Casteel v. Suncrest Health Care, Inc.

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 6/17/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DIANNA L. CASTEEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUNCREST HEALTH CARE, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
) NO. 3:14-00612
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
)

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623, and gender discrimination and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Pending before the
Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30). For the reasons stated herein,
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and the action is DISMISSED.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff worked for Defendant from December 2010 until January 10, 2013, most recently
as a patient care coordinator in Winchester, Tennessee. At some point in 2012, Defendant decided
to engage in a reduction in force (“RIF”) of its employees. On or before December 20, 2012,
Roxanna Pender, a regional manager for Defendant, selected Plaintiff to be included in the planned
RIF. The parties agree that Pender originally intended to offer Plaintiff two weeks’ severance pay,
approximately $1,800, and that Pender intended to notify Plaintiff of her inclusion in the RIF on
January 10, 2013.
Plaintiff alleges that, about a week before the dismissal, on January 2, 2013, she received a
written warning about disrupting the office and unnecessary rudeness. She had received a previous

warning on a different issue the prior December14. According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, she spoke
to Pender upon receiving January 2 warning and, in the course of those communications, informed
Pender that Plaintiff believed that a vice president of the company, Chris Jones, had been sending
inappropriate texts to another Winchester office employee, Chancy Wilson (Docket No. 1 ¶ 22).
When Plaintiff was indeed terminated on January 10, 2013, she was not granted severance as
originally planned. Plaintiff was fifty-eight years old at the time.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s actions surrounding Plaintiff’s termination and denial of
severance reflect both discrimination based on her age and retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaint about
the inappropriate text messages. Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s inclusion in the RIF had already
been decided before she made the complaints about the allegedly inappropriate messages, and that
Defendant denied Plaintiff severance because Plaintiff had told other employees details related to
the RIF that Defendant considered confidential. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination, cannot establish that Defendant’s proffered reasons for its
actions were pretextual, and cannot establish that any adverse action was taken against Plaintiff as
a result of her engagement in a protected activity.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Pennington v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). The party bringing the summary
judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and
identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material
facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this

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burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the nonmoving party’s claim
or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence, facts,
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W.
R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court does not, however, weigh the evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will be insufficient to survive summary
judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving
party. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595.
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Plaintiff concedes that her gender discrimination claim was included in the Complaint in
error. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted with regard to this claim.
AGE DISCRIMINATION
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge . . .
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A plaintiff
may establish a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under the ADEA based upon direct
or indirect, circumstantial evidence. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir.
2011). “Direct evidence of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires the
conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.”

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Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is proof that does not on its
face establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that
discrimination occurred.” Id. “Regardless of the type of evidence presented, the burden of
persuasion remains on ADEA plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of their
employer’s adverse action.’” Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 811 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 177 n.4 (2009)).
Where only indirect evidence of discrimination is available, the claims are analyzed using
the three-step framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and modified by Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Ercegovich v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1998); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer &
Ebling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1993). First, the employee must carry the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. If the employee meets this burden by
presenting facts that, if true, would prove each of the elements of the prima facie case, the second
step requires the employer to respond by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action at issue. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Third, assuming the
employer meets its burden, then the burden of production shifts back to the employee to rebut this
proffered reason by showing that it was pretext designed to mask discrimination. Id. at 804.
Plaintiff concedes that she presents no direct evidence of age discrimination and therefore
her claims are appropriately considered under the McDonnell Douglas framework. In the first stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing: “(1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an

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adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”
Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). When an employee is alleging that her inclusion in a reduction in
force was discriminatory, she must satisfy the fourth prong by presenting “additional direct,
circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled [her] out . . . for
discharge for impermissible reasons.” Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp., 749 F.3d 530,
536-37 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990)).
Insofar as Plaintiff challenges her inclusion in the RIF as discriminatory,1 she has not
adduced evidence sufficient to create a jury question with regard to whether she has satisfied the
fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. Plaintiff suggests that she was selected for inclusion in the RIF
instead of a younger employee, Cathy Blackburn, but has provided no evidentiary support other than
the fact that Blackburn was expected to assume some of Plaintiff’s duties after Plaintiff’s
termination. Plaintiff also relies on her comparison to office manager Beth Morris, who, Plaintiff
argues, was similarly situated to Plaintiff but was not included in the RIF. Merely showing that a
younger person in a different position was retained while Plaintiff was made subject to an RIF is not
sufficient to create an inference of discrimination. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465 (observing that
such a rule “would allow every person age 40-and-over to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination if he or she was discharged as part of a work force reduction”). Plaintiff’s only other

