Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. MP&T Hotels, LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/10/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (ds)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
GREAT LAKES REINSURANCE
(UK) PLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MP&T HOTELS, LLC d/b/a
KNIGHTS INN LEBANON, THOMAS
SUTHERLAND, and CHARLES STEWART
d/b/a STEWART AND SONS TERMITE
AND PEST CONTROL,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:14-cv-2018
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Charles Stewart
(Docket No. 13), which has been joined in by defendants Thomas Sutherland (Docket No. 21)
and MP&T Hotels, LLC (“MP&T Hotels”) (Docket No. 18) (together, the “defendants”). The
plaintiff, Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC (“Great Lakes”) filed a Response in opposition to
the Motion (Docket No. 17). For the reasons discussed herein, the defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. The court will also stay this action pending
resolution of the underlying state tort action in the Circuit Court for Wilson County, Tennessee.
BACKGROUND1
This declaratory judgment action involves a simple question: is the plaintiff, an insurance
company, obligated by its general liability policy with an insured, defendant MP&T Hotels, to
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts discussed in this Memorandum are drawn from the pleadings
and exhibits submitted by the parties. (See Docket Nos. 1, 14, 17, 18.)
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defend and indemnify the insured with respect to an underlying personal injury action? Despite
this seemingly simple question, the issue presently before the court is whether, given the
pendency of a related state court proceeding, this court should decline to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction over Great Lakes’ request for declaratory relief. The court will briefly
recite the facts as they relate to the motion before the court.
I.
The Parties
Great Lakes is an insurance company based in London, England, that provides insurance
coverage to MP&T Hotels under Policy No. GLG005531 (the “Policy”). The Policy provides
general liability coverage in accordance with its expressed terms, conditions, definitions, and
exclusions. MP&T Hotels operates a hotel, the Knights Inn, which is located in Lebanon,
Tennessee. Defendant Charles Stewart, who does business as Stewart & Son Termite and Pest
Control, has performed pest extermination services at the Knights Inn.
On September 23, 2013, Thomas Sutherland was a guest of the hotel. Currently,
Sutherland is the plaintiff in a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Wilson County,
Tennessee, against MP&T Hotels and Stewart & Son (the “Sutherland Litigation”).
II.
The Sutherland Litigation
On March 20, 2014, Sutherland filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Wilson County
against MP&T Hotels. (Docket No. 1, Ex. 2.) In his original Complaint, Sutherland alleged that,
as a paying guest of MP&T Hotels, he was injured as a result of exposure to a noxious fume or
chemical odor. (Id.) Sutherland’s original Complaint alleges three claims against MP&T:
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of contract. It requests money damages, including
compensatory damages for Sutherland’s medical expenses and pain and suffering, and punitive
damages related to MP&T Hotels’ alleged gross negligence.
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On September 2, 2014, MP&T Hotels answered the Complaint and generally denied all
of Sutherland’s allegations, except the allegation that Sutherland was a registered guest on March
23, 2013. The Answer also raised an affirmative defense of comparative fault on the part of
Stewart. Based on the hotel’s comparative fault defense, Sutherland amended his Complaint to
join Stewart as an additional defendant. (Docket No. 1, Ex. 3.) The general allegations of
Sutherland’s pleading did not change with his amendment, but he added Stewart as a defendant
to each cause of action.
III.
Facts Relevant to the Declaratory Judgment Action2
On May 1, 2012, Great Lakes issued the Policy to MP&T Hotels. The Policy, which is
attached to the Complaint, provides general liability coverage to MP&T Hotels, subject to its
detailed terms, conditions, definitions, and exclusions. Generally, the Policy provides that Great
Lakes
[w]ill pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance
applies. [Great Lakes] will have the right and duty to defend the insured against
any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the
insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property
damage” to which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion,
investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may result.
(Docket No. 1, Ex. 1.) In short, in order for coverage to apply under the Policy, there must be
“bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” during the policy period.
The Policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a
person, including death resulting from any of these at a time.” “Occurrence” means an accident,
including the continuous and repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
2
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the allegations of Great Lakes’ Complaint.
(Docket No. 1.)
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conditions. The Policy also includes exceptions to coverage for injuries that are “expected or
intended” by the insured (for instance, those caused by intentional acts) and “contractual
liability.” Another exception to coverage, relevant here, is the “Absolute Pollution Exception.”
