or concentration for more than two
hours without interruption. Could not interact with the public, and
could not have more than occasional interaction with supervisors or
co-workers. Would the hypothetical worker be able to perform the
claimant’s past work?
(Doc. 8, p. 40) The VE replied that “past work would be ruled out . . . .” (Doc. 8, p. 41) When
asked wether there was other work the hypothetical worker could do, the VE answered, “Yes,” and
identified “production helper,” “packer,” and “store laborer” as jobs that were available in the
economy in substantial numbers. (Doc. 8, p. 41) The VE further characterized these jobs as

14

“medium level of work exertion,” each with a SVP12 of 1. (Doc. 8, p. 41)
The ALJ then asked the VE, “Would the hypothetical individual be able to perform any of
the jobs you identified if instead of being able to have occasional interaction with supervisors and
co-workers, [he] was not able to respond appropriately to even minimal interaction with
supervisors?” (Doc. 8, p. 41) The VE replied that such a situation would be “unacceptable” because
it “would result in disciplinary measures, reprimands, probations, suspension, and eventually . . .
dismissal if . . . not remediated.” (Doc. 8, pp. 41-42)
C. The ALJ’s Notice of Decision
Under the Act, a claimant is entitled to disability benefits if he can show his “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1505, 416.905. Corresponding regulations outline the five-step sequential process described
below to determine whether an individual is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act.
First, the claimant must demonstrate that he has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the period of disability.
Second, the claimant must show that he suffers from a severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment.
Third, if the claimant shows that his impairment meets or medically
equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P.,
App. 1, then he is deemed disabled.
Fourth, the ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant’s RFC,
the claimant can perform his past relevant work, in which case the

12

SVP – Specific Vocational Preparation. SVP is “the amount of time required by a typical worker to learn
the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance of a job.” Kyle v.
Comm’s of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 851 n. 6 (6th Cir. 2010). Unskilled work corresponds to a SVP of 1-2. SSR 00-p,
2000 WL 1898704 * 3 (SSA). A SVP of “1” is the least demanding in terms of required vocational preparation.

15

claimant is not disabled.
Fifth, the ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant’s RFC, as
well as his age, education, and work experience, the claimant can
make an adjustment to other work, in which case the claimant is not
disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365,
374 (6th Cir. 2014). While the claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, the
burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five to identify a significant number of jobs in the
economy that accommodate the claimant’s RFC and vocational profile. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 652 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks omitted).
The SSA’s burden at the fifth step may be met by relying on the medical-vocational
guidelines, known in the practice as “the grids,” but only if the claimant is not significantly limited
by nonexertional impairment, and then only when “the characteristics of the claimant exactly match
the characteristics of one of the rules.” Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2003).
In cases where the grids do not direct a conclusion as to the claimant’s capacity, the SSA must come
forward with proof of the claimant’s individual vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs,
which is typically obtained through the testimony of a VE. See Wright, 321 F.3d at 616 (citing SSR
83-12, 1983 WL 31253 (SSA)). In determining the claimant’s RFC for purpose of the analysis at
steps four and five, the SSA is required to consider the combined effect of all the claimant’s
impairments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B); 20 C.F.R., 404.1523; 404.1545(a)(2); see Gentry
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 726 (6th Cir. 2014).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The district court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and
16

whether it was made pursuant to proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Gayheart, 710 F.3d
at 374 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance but more than a scintilla; it refers to relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722 (internal citation omitted); see
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The Commissioner’s decision must stand if
substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached, even if the evidence also could support a
different conclusion. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 374 (internal citation omitted). In other words, “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833
(6th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, an ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations denotes
a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion may be justified based upon the record.
Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Claims of Error
1. Whether the ALJ Erred in Finding Only “Moderate” Restrictions
in Activities of Daily Living, Social Functioning, and
Maintaining Concentration, Persistence, and Pace
(Doc. 11, pp. 8-11 of 16)
Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ erred in not “‘tak[ing] into account structured settings,
ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis, the amount
of supervision, and the setting in which [Plaintiff] is able to function as required by 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a.” (Doc. 11, pp. 8-9 of 16) Plaintiff also argues that the evidence “strongly supports a
finding that greater-than-moderate limitations are present,” and that “the ALJ’s determination that
the criteria of 12.04B . . . were not met is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 11, pp. 9-11
of 16)
The regulation to which the first part of plaintiff’s argument pertains is quoted below in
17

