Harris v. Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/29/14. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
VAUGHN HARRIS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
METRO-DAVIDSON COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:14-cv-01953
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, an inmate at the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in Nashville, Tennessee,
brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Metro-Davidson County Detention
Facility (MDCDF), Corrections Corporation of America, and 27 individuals (25 named, and 2
unnamed John or Jane Does), alleging a host of civil rights violations at MDCDF. (Docket No. 1).
The complaint seeks damages, entry of a declaratory judgment, issuance of an injunction, and
expungement of the plaintiff’s institutional disciplinary record. (Id. at pp. 5I-5J).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
I.

PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
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dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
II.

PLRA Screening
The plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

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United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Here, the plaintiff’s lengthy complaint sets forth a number of alleged violations of his
constitutional and civil rights. The complaint alleges that, while incarcerated at the MDCDF, the
plaintiff has been denied access to a law library five days a week, has been the victim of excessive
force and retaliatory actions at the hands of correctional officers on multiple occasions, has been
segregated from the general population unjustly, and has been denied his due process rights, along
with a host of other claims. (Docket No. 1).
A.

Claims against MDCDF

First, the plaintiff’s complaint names as a defendant the Metro-Davidson County Detention
Facility. However, MDCDF, like any other jail or workhouse, is not a “person” that can be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3 (E.D.
Tenn. July 27, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley County Justice Center on the
same basis); Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn.
May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable entity within the meaning of §
1983.”). Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
MDCDF.

B.

Official capacity claims for monetary damages

The plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their
official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

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491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989). Thus, those claims must be dismissed.
C.

Access to the courts claims

The law is well settled that a prisoner has a First Amendment right of access to the courts.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-823 (1977). The right of access to the courts requires prison
officials to ensure that inmates have access to the courts that is “adequate, effective and
meaningful.” Id. at 822. To ensure the meaningful exercise of this right, prison officials are under
an affirmative obligation to provide inmates with access to an adequate law library, Walker v.
Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 931 (6th Cir. 1985), or some alternative form of legal assistance, Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974)(overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401 (1989)). Meaningful access varies with the circumstances, and prison officials are
accorded discretion in determining how that right is to be administered. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31.
However, it is not enough for plaintiff simply to claim that he was denied access to the courts, or
that he did not have access to an adequate law library or to some alternate form of legal assistance.
To state a claim on which relief may be granted, plaintiff must show that a defendant’s conduct in
some way prejudiced the filing or prosecution of a legal matter. Walker, 771 F.2d at 932; Kensu v.
Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996).
Here, the plaintiff alleges that “G-unit inmates” such as the plaintiff are only permitted to
access legal materials “two days a week for 30 minutes” and that such limitations violate the
inmates’ constitutional and civil rights. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 14). However, the plaintiff has not alleged
that any action by defendant Mangrum, the educational director, or defendant Yates, the law
librarian, prejudiced either the plaintiff’s filing or prosecution of a legal matter. Thus, the plaintiff
has not stated an actionable claim under the First Amendment for the denial of access to the courts.

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The plaintiff’s denial of access to courts claims will be dismissed.
D.

Failure to respond to grievances

The plaintiff’s claims against several defendants are premised on the defendant’s response,
or lack of response, to the plaintiff’s grievances and/or complaints. (See Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 16, 22,
23, 28). Although the plaintiff may feel that his grievances were not taken seriously or handled
properly, a plaintiff cannot premise a § 1983 claim on allegations that the an institution’s grievance
procedure was inadequate and/or unresponsive because there is no inherent constitutional right to
an effective jail grievance procedure in the first place. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467
(1983)(overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)); Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Flick v.
Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991). Since a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to an
effective or responsive grievance procedure, the plaintiff’s claims based on any defendant’s failure
to respond to plaintiff’s grievances do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These
claims will be dismissed.
E.

Remaining claims and defendants

As to the plaintiff’s remaining claims and defendants, the court finds that the complaint
sufficiently states colorable due process claims, First Amendment (retaliation) claims, Fourth
Amendment (excessive force) claims, and Eighth Amendment (conditions of confinement;
inadequate medical health care) claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Although designation of “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants is not favored, it is
permissible when the defendants’ identities are not known at the time the complaint is filed, but may

The complaint also alleges state law tort claims.

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be determined through discovery. See Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 882-84 (6th Cir. 1986).
The court concludes that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the complaint against the “John Doe”
or “Jane Doe” defendants, the two unnamed CCA Board of Directors members, at this juncture
because of the likelihood that the identities of these defendants will be determined during discovery.
III.

Motion to Appoint Counsel
The plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel in his pro se federal civil rights case.

(Docket No. 3). He states that he needs an attorney since he is unable to afford counsel, the issues
involved in his case “are complex,” he has limited access to law books, and he has limited
knowledge of the law. (Id.)
The Supreme Court has held that “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only
where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Thus, unlike criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right
to an appointed counsel in a civil action, such as this action. Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751
(E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); see Williamson v. Autorama, Inc., No. 915759, 947 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1991)(citing Willett favorably). The appointment of counsel for a civil
litigant is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will occur only under exceptional
circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993).
The plaintiff’s circumstances as described are typical to most prisoners and do not suggest
anything exceptional in nature. Therefore, the motion for the appointment of counsel will be denied
at this time. Should the plaintiff’s circumstances change over the course of this litigation, he may
renew his request for appointment of counsel.
IV.

Motion to Amend

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The plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his complaint. (Docket No. 4). “The court should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Rose v. Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). A motion to amend should not be denied
unless there is evidence of undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the nom-movant, or futility.
Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 519 (6th Cir. 2001), see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962).
There is no evidence before the court suggesting any intent on the part of Mr. Harris to delay
or prejudice this action. The only amendments he seeks are to add a missing date in the complaint
and an additional request for production of documents that he attached to his complaint. (Docket
No. 4). Therefore, the court will grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend.
V.

Conclusion
As set forth above, the court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state claims upon

which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to the following claims and defendants: all
claims against MDCDF, claims for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their
official capacities, access to courts claims against all defendants, and failure to respond to grievances
against all defendants. These claims and defendants therefore will be dismissed.
However, with regard to the remaining defendants, the court finds that the complaint states
colorable due process claims, First Amendment (retaliation) claims, Fourth Amendment (excessive
force) claims, and Eighth Amendment (conditions of confinement; inadequate medical health care)
claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case will proceed as to these claims and defendants.
The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket No. 3) will be denied. However,
the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (Docket No. 4) will be granted.

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An appropriate order shall be entered.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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