The exception states:
It is agreed that the exclusion relating to the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases,
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants is replaced by the
following; or in the event no exclusion exists then the following exclusion applies
nevertheless:
1. to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the actual, alleged, or
threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants;
a. at or from premises owned, rented or occupied by the named insured;
...
Pollutants mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste
includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
(Id.)
IV.
Procedural Background of the Declaratory Judgment Action
Great Lakes filed this action on October 22, 2014. Great Lakes alleges in its Complaint
that, although it has been defending MP&T Hotels in the Sutherland Litigation under a full
reservation of rights, it is not obligated to defend or indemnify MP&T Hotels because the
Sutherland Litigation falls outside of the Policy’s terms. The Complaint names MP&T Hotels,
Sutherland, and Stewart as defendants. However, the allegations appear to only establish a
controversy between Great Lakes and its insured. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that (1)
Sutherland’s gross negligence claim is excluded from coverage under the “expected and
intended” injury exclusion; (2) Sutherland’s breach of contract claim is excluded from coverage
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under the “contractual liability” exclusion; and (3) Sutherland’s negligence claim is excluded
from coverage under the Absolute Pollution Exception. Great Lakes’ Complaint requests that
the court declare that the claims identified in the Sutherland Litigation are not covered by the
Policy, pursuant to the three specific exclusions. Great Lakes further seeks a judgment
declaring that the Policy does not obligate Great Lakes to pay for any damages to Sutherland.
On November 14, 2014, MP&T Hotels filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Docket No.
11.) On November 17, 2014, Stewart filed a Motion to Dismiss the Declaratory Judgment
Action, arguing that the court should decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the
action. (Docket No. 13.) Great Lakes filed a Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
on November 25, 2014. (Docket No. 17.) On December 1, 2014, MP&T Hotels filed a brief in
support of Stewart’s motion. (Docket No. 18.) Sutherland joined in Stewart’s motion on
January 23, 2014. (Docket No. 21.)
ANALYSIS
The defendants ask the court to decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over this
action. Specifically, they argue that, according to five relevant factors of consideration
articulated by the Sixth Circuit, a decision to exercise jurisdiction over this action would be
inappropriate because the resolution of unanswered factual questions in the state court action is a
necessary predicate to this declaratory relief action.
I.
The Declaratory Judgment Act and Relevant Factors for Consideration
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “Since its inception,
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the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and
substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.” Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995); see also Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491
(1942). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as an
enabling Act, which confers discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the
litigant.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 287 (internal citations omitted). The Court has further explained
that the broad discretion given to district courts includes an alternative to dismissal; accordingly,
district courts may also enter a stay of the federal action, pending resolution of the state court
proceeding. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495; Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282-83 (discussing Brillhart and
appropriate inquiry for whether or not to enter a stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment at the
outset). Accordingly, this court has broad discretion with respect to whether or not to exercise
jurisdiction over Great Lakes’ action, or to otherwise stay the action during the pendency of the
underlying tort action.
The Sixth Circuit has established guidelines for district courts deciding whether or not to
exercise discretionary jurisdiction over a declaratory relief action. “In determining the propriety
of entertaining a declaratory judgment action, competing state and federal interests weigh in the
balance, with courts particularly reluctant to entertain federal declaratory judgment actions
premised on diversity jurisdiction in the face of a previously-filed state-court action.” Adrian
Energy Assocs. v. Mich. Public Serv. Comm’n, 481 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2007). In insurance
cases (like this action), the Sixth Circuit has frequently held that “declaratory judgment actions
seeking an advance opinion on indemnity issues are seldom helpful in resolving an ongoing
action in another court.” Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
791 F.2d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof.
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Assocs., PLC, 495 F.3d 266, 273 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit has further “question[ed] the
need for declaratory judgments in federal courts when the question is one of state law and when
there is no suggestion that the state court is not in a position to define its own law in a fair and
impartial manner.” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J&L Lumber Co., Inc., 373 F.3d 807, 816-17 (6th
Cir. 2004). Accordingly, generally, “[s]uch actions . . . should normally be filed, if at all, in the
court that has jurisdiction which gives rise to the indemnity problem. Otherwise confusing
problems of scheduling, orderly presentation of fact issues and res judicata are created.”
Manley, 791 F.2d at 463; see also Scottsdale Ins. Co v. Roumph., 211 F.3d 964, 967 (6th Cir.
