Mansfield v. City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 9/30/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
TREY MANSFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MURFREESBORO,
TENNESSEE,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:14-cv-01396
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Trey Mansfield brings claims of retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3), and Title VII (“Title VII”) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §2000e et seq. Defendant City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on both claims, to which Plaintiff has responded, and Defendant has replied.
The Court will grant Defendant’s Motion and this case will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has served in the Murfreesboro Police Department (“MPD”) as a police officer
with the Uniformed Division since 1999. In 2009, Plaintiff began working as a K-9 handler. He
is one of the “longest serving K-9 handlers in the Department.” (Docket No. 40 at 2).  
In 2011, Plaintiff, and other Murfreesboro police officers, asserted “claims against the
City for back pay [over mealtime breaks] under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).”
(Docket No. 41 at 3). The MPD ended the proposed lawsuit by “implement[ing] policy changes
governing . . . non-exempt officer mealtimes” (Docket No. 40 at 4).

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On August 23, 2012, the Murfreesboro City Manager “received a complaint from
[Plaintiff] relating to statements” allegedly made by Major Hudgens (“Hudgens”) pertaining to
“work schedule changes that affected Officer Mansfield and other K-9 officers.” (Docket No. 40
at 6). The parties dispute whether Hudgens’s conduct was motivated by Plaintiff’s involvement
in the FLSA matter.
In 2013, the MPD created a sergeant position for the K-9 Unit.

Chief Chrisman

announced the position through a memorandum. MPD General Order No. 224 outlines MPD’s
policy to “select and promote the most qualified personnel through the use of a selection process
that is fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory” while also stating that [t]he Chief has . . .
discretion” in the selection process. (Docket No. 40 at 12). The hiring Promotion Board had
seven members. The parties agree that it ultimately did not include Hudgens “to avoid the
possibility of perceived bias against [Plaintiff and Officer Holobaugh]” (Docket No. 40 at 1415), both of whom filed complaints against Hudgens and applied for the Sergeant K-9 position.
Because of his technical expertise, however, Hudgens participated by submitting six interview
questions to Chief Chrisman, five of which were asked to applicants.
The Board interviewed the eight applicants who applied for the position and scored each
one. Four of these applicants, like Plaintiff, worked in the K-9 unit. Mark Wood (“Wood”) was
the highest scoring applicant and was ultimately selected for the position. Wood did not work in
the K-9 unit, but rather in the Patrol Services Section. He was the only applicant who held the
rank of Sergeant. Contrarily, Plaintiff was ranked by only one Board member as the highest
ranked officer in a tie with another applicant.

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Afterward, Chief Chrisman, Deputy Chief Bowen, and Assistant Chief Fields interviewed
the applicants in a second round. After narrowing down the selection to Holobaugh and Wood,
the three chiefs consulted Hudgens, along with two Captains.
In selecting Wood for the position, Defendant asserts that the chiefs sought an “effective
supervisor not merely a K-9 handler.” (Docket No. 40 at 18). Plaintiff claims that this reasoning
is pretext for retaliation against him for his participation in the FLSA matter and a January 2012
interview he gave in connection with Officer Amy Norville’s allegation against Hudgens that he
“discriminated against her because of her sex” (Docket No. 40 at 5). Plaintiff opposed Major
Hudgens’s conduct toward this officer and this was “known to the City, Major Hudgens, and
Chief Chrisman at the time of the promotion at issue.” (Docket No. 44 at 6).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where a
moving party without the burden of proof at trial seeks summary judgment, the movant “bears
the initial burden of showing that there is no material issue in dispute.” Lindsay v. Yates, 578
F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Once
a moving party has met its burden of production, ‘its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll.,
698 F.3d 275, 282 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “Reviewing the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court must ultimately determine whether the
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evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 282 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
A movant with the burden of proof, however, must present evidence “sufficient for the
court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.”
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The movant
“must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the
evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett v. Myers,
281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment in favor of the party
with the burden of persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different
interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
ANALYSIS
The claims brought by Plaintiff are subject to a similar analytical framework. Plaintiff can
attempt to prove his Title VII and FLSA claims “either by introducing direct evidence of
retaliation or by proffering circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of
retaliation.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g denied (Apr.
2, 2014) (citing Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2008));
Evans v. Prof'l Transp., Inc., 614 F. App'x 297, 300 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence involves the use of the burden shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Id. “The
direct evidence and the circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff need
only prove one or the other, not both.”

