Washington v. The State of Tennessee Metropolitan Gov et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 10/8/14. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ANGELOS WASHINGTON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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STATE OF TENNESSEE, METROPOLITAN
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GOVERNMENT, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, )
DR. [N/F/N/] BURNS, and NURSE CINDY [N/L/N], )
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Defendants.
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No. 3:14-cv-01830
Judge Campbell
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Angelos Washington, a prisoner or pretrial detainee in the custody of the Davidson County
Sheriff’s Office, brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the medical providers
at the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office have been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical
needs. The plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.
Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, the Court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint filed in forma
pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or brought by a prisoner-plaintiff against government entities or officials,
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenging the conditions of confinement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon conducting
this review, the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those
statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U .S. at 570).
A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)). Pro se status, however, does not exempt a plaintiff from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Neither [the
Supreme] Court nor other courts . . . have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se
suits.”).
II.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Angelos Washington sues “The State of Tennessee Metropolitan Gov.” which the Court
construes to mean both the State of Tennessee and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County (“Metro Nashville”). He also names as defendants Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”), the
entity in contract with Metro Nashville to provide medical services to inmates of the Davidson County
Sheriff’s Department Criminal Justice Center (“CJC”), and “Dr. Burns” and “Nurse Cindy,” who are employed
at the CJC.
The plaintiff alleges that he is a paraplegic as a result of a gunshot wound in 2001. He uses an “in
and out self cath. to empty his bladder.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1, at 5.) According to the plaintiff, the catheters
he uses to empty his bladder are disposable and intended to be used only one time in order to avoid the high
risk of kidney infections. The plaintiff states that he has only one functioning kidney. Consequently, a kidney
infection in his case could be life-threatening, and his medical providers strictly instructed him to use the
catheters once only.
The plaintiff was taken into custody on July 3, 2014. On July 5, 2014, he put in a sick-call because
he noticed symptoms of a bladder infection. He was not actually seen by Dr. Burns until July 10, five days
later. Dr. Burns put the plaintiff on antibiotics but denied his request to be provided more than one catheter
per day, and also denied the plaintiff’s request for gloves and disinfectant wipes to help him avoid infection,
on the basis of cost.
In August, the plaintiff was in pain and either still suffering from the same bladder infection or had
incurred a new infection. He spoke to Nurse Cindy, explaining that the problem was not being able to change
catheters frequently enough. Nurse Cindy, like Dr. Burns, denied the plaintiff’s request for additional one-use
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catheters and instead told the plaintiff to wash out the catheter. Nurse Cindy also told him his request was
denied because of the cost.
The plaintiff insists that Dr. Burns’ and Nurse Cindy’s refusal of his requests for additional catheters,
in light of his recurring bladder infections and clear risk of kidney infections, amounts to deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Based on the reference to cost, the Court also construes the
complaint as asserting that the denial of the plaintiff’s request for additional medical supplies based on cost
resulted from a policy of either CCS or of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office and Metro Nashville.
III.
Discussion
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed
favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2)
caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
The plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violations are based on the alleged failure by jail medical
personnel to provide adequate medical care. The Eighth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The plaintiff
here appears to be a pretrial detainee rather than a convicted prisoner. A pretrial detainee’s rights are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth, but the standard is basically the same. See
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Although the Eighth Amendment’s protections
apply specifically to post-conviction inmates, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
operates to guarantee those same protections to pretrial detainees as well.”).
In its application by the courts, the Eighth Amendment has been specifically construed to prohibit
the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality
opinion), and conduct repugnant to “evolving standards of decency,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion). The amendment imposes affirmative duties on prison officials to “assume some
responsibility for [each prisoner’s] safety and general well-being,” and to “provide for his basic human
needs,” including medical care. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
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(1989). “Contemporary standards of decency require no less.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976)).
