Warter v. Volunteer Taxi Inc.

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 3/30/2016. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

BETTY WARTER
v.
VOLUNTEER TAXI INC.,
et al.

)
)
) NO. 3-14-1981
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
)

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant Abebe’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 43). For the
reasons stated herein, Defendant Abebe’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Abebe are DISMISSED.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id.
Matters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a motion to
dismiss unless they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and central to her claim or are public
documents of which the court may take judicial notice. See, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Corporex
Realty & Inv., LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 689, 697-98 (E.D. Ky. 2012); In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 769 F.3d 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2014). The Court cannot consider matters outside the
pleadings without converting the Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d).

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims arise from an incident involving her son on October 20, 2013, when he and
others rode in a taxi cab owned by Defendant Volunteer Taxi, Inc. and driven by Defendant Abebe.
Defendant Abebe asserts that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred by the applicable one-year
statute of limitations for wrongful death and negligence actions. The parties disagree as to when
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Abebe accrued.
Defendant Abebe argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him accrued on October 20, 2013.
Plaintiff’s claims against Abebe were not filed until the March 25, 2015 Amended Complaint, well
past the one-year time period. Plaintiff claims, however, that she did not discover the identity of
Defendant Abebe until March 17, 2015, when Defendant Volunteer Taxi disclosed the name of its
driver.1
Although the applicable statute of limitations in this diversity action is governed by state
law, the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run is determined by federal law. Ruff
v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). Under federal law, the statute begins to run when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of her claims. Id. A plaintiff
has reason to know of her injury when she should have discovered it through the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Id. at 501; see also Cockrill v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville/Davidson
County, 2015 WL 136271 at * 3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2015). Thus, it is when Plaintiff knew of the
injury that matters, not when she knew the identity of the taxi cab driver and alleged tortfeasor.

1

The Court recognizes that this is not a case where the other Defendant alleged
comparative fault of Defendant Abebe, thereby triggering Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, which
provides that when a defendant alleges in an answer that a person not a party to the suit caused
or contributed to the injury, the plaintiff may, within ninety days, amend the complaint to add the
person as a defendant.
2

This Court has held that absent fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, which are not
alleged here, the statute of limitations begins to run on a tort claim when the plaintiff discovers his
injuries, not when he correctly identifies the allegedly offending party. Willis v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 819 F.Supp.2d 700, 704 (M.D. Tenn. 2011). Similarly, this Court held, in a class action alleging
“cramming” practices (unauthorized charges on consumer billing statements), that the statute of
limitations began to run on the date the injury occurred, not on the date the party causing the injury
was identified. Wike v. Vertrue, Inc., 2008 WL 2704429 at * 5 (M.D. Tenn. July 3, 2008).
In Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff
was put on notice at the time of his fall that he was injured as a result of allegedly wrongful or
tortious conduct, although he may not have known of the specific tortfeasors. In Schultz, the court
held that the plaintiff could have determined the owner of the property on which he was injured, and
his claims against the owner were time-barred. Schultz, 495 F.3d at 293.
In Haynes v. Locks, 711 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), a products liability case, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the “Discovery Rule”2 should apply to determining the identity
of the manufacturer of a product. Id. at 903 (while plaintiff was attempting to identify the correct
defendants in this cause, the statute of limitations was not tolled).
In a more recent case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations
is not tolled while a plaintiff attempts to identify the correct defendants. Dowdy v. Prison Health

2

Under the “Discovery Rule,” applicable in tort actions, the cause of action accrues
and the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury occurs or is discovered, or when in
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, the injury should have been discovered. Wagner v.
Int’l Automotive Components Group North America, Inc., 2015 WL 5512899 at * 5 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 16, 2015) (citing Schultz at 292).
3

Servs., 2001 WL 1355623 at ** 2 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2001) (citing Haynes). Dowdy was a civil rights
action.
This Court stated in Wagner v. Int’l Automotive Components Group North America, Inc.,
2015 WL 5512899 at * 5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015), that the Discovery Rule only serves to change
a statute of limitations where there is a delay in the discovery of the actual injury. In Wagner, the
plaintiff contended that the accrual of the cause of action under the Discovery Rule hinges on the
identification of the tortfeasor as well as the date the plaintiff became aware of the injury. The
Court, rejecting that argument, stated: “this is a vastly expansive reading of the discovery rule that
is not supported by the case law.” Wagner at * 5.
The Sixth Circuit stated, in IFC Nonwovens, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 1993
WL 272445 at * 2 (6th Cir. July 19, 1993), that the statute of limitations is tolled only during the
period when the plaintiff has no knowledge at all that a wrong has occurred. Id. Citing Haynes, the
court held that while the plaintiff was attempting to identify the correct defendants, the statute of
limitations was not tolled. Id.
Although there are cases to the contrary,3 the Court will follow its prior ruling and the
reasoning of the above cases. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Abebe are time-barred. Plaintiff’s
arguments concerning her inability to discover the name of the taxi cab driver, even if the Court
could consider them on a Motion to Dismiss, are not persuasive, since it is the discovery of her
injury which is relevant, not the discovery of the tortfeasors.

3

See, e.g., Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1982) (source of plaintiff’s
injury not apparent at the time of injury); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of
Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012) (alleged fraudulent concealment).
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For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 43) is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Abebe are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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