relevant part:
Assessment of functional limitations is a complex and highly
individualized process that requires us to consider multiple issues
and all relevant evidence to obtain a longitudinal picture of your
overall degree of functional limitation. We will consider all relevant
and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of
your symptoms, and how your functioning may be affected by factors
including but not limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured
settings, medication, and other treatment. . . . . [W]e will consider
such factors as the quality and level of your overall functional
performance, any episodic limitations, the amount of supervision or
assistance you require, and the settings in which you are able to
function.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(C)(1)-(2)(bold and underline added).
As shown below, the ALJ considered the factors at issue in his analysis of the opinions of
Drs. McAlister and Joslin. More particularly, the record shows that the ALJ considered plaintiff’s:
1) need for “continued frequent psychotherapy and medication management, preferably with a
consistent treating source that he could establish a rapport with over time”; 2) need “for external
structure and control that . . . served him well in the Army”; 3) “very fragile stability . . . that would
be shattered with any high stress work environment”; 4) need to work in a “low to moderate stress
work environment with supportive, non-confrontational supervision”; 6) need to work with “a few
familiar co-workers”; 7) inability to “interact directly with the public”; 8) need for feedback “given
in a supportive manner”; 9) inability to interact with co-workers and supervisors except only “on
an occasional basis”; 10 ) need for “infrequent change” in the workplace; and 11) ability to
“maintain attention, concentration, persistence and pace with appropriate breaks despite periods of
increased signs and symptoms.” (Doc. 8, pp. 16, 18)
In giving Dr. McAlister’s opinion “great weight,” and “accept[ing]” Dr. Joslin’s opinion, the
ALJ necessarily gave “great weight” to/”accept[ed]” the considerations enumerated above at p. 18
in his RFC analysis. Because the ALJ did, in fact, consider the factors at issue as required under 20
18

C.F.R. § 404.1520a, the first part of plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
The second part of plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ erred in his determination that the
criteria of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.04B were not met. The paragraph B criteria
under ¶ 12.04 are met when “at least two of the following” are established:
1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or
2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or
3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace; or
4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration . . . .
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.04B.13
The ALJ found that plaintiff had “moderate” restrictions/difficulties in activities of daily
living, social functioning, concentration, persistence or pace, and that there was “no record of any
decompensation of extended duration.” (Doc. 8, p. 14) Based on these conclusions, the ALJ
determined the following:
Because the claimant’s mental impairment does not cause at least two
‘marked’ limitations or one ‘marked’ limitation and ‘repeated’
episodes of decompensation, each of an extended duration, the
‘paragraph B’ criteria are not satisfied.
(Doc. 8, p. 14)
As previously discussed above at pp. 11-12, both Drs. McAlister and Joslin reached the
conclusion that plaintiff had “moderate” limitations/restrictions in activities of daily living. Dr.
Joslin also assessed plaintiff with “moderate” limitations in maintaining social functioning, and Dr.
Thompson concurred. Dr. McAlister, in turn, answered “No” to the question was there “total . . .

13

Plaintiff does not address ¶ 12.04B.4 in his first claim of error.

19

social impairment due to mental disorder signs and symptoms?” Finally, Dr. McAlister concluded
that plaintiff’s disorder, signs, and symptoms would not result in work related deficiencies. For their
part, Dr. Joslin concluded, and Dr. Thompson concurred, that plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention
and concentration for extended periods was only moderately limited, and that he would be able to
do so with appropriate breaks despite any increased signs and symptoms.
The opinions of Drs. McAlister, Joslin, and Thompson constitute substantial evidence in
support of the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s limitations/restrictions in activities of daily living,
maintaining social functioning, as well as concentration, persistence, or pace were moderate at most.
Consequently, the second part of plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
2. Whether the ALJ Erred in Finding that Plaintiff’s Highly-Structured Living
Environment, Two Inpatient Mental Health Stays, Medication
Management, and Outpatient Therapy Did Not
Meet the Requirements of 12.04C.1-3
(Doc. 11, pp. 11-14 of 16)
Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ erred by not considering how the highly-structured living
arrangement as an active member of the U.S. Army allows [him] to function on some level but that
removal from that environment ‘would be predicted to cause the individual to decompensate.’”
(Doc. 11, pp. 12-13 of 16) Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ also erred by failing to consider the record
as a whole which supports a finding that [his] history of depression and possibly PTSD[14] ‘prevents
function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with an indiction of continued need for such
an arrangement.’” (Doc. 11, p. 13 of 16)
The provisions of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.04C to which this argument
pertains, are quoted below:

14

The record reveals that, PTSD appeared in the record repeatedly as a possible diagnosis. (Doc. 8, pp. 229,
288, 324, 330, 334, 351, 359) However, PTSD ultimately was ruled out as a diagnosis. (Doc. 8, pp. 228, 358, 466, 476)

20

C.

Medically documented history of a chronic affective disorder of at
least 2 years’ duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation
of ability to do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs
currently attenuated by medication or psychosocial support, and one
of the following:

1.

Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration; or

2.

A residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal
adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or
change in the environment would be predicted to cause the individual
to decompensate; or

3.

Current history of 1 or more years’ inability to function outside a
highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued
need for such an arrangement.

The ALJ wrote the following in his decision regarding the paragraph C criteria: “The
undersigned has also considered whether the ‘paragraph C’ criteria are satisfied. In this case, the
evidence fails to establish the presence of the ‘paragraph C’ criteria.” (Doc. 8, p. 14) Although the
decision is silent as to the ALJ’s reasoning, as previously noted at p. 12, Dr. Joslin also reported that
the “[e]vidence does not establish the presence of the ‘C’ criteria.” Although Dr. Joslin also does
not explain her opinion, as shown below, the ALJ’s determination is amply supported on other
grounds.
Turning first to the specific terms of ¶ 12.04C, it is apparent that plaintiff has a documented
history of a chronic affective disorder for at least two years, that the disorder caused him more than
minimal limitations in his ability to engage in basic work activities, and that medication and
psychosocial support have been required to attenuate those symptoms. Having satisfied the basic
requirement of ¶ 12.04C, the next question is whether plaintiff can satisfy one of the three additional
factors enumerated above at p. 21.
Turning first to ¶ 12.04C.1, the regulations provide the following with respect to the

21

terminology “episodes of decompensation” and “extended duration”:
Episodes of decompensation are exacerbations or temporary increases
in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive functioning,
as manifested by difficulties in performing activities of daily living,
maintaining social relationships, or maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace. Episodes of decompensation may be
demonstrated by an exacerbation in symptoms or signs that would
ordinarily require increased treatment or a less stressful situation (or
combination of the two). Episodes of decompensation may be
inferred from medical records showing significant alteration in
medication; or documentation of the need for a more structured
psychological support system (e.g., hospitalizations, placement in a
halfway house, or a highly structured and directing household) or
other relevant information in the record about the existence, severity,
and duration of the episode.
The term repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration . . . means three episodes within 1 year, or an average of
once every 4 months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks. . . .
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.00C.4 (emphasis added).
Although the ALJ did not specifically address the question of episodes of decompensation
in the context of the paragraph C criteria, as previously noted at p. 19, he did address such episodes
in the context of the paragraph B criteria. In that regard, the ALJ wrote that “[t]here is no record of
any episodes of decompensation of extended duration.” The record supports the ALJ’s finding –
there is no objective medical evidence in the record of any episodes of decompensation of extended
duration as defined above.15 The ALJ’s finding in the context of the paragraph B criteria applies
with equal force to the paragraph C criteria.
As noted above at p. 12, Dr. Joslin reported that the “[e]vidence does not establish the
presence of the ‘C’ criteria.” On the other hand, Dr. Joslin reported “[o]ne or [t]wo” repeated

15

The two hospitalizations in Germany referred to in the record do not satisfy the “extended duration”
requirement under 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.00.C.4. As previously noted at p. 13 n. 11. there is no
medical evidence of record to support plaintiff’s testimony that he was hospitalized for two weeks in Germany.

22

episodes of decompensation of extended duration. Dr. Joslin does not identify the episodes to which
she refers in her opinion. Nevertheless, taking Dr. Joslin’s opinion as true/correct for the sake of
argument, it is obvious that “[o]ne or [t]wo” episodes of decompensation cannot equal “three
episodes,” within 1 year or otherwise, nor do “[o]ne or [t]wo” episodes “average . . . once every 4
months” given the time frame involved in this case.16 In short, plaintiff cannot establish the
requirements of ¶ 12.04C.1 based on Dr. Joslin’s opinion that he experienced “[o]ne or [t]wo”
episodes of decompensation of extended duration.
Plaintiff argues at length that episodes of decompensation may be “inferred” from his
medical records. However, as noted above at p. 22, to infer episodes of decompensation from the
medical records requires that those records establish one of the following: 1) a “significant alteration
in medication”; 2) “documentation of the need for a more structured psychological support system”
such as a “hospital, halfway house, or a highly structured and directing household”; 3) or “other
relevant information . . . about the existence, severity, and duration of the episode.” Plaintiff does
not argue that there has been a “significant alteration in [his] medication,” nor is there anything in
the record that would support such a conclusion. Nor does plaintiff argue that there is “relevant
information in the record” about the existence of other episodes of decompensation. Therefore, the
only remaining way for the court to infer episodes of decompensation from the record is for there
to exist “documentation of the need for a more structured psychological support system” which, as
noted above at p. 22, the regulation characterizes as a hospital, a halfway house, or a “highly
structured and directing household.”
Plaintiff relies on the opinion of Dr. McAlister’s to support his argument that he requires a

16

Given that Dr. Joslin’s opinion fails to establish the total/average number of episodes required under ¶
12.04.C.1, it makes no difference whether the episodes at issue “each last[ed] for at least 2 weeks.” Again, as previously
noted at p. 13, n. 11, there is no medical evidence of record that plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks in Germany.