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Defendant suggests, based on citation to the discovery deposition of the Plaintiff, that
Plaintiff is challenging only the denial of severance as discriminatory (Docket No. 31 at 1), and
that any contention by Plaintiff to the contrary is an attempt to improperly raise new claims to
avoid summary judgment (Docket No. 40 at 1). Nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint, however,
limits her discrimination claim to the denial of severance and not her termination (Docket No. 1
¶¶ 25-26), and a statement at deposition would not, in and of itself, change which claims are
pending before the court.
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evidence from which an inference of discrimination could be drawn consists of her own deposition
testimony of rumors that Defendant was “getting rid of older employees.” Such hearsay, however,
is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
Because the parties agree that the denial of severance to Plaintiff was distinct from her
inclusion in the RIF, Plaintiff does not need to satisfy the demands of this Circuit’s RIF cases to
make her prima facie case regarding the severance. Even if one assumes that Plaintiff can make that
prima facie case, however, she has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to create a jury question with
regard to whether the Defendant’s proffered reason for the denial of severance was pretextual.
Plaintiff concedes that it was Pender who adjusted Plaintiff’s termination code to make Plaintiff
ineligible for severance, that Pender believed that information concerning the RIF was confidential,
and that Pender was “frustrated and upset because she believed [Plaintiff] had robbed her of the
opportunity to deliver this news in an appropriate and accurate manner” (Docket No. 39 ¶¶ 6, 9, 11).
Plaintiff takes issue with the denial of severance on the grounds that Plaintiff did not know that the
details she divulged were part of the larger RIF, that she was unaware that those details were
considered confidential, and that she was not the only employee involved in the dissemination of
the information. While these protestations may raise questions, in hindsight, about the fairness or
wisdom of the denial of severance, they do not undermine the contemporaneous legitimacy of
Defendant’s proffered reason. So long as an employer has an honest belief in its proffered
nondiscriminatory reason, an employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply
because it is ultimately shown to be flawed or incorrect. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d
714, 728 (6th Cir. 2008). Nor can Plaintiff establish pretext simply by raising questions about
Defendant’s business judgment. Hein v. All America Plywood Co., Inc., 232 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir.

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2000); Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1997). While an employee may
show pretext by demonstrating that the employer’s business decision “was so lacking in merit as to
call into question its genuineness,” Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Dister
v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988)), such is not the case here, particularly in
light of Plaintiff’s concession that Pender’s frustration with Plaintiff’s disclosures was genuine.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims must therefore
be granted.
RETALIATION
To make a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that (1) she
engaged in protected activity; (2) the exercise of protected rights was known to the Defendant; (3)
Defendant took an adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328,
336 (6th Cir. 2013). To establish a causal connection, Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence
from which one could draw an inference that Defendant would not have taken the adverse
employment action had she not engaged in activity protected under Title VII. Taylor, 703 F.3d at
339. Once a prima facie showing is made, the Defendant must articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for its action, after which the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to show that the proffered
reason was not its true reason but merely a pretext for retaliation. Harris v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 594 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff argues that her reporting of the inappropriate text messages to Pender constituted
a protected activity, and that her termination and denial of severance were made in retaliation for
her report. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, does not aver that Plaintiff informed Pender of the

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alleged inappropriate messages until January 2, 2013 (Docket No. 1 ¶ 22), and Plaintiff concedes
that the decision to include her in the RIF was made on or before December 20, 2012 (Docket No.
39 ¶ 3). Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony is at first internally contradictory with regard to the
timing of the relevant conversation with Pender, but Plaintiff ultimately echoes her Complaint and
places that conversation as occurring in response to the January 2, 2013 warning (Deposition of
Plaintiff at 85-88 & exhs. 12-14). Plaintiff’s initial confusion with regard to the chronology of
events on which she relies—without more to suggest that her allegedly protected action did or even
could have caused Defendant’s decision—is insufficient to create a question of fact as to whether
her report of the text messages was the cause of her inclusion in the RIF.
The timing of Plaintiff’s decision to raise concerns about the alleged texts does not, in
contrast, preclude the possibility that those concerns played a role in the decision to deny her the
planned severance. Plaintiff’s failure to rebut Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for
its decision, however, is fatal to her retaliation claim just as it is fatal to her discrimination claim.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims must therefore likewise
be granted.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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