2000). However, there is no per se rule to prevent district courts from exercising jurisdiction
over declaratory judgment actions related to insurance relationships and relevant exceptions to
coverage. Roumph, 211 F.3d at 967; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825 F.2d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir.
1987).
Accordingly, courts routinely engage in detailed case-specific inquiries when deciding
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions, such as this one. To
guide district courts in their decision-making, the Sixth Circuit has articulated five factors for
consideration:
(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy;
(2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue;
(3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural
fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;”
(4) whether the use of a declaratory judgment action would increase the friction between
our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and
(5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective.
Grand Trunk v. W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984).
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II.
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The court will analyze each of the Grand Trunk factors individually as it applies to Great
Lakes’ request for declaratory relief.
A. Will the declaratory action settle the controversy?
The parties appear to agree that the primary controversy before this court is whether or
not the Absolute Pollution Exclusion applies to the negligence claim alleged by Sutherland in his
tort action against MP&T Hotels.3 The defendants argue that, without factual findings as to the
cause of Sutherland’s alleged injuries, this court is unable to render a judgment that would settle
the controversy between Great Lakes and its insured. Upon review of the pleadings and the
parties’ submission, the court agrees.
In the underlying tort action, Sutherland has alleged that, “while in his room, [Sutherland]
began to smell a strong chemical odor . . . which caused [him] to develop a headache.”
Sutherland further alleges that, “[a]fter contacting the front desk [about the odor] . . . [he] began
to experience great pain and suffering.” As a result of this alleged suffering, Sutherland has filed
claims against two parties who are allegedly responsible, in part or in full—Stewart and MP&T
Hotels. At this point, however, the tort action has led to no conclusion as to liability and no
factual findings as to the cause of the “strong chemical odor.” The court agrees with the
defendants that, before it can determine whether an exception to coverage applies to Sutherland’s
claims, a factual determination will need to be made with regard to (1) what “pollutant,” if any,
3
Although Great Lakes does not specifically address its additional exceptions to coverage in its
brief opposing the pending Motion to Dismiss, it appears from the Complaint that Great Lakes
will also argue that the “intentional tort” and “contractual liability” exceptions will bar
Sutherland’s gross negligence and breach of contract claims. (See Docket No. 1, Docket No.
22.) The defendants have not specifically responded to these contentions in their briefs here.
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allegedly caused Sutherland’s injuries; and (2) whether the “pollutant,” if any, was in fact
“discharged,” “dispersed,” “released,” and/or “escaped,” as set forth in the Absolute Pollution
Exception. Before such findings are made, infinite explanations exist for the alleged “chemical
odor”—many of which may place Sutherland’s injuries within the Policy’s coverage (e.g., a nonpollutant, perhaps a perfume, was present in the room), and many that fall within the Policy’s
exception to coverage (e.g., the presence of a pesticide in the room). Accordingly, at this stage,
any conclusion as to the application of the exclusion to Sutherland’s claims would be premature,
and the declaratory judgment action would not resolve the controversy among the parties.4
Consequently, the court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.5
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Nevertheless, the court concludes that, when a proper factual record exists, this declaratory
relief action will settle the controversy between Great Lakes and its insured (MP&T Hotels).
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The court recognizes that, as Great Lakes argues, some courts have rendered judgment as to
coverage based solely on pleadings in an underlying tort action in declaratory actions related to
an insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify its insured. Drexel Chem. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Co.,
933 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The rule, as articulated by the Tennessee Court of
Appeals, is that “[a]n insurer may not properly refuse to defend an action against its insured
unless ‘it is plain from the face of the complaint that the allegations fail to state facts that bring
the case within or potentially within the policy’s coverage.’” Id. (quoting Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
Happy Day Laundry, Inc., 1989 WL 91082 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1989)). Here, however, the
court concludes that the allegations of Sutherland’s Complaint in the underlying tort action are,
at the very least, “potentially within the policy’s coverage.” Moreover, the cases that Great
Lakes calls “similar” are, in fact, distinguishable from Great Lakes’ action. For instance, in
Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Hicks, the Eastern District of Michigan, upon a Rule 56 motion,
held that a declaratory judgment action was appropriate in federal court because the allegations
of pleadings from the underlying state tort action relied entirely on an allegation of assault as the
cause of the tort victim’s injuries. 871 F. Supp. 947, 951 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Consequently, the
apparently uncontested and only possible cause of injury fell outside of the insurer’s coverage
based upon a blanket exclusion to coverage for illegal acts. Conversely, here, Sutherland’s
Complaint alleges merely that exposure to a “chemical odor” caused his injuries, and it appears
unclear (or at the very least, disputed) whether that odor falls within the applicable exclusion to
coverage. Moreover, certain factual questions related to the cause of Sutherland’s injuries
presently before the state court would significantly overlap with the discovery required to resolve
the coverage question before this court in this declaratory action. Unlike Mount Vernon,
Sutherland’s allegation of a chemical odor does not fall unequivocally within the language of the
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B. Will the declaratory action clarify the legal relations at issue?
