Wildasin v. Mathes et al

Filing 109

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 4/12/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOAN ROSS WILDASIN,
Plaintiff,

v.
PEGGY MATHES;
HILAND, MATHES &
URQUHART; AND BILL
COLSON AUCTION &
REALTY COMPANY
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:14-cv-2036
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
On March 11, 2016, the Court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Hiland, Mathes & Urquhart (“HUM”). Wildasin v. Mathes, 2016 WL 927440, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2016). HUM now asks the Court to revise that Order pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Docket No. 92.)
Rule 54(b) allows a court to revise any order before it enters final judgment. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b); Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 Fed. App’x 949, 959 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“District Courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider
interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.”). This
rule “vests significant discretion in district courts.” Parker v. Robertson, 34 F. Supp. 3d 859, 861
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2014). A court may revise an order “as justice requires,” Rodriguez, 89
Fed. App’x at 959, as long as the moving party is not attempting to “relitigate . . . arguments
[that were] previously rejected.” Ingram Barge Co. v. Century Aluminum of W. Va., Inc., 2012
WL 3945529, at *3 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012).
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HUM’s argument is straightforward. It points out that on March 31, 2016, the Court
granted summary judgment for Defendant Peggy D. Mathes (“Mathes”) on Plaintiff’s
negligence-as-legal-counsel claim. See Wildasin v. Mathes, 2016 WL 1274574, at *1 (Mar. 31,
2016). In reaching that result, the Court reasoned that, because “Tennessee courts generally
assume that the average layperson is ill equipped to decide whether an attorney’s conduct meets
the applicable standard of care,” Plaintiff Joan Ross Wildasin could not make a prime-facie case
without expert testimony. Id. at *8. The Court’s holding easily followed from that reasoning:
Plaintiff had failed to introduce expert testimony, so her claim failed as a matter of law. Id. at
*8–9.
HUM contends that Plaintiff’s claim against HUM must fail, too. It notes that Plaintiff
brought only one claim against HUM: vicarious liability for Mathes’s negligence as legal
counsel. (Docket No. 30, p. 8; Docket No. 92, p. 2.) Since Plaintiff cannot prove Mathes’s
negligence as counsel, HUM continues, Plaintiff is also barred from proving that HUM was
vicariously liable for Mathes’s negligence. (Docket No. 92, pp. 2–3.)
The Court agrees. Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff may not prove vicarious liability
without proving the existence of an underlying tort. See Queen v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 508 F.
Supp. 532, 535 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff’d, 689 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Tennessee law does not
impose vicarious liability when the agent is not subject to individual liability.”). Thus, if a
plaintiff cannot show that an agent has committed a tort, the plaintiff cannot show that the
principal is vicariously liable for the agent’s tortious conduct. Id. See also, e.g., Quality Tech.
Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Co., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1331, 1343 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (“[T]his
Court has found [the contractor] to be absolutely immune from common law tort liability, [so]
there can be no liability as to [the contracting company,] . . . because Tennessee law does not

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impose vicarious liability when the agent is not subject to individual liability.”); Stokes v.
Smokey Mountain Aero, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 677, 678 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (“If no action can be
maintained against an employee for the employee’s acts, Tennessee law also bars any actions
against the employer based on vicarious liability.”).
The Court has already found that Plaintiff cannot prove her negligence-as-legal-counsel
claim against Mathes. See Wildasin, 2016 WL 1274574, at *1. Without being able to prove
Mathes’s negligence, Plaintiff cannot show that HUM was vicariously liable for that negligence.
See Queen, 508 F. Supp. at 535. Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against HUM therefore fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant HUM’s Rule 54(b) Motion; amend its
March 11, 2016 Order; and grant summary judgment in favor of HUM on Plaintiff’s negligenceas-legal-counsel-claim. An appropriate Order will be entered.

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KEVIN H. SHARP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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