Wells v. Schofield

Filing 42

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motion for restraining order and preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 4 ) be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 9/2/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOHN C. WELLS, III,

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Plaintiff
v.
DERRICK SCHOFIELD,
Defendant
TO:

No. 3:14-1913
Judge Campbell/Bryant
Jury Demand

THE HONORABLE TODD J. CAMPBELL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John C. Wells, III, a prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, has filed his motion for restraining
order and preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 4). In his
motion,

Wells

seeks

to

enjoin

Defendant

Derrick

Schofield,

Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC),
from: (1) allegedly abandoning the prior TDOC classification system
in favor of transfers calculated to impose uniform racial quotas
throughout all TDOC prisons; (2) continuing the Tier Management
System at Northeast Correction Complex (“NECX”) and other TDOC
prisons on grounds that this system allegedly inflicts cruel and
unusual punishment upon inmates, including Plaintiff, and subjects
inmates to “a clear and imminent threat of death by fire to inmates
confined within their cells;” (4) exceeding an inmate population of
137.5%

of

designed

capacity

in

TDOC

prisons;

(5)

illegally

destroying government records and filing false reports to the

Governor and the State Legislature; and (6) from taking any form of
retaliatory

action,

including

retaliatory

transfers,

against

Plaintiff. The Defendant has not responded in opposition.
ANALYSIS
A district court considering a motion for preliminary
injunction must balance four factors: (1) whether the movant has a
strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant
would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether
issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others;
and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of
the injunction. Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Family
Svcs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 382 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing City of
Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir.
2014)). The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden
of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable harm and
likelihood of success. McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir.
2012).
At the outset, it appears to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge that the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Wells seeks is
directed

to

administrative

decisions

of

officials

within

the

Tennessee Department of Correction, and that the actions that
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin tend to affect all inmates within the
state prison system generally as distinguished from Plaintiff Wells
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in particular. The general rule is that a pro se prisoner may not
bring a class action concerning conditions of confinement at a
prison. Dean v. Blanchard, 865 F.2d 257, 1988 WL 130851 (6th Cir.
1988) (unpublished) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405,
1407 (4th Cir. 1975)). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff Wells
in this case, and in this motion for preliminary injunction, seeks
to represent the interests of other inmates, he lacks the standing
to do so.
In addition, courts owe substantial deference to the
professional judgment of prison administrators. Beard v. Banks, 548
U.S. 521 (2006); Adkins v. Woleder, 692 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2012).
Therefore, in matters of prison operations, a federal court should
not, absent substantial evidence, substitute its judgment for that
of a prison administrator. Beasley v. Konteh, 433 F.Supp.2d 874
(N.D. Ohio 2006).
Transfers to Achieve Racial Quotas. As mentioned above,
Plaintiff Wells seeks an injunction prohibiting Defendant Schofield
from transferring prisoners in order to achieve a uniform racial
balance within TDOC’s prisons. However, the Supreme Court has held
that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be placed
in any particular prison. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1996).
Therefore, neither Plaintiff Wells nor any other inmate has a
constitutionally protected interest against being transferred by
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TDOC to another prison facility. Here, in fact, Plaintiff Wells has
not been transferred from NECX nor does he allege any plans to do
so. Instead, he generally argues by implication that transfers of
African-American inmates to NECX will result in increased violence
within

that

facility.

From

these

arguments,

the

undersigned

Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff Wells has not demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on the merits with this claim, nor has
he demonstrated a probability that he will suffer irreparable
injury if the Defendant is not enjoined from such alleged transfers
based upon racial considerations.
Objections to the Tier Management System. Plaintiff
alleges that the Tier Management System was implemented at NECX on
June 9, 2014. He asserts that the Defendant should be enjoined from
continuing to implement this system because it increases the number
of hours the Plaintiff is confined to his cell each day, which
Plaintiff alleges constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under
the

Eighth

Amendment.

Plaintiff

also

alleges

that

the

Tier

Management System, as implemented, has reduced NECX to a “fire
trap,” because Plaintiff believes that the locks to cell doors are
no longer connected to a central control and that if a fire were to
occur corrections officers would not be able to unlock each
individual cell quickly and evacuate the facility safely.