In Estelle, the Supreme Court concluded that, although accidental or inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care to a prisoner would not violate the Eighth Amendment, “deliberate indifference to the
serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment, because it constitutes the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain” contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Under this analysis, what constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” will vary depending on the
nature of the alleged constitutional violation, but the Supreme Court has clarified that the question of whether
a prisoner's claim based on prison officials’ failure to provide adequate medical care involves both a
subjective and an objective component.
The objective prong asks whether the harm inflicted by the conduct is sufficiently “serious” to warrant
Eighth Amendment protection. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has defined
a “serious medical need” as “either one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere
negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under Farmer, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To establish the subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied
reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the
inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas,
537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). A defendant’s state of mind is sufficiently culpable to satisfy the subjective
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component of an Eighth Amendment claim when it amounts to a reckless disregard of a substantial risk of
serious harm; behavior that is merely negligent will not suffice. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36. Thus, when a
prisoner has received some medical attention but disputes the adequacy of that treatment, the federal courts
are generally reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments of prison officials and thus to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law. Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5. Notwithstanding, the
Sixth Circuit has also recognized that “in some cases the medical attention rendered may be so woefully
inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he has recurrent, painful, and potentially life-threatening
bladder infections resulting from the refusal of the medical care providers at the CJC to provide a sterile
catheter each time he needs to empty his bladder, or even to provide antiseptic wipes or gloves or other
materials to help him clean and sterilize the catheters that he is required to reuse. Although the plaintiff has
received some medical care, the Court finds that the complaint, construed liberally, alleges facts that, if true,
may establish that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s objectively serious
medical needs in violation of the plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, depending
upon whether the plaintiff is a state prisoner or pretrial detainee.
Having found that the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a Constitutional right, the next question
is whether the deprivation was caused by “person[s] acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court finds as an initial matter that the plaintiff’s claims against the state of Tennessee must be
dismissed because the state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, and the state is immune from suit
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–45 (1979); see Lawson v. Shelby
Cnty., Tenn., 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he [Eleventh] Amendment prohibits suits against a ‘state’
in federal court whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief.”). The only exceptions to a state’s
immunity are (1) if the state has consented to suit or (2) if Congress has properly abrogated a state’s
immunity. S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). Neither of these exceptions
applies to § 1983 suits against the state of Tennessee. See Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th
Cir. 1986) (noting that Tennessee has not waived immunity to suits under § 1983); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25 (1991) (reaffirming that Congress did not abrogate states’ immunity when it passed § 1983).
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However, Nurse Cindy and Dr. Burns are clearly “person[s] acting under color of state law” who may
be liable under § 1983, because they are persons to whom the obligation to provide medical care to
individuals in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office has been delegated. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (holding that a private medical provider contracted to provide medical care to
prisoners is a state actor for purposes of § 1983).
Metro Nashville, a municipality, may be liable under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978). Likewise, CCS, as the entity responsible for providing medical care to detainees of the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, is also considered a “person” acting under color of state law for purposes
of liability under § 1983. West, 487 U.S. at 56; see also Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that CCA acted under color of state law because it performed the traditional state function
of operating a prison). However, neither Metro Nashville nor CCS can be liable solely on the basis that they
employ a tortfeasor, because “[r]espondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under § 1983.”
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, an entity defendant can be
held responsible for an alleged constitutional deprivation only if there is a direct causal link between the
alleged constitutional violation and a policy or custom of the entity. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see
also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Like a municipality, a government contractor
cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory. . . . [A] private contractor is liable for a policy or
custom of that private contractor. . . .”).
Generally, the plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself and show that
the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t,
8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). At this stage in the proceedings, the Court finds that the
plaintiff has alleged the existence of a policy emanating either from CCS or Metro Nashville pursuant to
which potentially necessary medical supplies deemed too expensive are not provided, giving rise in some
cases to the deliberate denial of necessary medical care to inmates. At this juncture, he Court will permit
the claims against CCS and Metro Nashville to proceed.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the claims against the state of Tennessee will be dismissed, but
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the plaintiff will be permitted, at this stage, to pursue his claims against the remaining defendants. An
appropriate order is filed herewith.
Todd Campbell
United States District Judge
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