Flora Parkhurst, v. American Healthways Services,

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LLC., No. 3:15-00610, 2016 WL 4591630, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 2016) (citing Kline v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997)).1
A. Direct Evidence
Plaintiff asserts that Chief Chrisman’s statement that Plaintiff had “been openly, vocally
critical of the supervision, management, and administration of the K-9 unit and the police
department” (Docket No. 40 at 18) is direct evidence that Plaintiff did not receive his promotion
because, as Plaintiff asserts, he was interviewed in connection with the “sex discrimination”
complaint against Hudgens and because of his involvement in the FLSA matter. This Court
disagrees.
“[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful
[behavior] was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. Consistent with this

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 Recently, the Seventh Circuit admonished trial courts in that circuit to “stop separating ‘direct’ from
‘indirect’ evidence” because the “direct-and-indirect framework does nothing to simplify the analysis”
and actually “complicates matters by forcing parties to consider the same evidence in multiple ways.”
Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 2016 WL 4411434, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016). “Instead, all evidence
belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole,” which is “consistent with McDonnell Douglas
and its successors.” Id. at *5.
This Court agrees because “evidence is evidence,” id. at 4, and it has been repeatedly observed (and juries
are routinely charged) that the law makes no distinction between the two types of evidence. See 6th Cir.
Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction § 1.06 (2014); 3 O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions §101:42 (6th Ed. 2011); compare Stefanski v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 155 F. App’x 177, 182
(6th Cir. 2005) (“The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘circumstantial’ might puzzle philosophers, but it
does not seem to bother lawyers and judges.”) with Bartlik v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 100, 103 n.5
(6th Cir. 1996) (“The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in employment
discrimination cases is not self-evident.”). After all, the ultimate question in any discrimination case “is
simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race,
ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment
action,” and it makes little sense to ask “whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself
– or whether just the ‘direct’ evidence does so, or the ‘indirect’ evidence.” Ortiz, 2016 WL 441434, at *4.

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definition, direct evidence . . . does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences . . . .” Flora
Parkhurst, No. 3:15-00610, 2016 WL 4591630, at *3 (internal citations omitted).
It requires an inference that Chief Chrisman was referring specifically to Plaintiff’s
involvement in the Title VII and/or FLSA matters when he said Plaintiff was critical of the
department. This is not direct evidence.
B. Indirect Evidence
In the absence of direct evidence, Plaintiff may prove his Title VII and/or FLSA claim under
McDonnell Douglas. “Under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 730. “If [Plaintiff] succeeds in making out
the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation,

the burden of production shifts [to the

employer] to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination[].

