Seren Motus, LLC et al v. Club La Maison, Inc., et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 4/10/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
SEREN MOTUS, LLC
v.
CLUB LA MAISON, INC., et al.
)
)
) NO. 3-14-2011
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23), filed by Defendant
Carolyn McGinley. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and all
claims against Defendant McGinley are DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction.
FACTS
This action, as it applies to Defendant McGinley, arises from a Certification Agreement in
which McGinley purchased from Plaintiff three days of training to become certified as a
“BarreAmped” fitness instructor. Plaintiff claims intellectual property rights to this method of
teaching an exercise using a ballet barre. Per the Certification Agreement, Plaintiff would teach
McGinley this method and McGinley would then be authorized to teach this class. Plaintiff has sued
McGinley for breach of the Certification Agreement.
Plaintiff also entered into a License Agreement with Defendant Club La Maison, the studio
where McGinley worked. Through that License Agreement, Club La Maison was granted the right,
privilege and nonexclusive license to use Plaintiff’s trademark “BarreAmped.” Plaintiff has sued
Club La Maison for breach of the License Agreement.
McGinley has moved to dismiss this action against her for lack of personal jurisdiction,
arguing that she has no “minimum contacts” with the State of Tennessee and Plaintiff’s claims do
not arise from any activities by McGinley here.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation need not be accepted as true on a
motion to dismiss, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Fritz v. Charter
Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
The party seeking to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction bears the burden to
establish such jurisdiction. Beydoun v. Wataniya Restaurants Holding, 768 F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir.
2014). When, as here, the Court rules on a jurisdictional motion to dismiss without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the Court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Id. To defeat such a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction. Id. In that instance, the burden on the plaintiff is “relatively slight,” and
the Court should not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal. Air Products
and Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l., Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007); Theunissen v. Matthews,
935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Where a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction arises under a federal question, personal
jurisdiction over a defendant exists if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the
forum state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the
defendant due process. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002). Tennessee’s long-arm
statute has been interpreted to be coterminous with the limits of personal jurisdiction imposed by the
Due Process Clause, and the jurisdictional limits of Tennessee law and of federal constitutional law
of due process are identical. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 616 (6th Cir. 2005).
When determining whether a district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would offend
due process, the relevant inquiry is whether the facts of the case demonstrate that the non-resident
defendant possesses such minimum contacts with the forum state that the exercise of jurisdiction
would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Beydoun, 768 F.3d at
505. The Sixth Circuit has articulated a three-part test to guide this determination. First, the
defendant must purposefully avail herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a
consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a
substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable. Id.1
Purposeful availment is present where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
proximately result from actions by the defendant herself that create a substantial connection with the
forum state and where the defendant’s conduct and connection are such that she should reasonably
1
There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction, general and specific. Plaintiff in this
case asserts only specific jurisdiction.
3
anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. Beydoun, 768 F.3d at 505-06. The emphasis in
the purposeful availment inquiry is whether the defendant has engaged in some overt actions
connecting the defendant with the forum state. Id. at 506.2
As noted, Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
McGinley is proper. Plaintiff argues that McGinley has sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee
because she contacted Plaintiff in Tennessee about being trained and certified; she signed the
Certification Agreement, which became effective upon acceptance by Plaintiff in Tennessee; she sent
both the Certification Agreement and the contract payment to Plaintiff in Tennessee; and thus, she
created a contractual relationship with a Tennessee resident for a period of one year (the term of the
Certification Agreement).
At all relevant times, McGinley lived and worked in Pennsylvania. She has never been to
Tennessee. Docket No. 26 (Declaration of McGinley). She has never owned or leased property in
Tennessee. Id. She has never marketed or advertised in Tennessee and has no clients or business in
Tennessee. Id. Her training to become a certified “BarreAmped” fitness instructor took place in New
Jersey. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show that McGinley purposefully
availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities within Tennessee. McGinley did not conduct
any activities within the State of Tennessee. Neither does Plaintiff’s cause of action arise from any
activities in Tennessee. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that McGinley breached the Certification
2
Purposeful availment is something akin to a deliberate undertaking to do or cause
an act or thing to be done in the forum state or conduct which can be properly regarded as a
prime generating cause of the effects resulting in the forum state, something more than a passive
availment of the forum state’s opportunities. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water
Publishing, 327 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Agreement in Pennsylvania by teaching barre fitness at Club La Maison in Pennsylvania. The
exercise of jurisdiction over McGinley does not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
The mere existence of a contract between McGinley and Plaintiff is insufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over McGinley. See Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir.
2000); Noval Intern. Resources, LLC v. Andec, Inc., 875 F.Supp.2d 804, 810 (W.D. Tenn. 2012).
Here, the full purpose of the contract between these parties was so that McGinley could teach this
fitness method. Her training and her work under the contract were in Pennsylvania. The fact that
she sent her signed contract and payment to Plaintiff in Tennessee is simply not enough to confer
personal jurisdiction in this case.
For these reasons, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant McGinley.
McGinley’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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