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Only those deprivations denying the minimum civilized
measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the
basis of a violation of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Maston v. Montgomery County Jail Medical Staff Personnel, 832
F.Supp.2d 846 (S.D. Ohio 2011). In addition, the Eighth Amendment
objective requirement that a prisoner not be incarcerated under
conditions posing substantial risk of serious harm must be based
upon more than a prisoner’s subjective fear. Browning v. Pennerton,
633 F.Supp.2nd 415 (E.D. KY 2009).
In

light

of

the

deference

granted

to

prison

administrators to operate prisons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
finds that Plaintiff Wells cannot demonstrate a strong likelihood
of success on the merits with respect to his objections to the Tier
Management System that has been implemented at NECX. Plaintiff
concedes that under the current management system he is allowed out
of his cell for at least five hours each day (Docket Entry No. 4 at
4). The undersigned finds that this fails to establish a strong
likelihood that Plaintiff can prevail on the merits of an Eighth
Amendment claim based on hours of confinement. Similarly, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s subjective fear
of injury or death if a fire were to occur is insufficient to
demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits or a

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showing of irreparable injury to Plaintiff Wells if the requested
preliminary injunction is not granted.
Alleged Overpopulation. Plaintiff Wells alleges that the
prisons operated by TDOC are currently housing significantly more
prisoners

than

these

facilities

were

originally

designed

to

accommodate. Plaintiff asserts that such overcrowding causes an
increase of violence within prisons, resulting in “immediate and
irreparable loss, damage, and injury to the plaintiff and all other
similarly situated inmates” (Docket Entry No. 4 at 9). Plaintiff
seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendant Schofield from
operating any Tennessee prison at a population level exceeding
137.5% of design capacity, relying upon the authority of Brown v.
Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s implied arguments, the Supreme
Court did not establish any particular percentage of overpopulation
as a permissible limit under the Eighth Amendment. Rather, as the
Plata opinion reveals, the percentage of design capacity approved
in

this

decision

specific

factors

was

based

that

upon

existed

expert

testimony

concerning

within

certain

California

correctional facilities housing plaintiff Plata.
The Supreme Court has held that prison overcrowding, by
itself, does not constitute a constitutional violation, and that

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the Constitution does not mandate prisons where inmates are totally
free of discomfort. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
Here, Plaintiff Wells argues that failure to enjoin
Defendant from continuing current housing arrangements at NECX
“will result in immediate and irreparable loss, damage, and injury
to the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated inmates” (Docket
Entry No. 4 at 9). Despite this claim, Plaintiff Wells suggests no
particular threat directed at him as distinguished from any other
inmate

confined

in

the

facility.

Therefore,

the

undersigned

Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s claim of immediate and
irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not issued is
capricious. Moreover, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has
failed to show a strong likelihood of his success on the merits of
this claim.
Destruction of Records. Plaintiff seeks a preliminary
injunction to prohibit Defendant Schofield and his agents from
destroying records of violent incidents within the prison system in
furtherance of an alleged attempt to minimize and understate the
level of violence in TDOC prisons. As in other claims, Plaintiff
alleges that failure to issue a preliminary injunction will result
in immediate and irreparable loss to the Plaintiff “and all other
similarly situated inmates.” In the absence of any allegation of
immediate, specific threat to Plaintiff Wells, the undersigned
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finds that Plaintiff fails to make a showing of irreparable injury
if a preliminary injunction is not issued.
Retaliatory Action. Plaintiff Wells finally seeks a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendant Schofield and his
agents from taking any retaliatory action against Plaintiff for
raising claims in this lawsuit. Plaintiff fails to allege that any
such retaliatory action has been taken or threatened against him.
In the absence of such immediate threat, the undersigned finds that
Plaintiff Wells has failed to demonstrate that he would suffer any
irreparable injuries in the absence of issuance of the preliminary
injunction he seeks.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that Plaintiff’s motion for restraining order and
preliminary injunction lacks merit and should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends
that Plaintiff’s motion for restraining order and preliminary
injunction (Docket Entry No. 4) be denied.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any

party

has

14

days

from

receipt

of

this

Report

and

Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
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in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTER this 2nd day of September, 2015.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

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