As discussed with respect to the first factor, any determination as to coverage at this stage
would be premature without a more developed factual record. Accordingly, the declaratory
action would not clarify the legal relations between Great Lakes and its insured, MP&T Hotels.
The declaratory action also would have no bearing on the legal relationships among Great Lakes
and the additional defendants. Therefore, this factor weighs against the exercise of jurisdiction.
C. Is the declaratory remedy being used merely to “provide an arena for a race for
res judicata?”
“The next factor to consider is whether the use of the declaratory judgment action is
motivated by “procedural fencing” or likely to create a race for res judicata.” Scottsdale Ins. Co.
v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 558 (6th Cir. 2008). The defendants contend that Great Lakes’ action
appears to be an attempt to make an “end run” around the state court system. The third factor is
meant to preclude jurisdiction for declaratory plaintiffs who file their suits mere days or weeks
before the coercive suits filed by a natural plaintiff and who seem to have done so for the
purpose of acquiring a favorable forum.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has noted that, as to the third
factor, “when the plaintiff has filed his claim after the state court litigation has begun, we have
generally given the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt that no improper motive fueled the filing of
the action.” Id.
Absolute Pollution Exception. Great Lakes’ additional case citations are similarly unpersuasive.
See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 379 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that
the court was “satisfied that there is no significant overlap in the issues of fact that must be
decided [between the state court action and federal declaratory action]”); Monticello Ins. Co. v.
Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 173 F.3d 855, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that jurisdiction over
the declaratory relief action was appropriate because “the issue of insurer liability is distinct from
the . . . factual determinations necessary” in the underlying state tort action).
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Here, there is no evidence that Great Lakes’ action was motivated by procedural fencing.
Moreover, Great Lakes is not a party to the state court action and, therefore, the extent of its
coverage obligations to MP&T Hotels is not an issue before the state court. Accordingly, Great
Lakes’ attempt to clarify its legal duties as an insurer in federal court cannot be construed as a
“race to judgment.” The Sixth Circuit has made clear that, even though “this action may have
been an attempt to preempt an issue which the state court would eventually consider, the
Declaratory Judgment Act gives [a plaintiff] the right to do precisely that.” Id. Therefore,
because of the absence of an improper motive, this factor weighs in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction.
D. Will the action increase friction between the federal and state courts?
With respect to the fourth factor of consideration, the Sixth Circuit has offered three subfactors for consideration:
(1) whether the state court’s resolution of the underlying factual issues is important to an
informed resolution of the federal case;
(2) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than
is the federal court; and
(3) whether there is a close nexus between the underlying factual and legal issues and
state law and/or public policy, or whether federal common law or statutory law
dictates a resolution of the declaratory judgment action.
Travelers, 495 F.3d at 271.
In certain cases involving insurance coverage, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a
declaratory relief action can be resolved as a matter of law and does not require factual findings
by a state court. “However, sometimes resolution of the issue raised in federal court will require
making factual findings that might conflict with similar findings made by the state court. In such
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cases, the exercise of jurisdiction would be inappropriate.” Id. at 272. This case falls squarely
within the latter category.
Here, with respect to the first and second sub-factors identified by the Sixth Circuit, there
are necessary factual questions regarding the alleged “pollutant” or “chemical” that caused
Sutherland’s injuries that must be resolved before this court can make a conclusion as to what
coverage, if any, Great Lakes owes to its insured. These factual questions are best resolved by
the state court, which has jurisdiction over Sutherland’s claims and is tasked with resolving the
question of what party, if any, bears liability for Sutherland’s alleged injuries. The state court’s
inquiry will also necessarily include a resolution as to what chemical, if any, caused Sutherland’s
alleged injuries and the method by which the Sutherland was exposed to the alleged chemical.
