Edwards v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM & ORDER: The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that, in accordance with the court's findings, the Clerk will pay the proceeds held by the court to the plaintiff. Entry of this Order shall constitute final judgment in this case. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/4/15. (xc: financial deputy) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) Modified Text on 5/4/2015 (dt).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
LAURA LEE WILLS EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Counter-Claim and Third Party
Interpleader Plaintiff,
v.
LAURA LEE WILLS EDWARDS, CAROLYN
IVORY, and MIRIAM BROWN,
Counter-Claim and Third Party
Interpleader Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14-cv-1820
Judge Trauger

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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pending before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 26) filed by the
plaintiff, Laura Lee Will Edwards. The remaining parties to the action,1 Third Party Interpleader
Defendants Carolyn Ivory and Miriam Brown, have not opposed the motion. For the reasons
discussed herein, the plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
I.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts

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Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (“MetLife”) was dismissed from the action on
January 23, 2015. (Docket No. 25.)
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In support of the pending motion, the plaintiff has filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts
(“PSUF”) in conformity with the federal and local rules (Docket No. 27). Pursuant to Local Rule
56.01, because the other parties have failed to respond to the PSUF, the court considers the
plaintiff’s asserted facts to be undisputed for purposes of her summary judgment motion.
II.

Relevant Facts
The plaintiff is the natural daughter of Harry Debernia Wills (“HW”). HW, who was

born on September 24, 1950, retired from the General Electric Company as the owner of a life
insurance policy that was administered by MetLife (the “Policy”). The Policy provides life
insurance coverage in the amount of $43,062. An initial form designating beneficiaries for the
Policy is dated January 21, 1995. It designates Evelyn Wills (“EW”), HW’s wife, as the primary
beneficiary (“Initial Beneficiary Form”). The Initial Beneficiary Form identifies the plaintiff,
Ivory, and Brown (who are also daughters of HW) as contingent beneficiaries.
On May 11, 2009, EW executed a Power of Attorney that designated HW as her agent.
On September 8, 2011, apparently while EW was still alive, HW executed a Change of
Beneficiary Form (“Change Form”). The Change Form designates the plaintiff as the primary
beneficiary of the Policy and identifies Rodney Moore, HW’s stepson, as the contingent
beneficiary. The Change Form requires two signatures for execution: (1) a signature from HW,
the insured; and (2) a signature from HW’s spouse. In both signature fields, HW signed his
name and wrote the letters “POA” after his signature. MetLife accepted the Change Form on
September 27, 2011.
At some point in time after the Change Form was executed, EW died, predeceasing HW.
HW died on March 8, 2014. The plaintiff submits as an undisputed fact that HW signed the
Change Form designating the plaintiff as his sole beneficiary voluntarily and intentionally. The

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plaintiff further submits that, when HW signed the Change Form, he was of sound mind. It is
further undisputed that HW was not declared incompetent at any time before his death.
III.

Procedural Background
On August 5, 2014, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Sumner

County, Tennessee, seeking a declaratory judgment. (Docket No. 1, Ex. 1.) Specifically, the
plaintiff requested that the court declare her the sole beneficiary of her father’s life insurance
policy. MetLife removed the case to this court on September 10, 2014. (Docket No. 1.)
On October 16, 2014, MetLife filed its Answer to the Complaint and a Third Party
Complaint for Interpleader against Brown and Ivory, HW’s other daughters. (Docket No. 7.)
MetLife also filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff related to its interpleader claim. In its
interpleader complaint, MetLife wrote that, because HW signed both the signature field for the
insured (himself) and for his spouse (EW) on the Change Form using the letters “POA,” MetLife
is unable to determine whether the form was signed by HW or someone other than HW.
According to the interpleader complaint, on April 22, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a
claim form to MetLife for HW’s life insurance benefits under the Policy. MetLife alleged that,
because of the confusion as to whether HW signed the Change Form personally, it contacted
Brown, Ivory, and the plaintiff on July 28, 2014, advising them that their claims for benefits
were adverse and suggesting that the parties reach a compromise among themselves. It appears
that an agreement among the parties was not reached and, in August 2014, Ivory and Brown filed
their respective claims to MetLife for benefits under the policies.
On December 2, 2014, Ivory and Brown filed an Answer to the Third Party Interpleader
Complaint. (Docket No. 15.) In their Answer, Ivory and Brown admitted all of the allegations

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of the Third Party Interpleader Complaint and requested that the court distribute the funds
equally among the parties. (Id.)
On December 11, 2014, MetLife filed a motion requesting that the court permit MetLife
to pay the disputed funds into the court and dismiss MetLife from the case with prejudice.
(Docket No. 20.) Following an initial case management conference, the court granted MetLife’s
motion and dismissed MetLife from the action on January 23, 2015. (Docket No. 25.)
The plaintiff filed the pending motion on February 12, 2015. (Docket No. 26.) Despite
requesting an extension of time to respond to the plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 30), Brown and
Ivory failed to respond to the motion or to otherwise request an additional extension from the
court.
ANALYSIS
I.

Unopposed Summary Judgment Standard
The court may not grant summary judgment simply on the basis that the adverse party

has failed to respond. The court must review the motion and determine whether the movant has
carried its burden to establish the absence of a genuine issue as to every material fact. Stough v.
Mayville Cmty. Schs., 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998). Rule 56 requires the court to grant a
motion for summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
At the summary judgment stage, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those
parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Moldowan
v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). However, if the moving party seeks
summary judgment on an issue for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving

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party may meet its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “When the moving party has carried
this burden, ‘its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The non-moving party also may not rest upon its mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party’s pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
At this stage, “‘the judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Moldowan, 578
F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). “In evaluating the evidence, the court must draw all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587). But “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving
party’s position will be insufficient,” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252), and the non-movant’s proof must be more than “merely colorable.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587).
II.

Analysis
The question before the court is simple: do the undisputed facts demonstrate that HW

signed the Change Form himself and, therefore, that the primary designation of Laura Edwards
as HW’s sole beneficiary under the Policy is valid and enforceable? Upon review of the
undisputed facts in the record, the court concludes that the answer is yes. The undisputed facts

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establish that HW, without undue influence and in a competent mental state, executed the
Change Form designating the plaintiff as his primary beneficiary. It is further undisputed that
the signature of HW is his own and that he did not execute a power of attorney identifying any
person as his agent prior to signing the Change Form. In short, based on the record, no question
of fact for trial exists with respect to whether the Change Form is valid and enforceable.
For these reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment
with respect to her declaratory judgment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that, in accordance with the court’s findings, the Clerk
will pay the proceeds held by the court to the plaintiff. Entry of this Order shall constitute final
judgment in this case.
It is so ORDERED.
Enter this 4th day of May 2015.
_______________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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