C.G. et al v. Cheatham County Board of Education et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion 34 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. To the extent that Plaintiffs' motion seeks an extension of time within which to respond to Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 2/3/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
C.G. and B.G., individually
and on behalf of their
minor child, A.G.,
Plaintiffs
v.
CHEATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION and CHIP RONEY,
individually,
Defendants

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No. 3:14-2309
Judge Campbell/Bryant
Jury Demand

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs have filed their Motion to Strike Defendants’
Motion

for

Summary

Judgement

as

a

Discovery

Abuse

Sanction,

Alternatively Motion to Compel and for Continuance of Summary
Judgment Response Time (Docket Entry No. 34).
By this motion, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have
failed to respond adequately to an interrogatory and two requests
for production of documents, and that this failure has materially
hindered Plaintiffs in preparing their response to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 35-4). Plaintiffs
seek an order striking Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
a discovery sanction or, in the alternative, an order compelling
Defendants to produce the disputed discovery responses and granting
Plaintiffs an extension of time thereafter within which to respond
to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Defendants

have

filed

their

response

in

opposition

(Docket Entry No. 41), in which they argue that the documents
relating to complaints against Defendant Roney are not relevant to
any claim in this case because all such complaints were received by
Defendants after the matters giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.
Therefore,

Defendants

argue

that

the

requested

discovery

is

“patently irrelevant, immaterial and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible matter” (Docket Entry No. 41 at
1).
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
describes the general rule concerning the scope of discovery and
states in part as follows: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, . . . .” The
Rule

further

provides

that

information

within

this

scope

of

discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Roney, in

his capacity

as acting principal of Ashland City Elementary School, wrongfully
denied their minor child reasonable accommodations for the child’s
severe peanut allergy as required by law, and thereafter retaliated
against the Plaintiff parents after they complained about Defendant
Roney’s

failure

to

provide

such
2

accommodations.

During

his

discovery deposition taken on August 15, 2015, Defendant Roney was
asked whether there had been any complaints against him related to
children with special needs or disabilities. Roney answered this
question in the affirmative.
Plaintiffs argue in their motion papers that production
of all parent complaints involving special needs or disabled
children may be relevant to the existence of a custom, policy, or
procedure of Defendants in denying requests for accommodations
required by law. In response, Defendants argue that all complaints
against Roney responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests arose
after the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore,
Defendants argue, such later received complaints cannot, as a
matter of law, be evidence of a policy, custom or practice in
existence during Plaintiffs’ encounters with Defendant Roney. The
undersigned
argument.

Magistrate

Without

Judge

knowing

is

the

not

persuaded

nature

and

by

Defendants’

substance

of

the

complaints, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether
they would have probative value in this case. Therefore, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that the disputed discovery may
well be relevant when considered in light of the Plaintiffs’ claims
in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned finds that
to the extent that Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an order compelling
Defendants to produce these items in discovery, the motion is
3

GRANTED. Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory No. 2
and requests for production Nos. 3 and 4 are OVERRULED. Defendants
shall respond fully to this interrogatory and these requests for
production by February 15, 2016.
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an extension
of time within which to respond to Defendants’ pending motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall
file their response to the pending motion for summary judgment no
later than March 7, 2016. Defendants may file an optional reply
within 14 days after the filing of Plaintiffs’ response and, in any
event, no later than March 21, 2016.
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an award of
monetary sanctions and attorney’s fees, their motion is DENIED. As
grounds for this finding, the Magistrate Judge notes that although
Defendants’

responses

to

Plaintiffs’

written

discovery

were

discussed during a telephone case management conference on December
8, 2015, no motion to compel this discovery was then pending and
the Court entered no order compelling such discovery. Accordingly,
the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that an award of monetary
discovery sanctions and attorney’s fees at this time would be
unjust.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

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