23

more “structured psychological support system.” As previously noted at p. 11, Dr. McAlister was
of the opinion that plaintiff “would need . . . . continued psychotherapy and med management to
function outside the military setting.” However, Dr. McAlister did not recommend that plaintiff be
hospitalized, placed in a halfway house, or that it was necessary that he live in a highly structured
and directing household.17 Neither is there anything in the record to support the conclusion that the
Army, or anyone else for that matter, was of that mind. Absent a documented need for a more
structured support system as defined above at p. 22, plaintiff fails to establish that ¶ 12.04C.1 applies
based on Dr. McAlister’s opinion.
Turning next to ¶ 12.04C.2, although plaintiff refers to this section in the heading of this
claim of error, he does not provide law and argument in support of any claim under this section.
Therefore, any claim of error under ¶ 12.04C.2 is waived.
Turning finally to ¶ 12.04C.3, the Sixth Circuit does not appear to have addressed the
question of what constitutes a “highly supportive living arrangement” in the context of ¶ 12.04C.3.
However, the Eighth Circuit has. In Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521 (8th Cir. 2013), the Eighth
Circuit held in the context of ¶ 12.04C.3 that “[t]he regulations define ‘highly supportive’ settings
to include hospitals, halfway houses, care facilities and personal home settings that greatly reduce
the mental demands placed on [the claimant].” Myers, 721 F.3d at 526 (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.00F). Paragraph 12.00F, to which Myers cites, reads in relevant part as
follows:
Effects of structured settings. Particularly in cases involving chronic
mental disorders, overt symptomatology may be controlled or
attenuated by psychosocial factors such placement in a hospital,

17

Dr. McAlister issued her report in connection the VA/DOD disability evaluation proceedings in plaintiff’s
case. Therefore, her reference to plaintiff’s future need for a structured environment likely was in connection with
plaintiff’s need/eligibility for VA benefits following his discharge from the Army.

24

halfway house, board and care facility, or other environment that
provides similar structure. Highly structured and supportive settings
may also be found in [the] home. Such settings may greatly reduce
the mental demands placed on you. With lowered mental demands,
overt symptoms and signs of the underlying mental disorder may be
minimized. . . . [I]dentical paragraph C criteria are included in 12.02,
12.03, and 12.04. . . .
Although the regulations do not state so specifically, a plain reading of ¶ 12.00F above – with its
internal reference to “structured settings” – supports the Eighth Circuit’s determination in Myers in
the context of ¶ 12.04C.3.
Assuming solely for the sake of argument that plaintiff’s two hospitalizations in Germany
satisfied the requirements under ¶ 12.04C.3, those two hospitalizations occurred years ago, and
totaled only four days – well short of the one-or-more year requirement under ¶ 12.04C.3. There
also is nothing in the record that shows that plaintiff lived thereafter in a halfway house, board and
care facility, highly structured and supportive home setting, or “other environment that provide[d]
similar structure.”
Contrary to plaintiff’s oft-repeated assertion that life in the Army itself constitutes a “highlystructured living arrangement,” the Army is not a hospital . . . it is not a halfway house . . . it is not
a board and care facility . . . and it is not a “highly structured and directing household.” Army life
also cannot be said to provide an “similar structure” to that provided by the foregoing. Indeed, the
record supports just the opposite conclusion. As previously noted above at p. 8, plaintiff told Dr.
Quintero “that he had ‘nothing to do all day at work,’ that he did ‘not feel useful,’ and that he
‘literally walk[ed] around all day . . . find[ing] ways to spend his time . . . .’” As previously noted
at p. 8, plaintiff specifically identified this situation as the “stressor” that gave rise to his increase
in suicidal ideations. As previously noted at p. 13, plaintiff, who was on active duty at the time of
the administrative hearing, testified that “he goes to the base in the morning, goes home, and

25

‘do[es]n’t do anything.’” In short, whatever structure Army life provided plaintiff, it was not
“similar” to that contemplated in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶ 12.00F. Consequently,
plaintiff fails to establish that ¶ 12.04C.4 applies.
As shown above, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the paragraph C criteria
do not apply in plaintiff’s case. Accordingly, plaintiff’s second claim of error is without merit.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion
for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 10) be DENIED and the Commissioner’s decision
AFFIRMED.
The parties have fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this R&R to serve and
file written objections to the findings and recommendation proposed herein. A party shall respond
to the objecting party’s objections to this R&R within fourteen (14) days after being served with a
copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this R&R
may constitute a waiver of further appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 111
(1986); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2014.

/s/ Joe B. Brown
Joe B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

26