Black v. Read et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 5/15/14. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOHN BLACK,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
ADAM READ, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:14-mc-00698

Judge Campbell

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, John Black, an inmate at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary in Henning,
Tennessee, brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action against Metropolitan Nashville police
department employees Adam Read, Michael Donaldson, Steven Jenkins, Chad Young, Scott
Cothran, Andrae Starling, and Buddy Rhett in their individual capacities only, purporting to assert
claims for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1). His complaint is before
the court for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The complaint alleges that, on April 17, 2013, while driving, the plaintiff was stopped by

Metropolitan Nashville police officers, taken from his vehicle by force, handcuffed, placed in a
police car, and taken to a different location where the plaintiff was strip-searched. Nine baggies of
cocaine and $91.00 in cash were recovered from the plaintiff’s person. The plaintiff subsequently
was charged with felony drug offenses and incarcerated at the Davidson County Jail. According to
the complaint, the police lacked probable cause to arrest, search, and incarcerate the plaintiff.

1

The complaint alleges that, as a result of the plaintiff’s arrest, a forfeiture warrant was issued
to seize the plaintiff’s personal property, and the property has been seized; in addition, the plaintiff’s
probation has been revoked.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff is now “awaiting

adjudication” of the drug charges against him. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 6-20). The complaint seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at pp. 2, 2023).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

2

the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS
The plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
The complaint names Metropolitan Nashville police department employees Adam Read,
Michael Donaldson, Steven Jenkins, Chad Young, Scott Cothran, Andrae Starling, and Buddy Rhett
as defendants as their individual capacities only. These persons, acting in their individual capacities,
are “persons” acting under color of state law who may be sued under § 1983. Generally, the
complaint alleges that the plaintiff was falsely arrested, improperly searched, and falsely imprisoned

3

by the police officers, and that the defendants knew or should have known that the plaintiff was not
guilty of the crimes charged.1
Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983 overlap, with false arrest being
a species of false imprisonment. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). A false arrest claim
requires a plaintiff to show that the underlying arrest lacked probable cause. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983,
plaintiff must prove that police lacked probable cause); Gumble v. Waterford Twp., 171 F. App’x
502, 507 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
existence of probable cause for an arrest totally precludes any section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest,
false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, regardless of whether the defendants had malicious
motives for arresting the plaintiff.”)); Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988)
(“[A]rrest without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if probable cause exists for
the arresting officer’s belief that a suspect has violated or is violating the law.”).
Generally, probable cause exists when the police have “reasonably trustworthy information
. . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). “Probable cause determinations
involve an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of

1

The complaint also alleges that the plaintiff’s due process rights have been violated. For purposes of this initial
screening, because the court finds that the complaint states colorable claims for false arrest/false imprisonment under
§ 1983, the court need not sort out at this time the plaintiff’s lengthy allegations regarding the affidavit supporting his
arrest warrant and the veracity and reliability of the confidential informant who assisted in the investigation of the
plaintiff. The court notes, however, that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims may be subject to
dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), depending on the status of the criminal charges against
the plaintiff. See Medley v. City of Detroit, 2008 WL 427930, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2008)(where prisoner claimed
that his due process rights were violated when he was convicted for possession of weapons which were not in his
possession, court dismissed the claim under Heck, finding that such a claim would imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s
conviction). Here, it appears that the state proceedings against the plaintiff have not concluded. (See Docket No. 1 ¶
34).

4

an arrest.” Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999). “In general, the
existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one
reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995). Sixth
Circuit precedent suggests that, in the context of a warrantless arrest, a police officer may be under
some duty to make a reasonable investigation in determining whether adequate probable cause exists
for an arrest. See Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 328 (6th Cir. 2000)(“An allegation by one
individual that items in another’s possession actually belong to her is not enough to create probable
cause that a crime has been committed.”).
Where an arrest is made pursuant to a grand jury indictment, “the finding of an indictment,
fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer.” Radvansky v. City of Olmsted
Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 307 n.13 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th
Cir. 2002)). However, “after-the-fact grand jury involvement cannot serve to validate a prior arrest.”
Id. (citing Garmon v. Lumpkin Cnty., 878 F.2d 1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A subsequent
indictment does not retroactively provide probable cause for an arrest that has already taken
place.”)).
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n illegal arrest, without more has never been viewed
as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.” United States v. Crews,
445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (citing cases). “The exclusionary principle of Wong Sun and Silverthorne
Lumber Co. delimits what proof the Government may offer against the accused at trial, closing the
courtroom door to evidence secured by official lawlessness. Respondent is not himself a
suppressible ‘fruit,’ and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the

5

opportunity to prove his guilty through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted by the police
misconduct.” Crews, 445 U.S. at 474. Thus, any claim by plaintiff for false arrest on the basis that
his arrest was conducted without probable cause would not be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), which precludes a plaintiff from bringing a civil claim which, if he is victorious,
would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction. Because, here, “the plaintiff's action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the
plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (internal footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court footnoted:
[A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search
may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's
still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent
source and inevitable discovery, see Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 539, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), and
especially harmless error, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
307-308, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), such a § 1983
action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the
plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory
damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the
search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable
injury, see Memphis Community School. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.
299, 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), which, we hold
today, does not encompass the “injury” of being convicted and
imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.
Under these principles, the court finds that the complaint, at least for purposes of the initial
screening, states colorable claims against the named defendants in their individual capacities for
false imprisonment/false arrest. The court cautions the plaintiff that this is a preliminary finding
only. The court finds merely that the complaint survives the initial screening required by Congress.
IV.

CONCLUSION
6

For these reasons, the court finds the plaintiff’s complaint states colorable claims for false
arrest/false imprisonment against the named defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those claims shall
be allowed to proceed.
An appropriate order shall follow.

___________________________________
Todd J. Campbell
United States District Judge

7