Winters v. Schoffeld

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 9/11/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CANTRELL LASHONE WINTERS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
DERRICK D. SCHOFFELD,
Respondent.

Case No. 3:14-cv-01383
Judge Campbell

MEMORANDUM
State prisoner Cantrell Lashone Winters has filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the
writ of habeas corpus. This matter is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket
Entry No. 11), to which Petitioner has responded (Docket Entry No. 13). For the reasons set forth
below, Respondent’s Motion will be granted.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
Petitioner has acknowledged that “the timeline articulated by the Respondent is as stated
accurate in all respects.” (Docket Entry No. 13, at 2.) Accordingly, the Court adopts that timeline
in full:
Following a trial, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the petitioner,
Cantrell Lashone Winters, of evading arrest and possession of 50 grams or more
of hydromorphone in a school zone with intent to sell or deliver. State v. Winters,
No. M2009-01164-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2011). He received a 34-year sentence. Id. at *5. The
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on March 24, 2011 but modified the
evading arrest conviction from a class D to a class E felony due to the insufficiency
of the evidence establishing a risk of death or injury to bystanders. Id. at *25. The
petitioner did not pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The
mandate issued on June 6, 2011.
The petitioner filed a state post-conviction petition on January 26, 2012. Winters v.
State, No. M2012-02380-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2013); (Notice of Filing, Add. 1 at 9.) The post-conviction court
denied the petition after a hearing and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed on September 11, 2013. Id. at *5, 10. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
denied discretionary review on January 15, 2014. Winters v. State, No.
M2012-02380-SC-R11-PC, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2014).

The petitioner, through retained counsel, filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas
corpus on June 27, 2014.
(Docket Entry No. 12, at 2.)
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations
period for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state-court convictions. Under this
provision, the limitations period runs from the latest of four enumerated events, only one of which
is relevant here: “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Another

subsection of the statute provides that the limitations period is tolled during the time that “a properly
filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner’s judgment became final – and his limitations period began to run pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) – on May 23, 2011, the date on which his 60-day window to seek review
from the Tennessee Supreme Court after the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ adverse
decision on March 24, 2011. 248 days ran from that date until Petitioner tolled the AEDPA
limitations period under § 2244(d)(2) by filing his state post-conviction petition on January 26, 2012.
Petitioner’s state post-conviction action concluded when the Tennessee Supreme Court denied
review on January 15, 2014. According to Respondent, the limitations period began running again
on that date and expired 117 days later, on May 12, 2014. (Docket Entry No. 12, at 3–4.) Thus,
according to Respondent, Petitioner’s petition filed in this Court more than a month later, on June

1

The statutory period may also begin to run on “the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,
if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action,” “the date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,” or “the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).
2

27, 2014, must be dismissed as untimely. (Id. at 4.)
Petitioner responds that Respondent’s position is “incorrect as a matter of law,” and argues
that his limitations period was tolled for an additional 90 days after the Tennessee Supreme Court
denied review of his post-conviction case – the time within which he could have petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari. In support of his position, Petitioner cites Bronaugh v.
Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 285 (6th Cir. 2000), and relies on this quote: “Under 2244(d)(1), the one-year
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the time for filing a writ of certiorari for direct review
by the United States Supreme Court has expired.” (Docket Entry No. 13, at 1–2) (emphasis added).
In his reliance on Bronaugh, Petitioner overlooks the fact that the language he quotes
relates only to § 2244(d)(1)(A), concerning when a criminal judgment becomes final for the purpose
of beginning the AEDPA limitations period. There is no question in this case about when
Petitioner’s judgment became final and his limitations period first began to run.

Petitioner also

overlooks the fact that one of the chief points of Bronaugh was that § 2244(d)(1)’s limitations period
commencement provision and § 2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision impose separate and distinct
analyses. See Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that filings related to
direct appeal implicate only § 2244(d)(1) and do not require the “properly filed” analysis implicated
by (d)(2)).
More importantly, Petitioner overlooks the United States Supreme Court decision that
forecloses his argument. In Lawrence v. Florida, the question before the court was whether a
petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari from the state court’s denial of relief in a post-conviction
action tolled AEDPA’s limitations period. Construing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the court found that
post-conviction actions only toll the limitations period as long as they are pending in state court:
Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is
tolled only while state courts review the application. As we stated in Carey v.
Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 S. Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted), a state postconviction application “remains pending” “until
the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s postconviction
3

procedures.” This Court is not a part of a “State’s post-conviction procedures.” State
review ends when the state courts have finally resolved an application for state
postconviction relief. After the State’s highest court has issued its mandate or
denied review, no other state avenues for relief remain open. And an application for
state postconviction review no longer exists. All that remains is a separate certiorari
petition pending before a federal court. The application for state postconviction
review is therefore not “pending” after the state court’s postconviction review is
complete, and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the
pendency of a petition for certiorari.
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument that § 2244(d)(2) should be construed to be coextensive with §
2244(d)(1)(A). Id. at 333–34.
The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that Lawrence overturned its own precedent on this
issue:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence overruled this court’s holding in Abela
v. Martin [348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir.2003)]. In Abela, this court held that the statute of
limitations was “tolled from the filing of an application for state post-conviction or
other collateral relief until the conclusion of the time for seeking Supreme Court
review of the state’s final judgment on that application independent of whether the
petitioner actually petitions the Supreme Court to review the case.” Abela, 348 F.3d
at 172–73. Lawrence overruled Abela, holding that the “filing of a petition for
certiorari before this Court does not toll the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2).
Lawrence, 127 S.Ct. at 1086. The Court found that the tolling provision contained
in § 2244(d)(2) applies only to state post-conviction or collateral remedies, and that
a petition for certiorari seeking review of a states denial of post-conviction relief is
a federal post-conviction remedy. Id. at 1083.
Sherwood v. Prelesnik, 579 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s argument,
the law is clear that the differences between § 2244(d)(1)(A) and (d)(2) are not “artificial
distinctions.” (See Docket Entry No. 13, at 2.)
Petitioner has stated that “If the 90-day period for application for the writ of certiorari is not
included in the calculus, the motion to dismiss is well-taken.” (Id.) The Court agrees. The law is
clear that the 90-day period for application for the writ of certiorari following denial of relief in a postconviction action is not included in the tolling period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and
Respondent’s motion to dismiss is therefore well-taken.

4

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the petition in this action is untimely and
is barred from review by the applicable statute of limitations. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
(Docket Entry No. 11) will be granted.
An appropriate Order shall enter.

TODD CAMPBELL
United States District Judge

5