Although, as Great Lakes argues, the issue of coverage is not before the state court, the factual
question of what “odor” caused Sutherland’s injuries is inextricably bound to the resolution of
the state action and this federal action. Consequently, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the coverage issue at this time and any conclusion that it might reach may result in claim
preclusion in the state court action or, at the very least, lead to conflicting factual findings in
these two proceedings.
Finally, the final sub-factor “focuses on whether the issue in the federal action implicates
important state policies and is, thus, more appropriately considered in state court.” Flowers, 513
F.3d at 561. The Sixth Circuit has held that, generally, “issues of insurance contract
interpretation are questions of state law with which the . . . state courts are more familiar and,
therefore, better able to resolve.” Travelers, 495 F.3d at 273.
Applying these sub-factors to this case, the court concludes that the fourth factor counsels
against the exercise of jurisdiction. A legal conclusion as to the scope of the Policy’s coverage
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requires findings of fact that are already properly before the state court in the Sutherland
Litigation. Accordingly, this factor weighs against the exercise of jurisdiction.
E. Is there an alternative remedy which is better or more effective?
The defendants contend that the Circuit Court for Wilson County is best situated to
decide the issues in this case, including the application of policy coverage to the Sutherland
Litigation. Accordingly, they argue, Great Lakes should intervene in the state court action to
request declaratory relief with respect to the scope of coverage under the Policy. It is well settled
that a district court should “deny declaratory relief if an alternative remedy is better or more
effective.” Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 326. The Sixth Circuit has concluded that the inquiry as to
alternative remedies “must be fact specific, involving consideration of the whole package of
options available to the federal declaratory plaintiff.” Flowers, 513 F.3d at 562.
Here, Great Lakes, which is already defending MP&T Hotels in the underlying tort action
pursuant to a reservation of rights, could have intervened in the Sutherland Litigation or filed a
declaratory action in the Tennessee courts, which could have been combined with the tort action
by the state court. In many ways, these alternatives would have been better. All defendants in
this action are parties to the Sutherland Litigation, and the factual questions that are
determinative of the Policy’s application are already pending before the state court. Moreover,
the state court is best equipped to provide clear guidance as to Tennessee law and public policy
with respect to insurance coverage. Accordingly, an alternative action in the state court would
promote judicial efficiency and does not appear to prejudice Great Lakes.
Accordingly, this final factor counsels against exercising jurisdiction in this case.
F. Balancing the Factors
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Four of the five Grand Trunk factors indicate that this court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over Great Lakes’ declaratory relief claim. Given the limited record before this court
and pendency of parallel proceedings that will resolve the factual questions underlying the legal
relationship between Great Lakes and its insured, the court concludes that it would be
inappropriate to adjudicate or render a judgment regarding Great Lakes’ coverage obligations at
this time.
Nevertheless, the court declines to dismiss the action as the defendants request. As the
Supreme Court has noted, “where the basis for declining to proceed is the pendency of a state
proceeding, a stay” – rather than dismissal – “will often be the preferable course, because it
assures that the federal action can proceed without risk of a time bar if the state case, for any
reason, fails to resolve the matter in controversy.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288 n.2. Here, this action
is properly before the court on the ground of diversity jurisdiction. Going forward, the Circuit
Court for Wilson County may reach a number of potential determinations—including findings of
fact as to the cause of Sutherland’s injuries and the liability assigned to MP&T Hotels and
Stewart, if any. Following the resolution of these necessary factual determinations, this
declaratory relief action may properly proceed in this court.
III.
Final Matters
As a final housekeeping matter, the court notes that Great Lakes admits expressly in its
Complaint that it only included Sutherland and Stewart as parties to this action because they are
“interested parties” in the outcome. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 7.) Great Lakes further submits in its brief
that it does not object to Sutherland’s and Stewart’s requests to be dismissed from the case.
(Docket No. 17 at 2 n.1). Consequently, the court will dismiss the individual defendants,
Sutherland and Stewart, from this declaratory relief action.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will deny the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to
defendant MP&T Hotels and grant the Motion to Dismiss with respect to defendants Sutherland
and Stewart. Additionally, the court will order that this action will be stayed pending resolution
of the Sutherland Litigation.
An appropriate order will enter.
_______________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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