If the

[employer] satisfies its burden of production, the burden shifts back to [Plaintiff] to show that the
reason was a pretext for retaliation. Although the burden of production shifts between the
parties, the [Plaintiff] bear[s] the burden of persuasion through the process.’” Evans v. Prof'l
Transp., Inc., 614 F. App'x at 300 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) his exercise of such protected activity
was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an action that was materially
adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and
the materially adverse action.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 730 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Similarly, “[t]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation [under the FLSA], an
employee must prove that (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity under the FLSA; (2) his
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or her exercise of this right was known by the employer; (3) thereafter, the employer took an
employment action adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482,
489 (6th Cir.2006) (internal citation omitted).
The only dispute between the parties with respect to the prima facie case is whether the
fourth factor, under both Title VII and the FLSA standard has been met. “In order to establish a
causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action, a plaintiff must produce
enough evidence of a retaliatory motive such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the
adverse action would not have occurred but for his engagement in protected activity.” Russell v.
Kloeckner Metals Corp., No. 3-13-0316, 2014 WL 1515527, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 18, 2014)
(citing Dye v. Office of the Racing Commission, 702 F.3d 286, 205 (6th Cir.2012)); see Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532-33 (2013).
Plaintiff alleges that decision-makers knew of his involvement in the Title VII and FLSA
matters. It is undisputed that there was tension between Hudgens and Plaintiff which resulted in
unpleasant encounters including one where Hudgens admits to saying, albeit in a “joking
manner”, “I think I’ll fuck with [Plaintiff] today.” (Docket No. 48-4 at 14-15). Plaintiff came
forward with complaints against Hudgens on August 23, 2012 alleging that these instances
occurred “over the previous year . . . .” (Docket No. 40 at 6). The parties agree that the new K-9
sergeant position was announced on August 16, 2013 and interviews began on October 14, 2013,
over a year after Plaintiff asserted his complaints against Hudgens. This is not a sufficient
showing of “temporal proximity.” See Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 550
(6th Cir.2008) (stating general rule that temporal proximity in retaliation involves short periods
of time, such as four to six months). Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that establishing a prima
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facie case is not an onerous burden, Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000),
and therefore will address the remaining factors of the burden shifting paradigm.
Plaintiff’s claims fail at the second and third stage of the McDonnell-Douglas framework.
Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff, specifically,
that the “chiefs were looking for an effective supervisor not merely a lead K-9 handler.” (Docket
No. 40 at 18). Wood was the only applicant with prior supervisory experience as a sergeant,
albeit from a different unit, and was the highest ranked overall. Although Plaintiff may believe
he was the more qualified candidate “[t]he law does not require employers to make perfect
decisions, nor forbid them from making decisions that others may disagree with.” See BurkeJohnson v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 211 F. App'x 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Because Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for not hiring Plaintiff,
the burden shifts back to Plaintiff show pretext. While Plaintiff claims Chief Chrisman’s reasons
are pretextual, he does not show that these reasons have (1) no basis in fact, (2) that they did not
actually motivate Chief Chrisman, or that (3) that “they were insufficient to motivate” Chief
Chrisman’s decision not to hire Plaintiff. Hedrick v Western Reserve Care Sys., 335 F.3d 444,
460 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff asserts that the chosen applicant was required to have been “a certified canine
handler” (Docket No. 40 at 9). As support for this notion he cites Chief Chrisman’s memo
which stated that the “selected applicant will supervise the K-9 unit in addition to being a patrol,
tracking, or canine handler . . . .” Id. However, the use of the word “or” clearly communicates
that being a “canine handler” was not a prerequisite. The form itself did not indicate experience
with the K-9 unit as a primary responsibility. The memo also stated that the “selected applicant
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will supervise the K-9 unit” (Docket No. 40 at 9) and required that “the selected applicant . . .
successfully complete K-9 training . . .” implying no prerequisite with K-9 experience. Id.
(alterations in original). Moreover, the requirements also specified that the selected applicant
would be required to supervise, and Wood had supervisory experience in the form of being a
shift supervisor. Plaintiff has forwarded nothing to suggest that he was treated any differently
than the other four K-9 officers who applied for the position, but were not accepted.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Hudgens, his supposed nemesis, was a decisionmaker who prevented him from receiving the position. True, Hudgens was consulted, but so too
were two Captains. Moreover, at the time those three were consulted, the decision had already
been made that the position would go to either Holobaugh or Wood. Even at the first stage,
Hudgens’s involvement was simply limited to providing interview questions.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and this
case will be dismissed. A separate Order shall follow.

____________________________________
KEVIN H. SHARP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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