Heithcock v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT: The plaintiff's Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Order of Dismissal (Docket No. 36)is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/14/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
SAMARA HEITHCOCK, individually
and as next friend of her minor
daughter, M.H.,

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Plaintiff,
v.

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN’S SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:14-CV-2377
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pending before the court is a Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Order of Dismissal
(“Motion to Alter”) filed by the plaintiff Samara Heithcock (“Heithcock”) (Docket No. 36), to
which the defendants have filed a Response. (Docket No. 42.) For the following reasons, the
motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2015, the court entered a Memorandum and Order (“Motion to Dismiss
Order”), in which the court (1) dismissed Heithcock’s federal claims against the defendants in
their entirety and (2) declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Heithcock’s pendant
state law claims. (Docket Nos. 34, 35.) The court incorporates herein the factual and legal
analyses set forth in the court’s Motion to Dismiss Order, familiarity with which is presumed.
On September 11, 2015, Heithcock filed the Motion to Alter, as well as an accompanying
Memorandum of Law and Affidavit of Samara Heithcock. (Docket Nos. 36, 37, 40.) On
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September 28, 2015, at the court’s request, the defendants filed a Response. (Docket No. 42.)
ANALYSIS
I.

Legal Standard
Under Rule 59(e), a court may alter or amend a judgment based on: (1) a clear error of

law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to
prevent manifest injustice. Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615
(6th Cir. 2010); Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir.
2007); Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005); GenCorp, Inc. v. Int’l
Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). However, a motion under Rule 59(e) is not a
vehicle for presenting new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was
issued. Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 395; see also Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616 (noting
movant “cannot use a Rule 59 motion to raise arguments which could, and should, have been
made before judgment issued”); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d
367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (“A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to reargue a case.”).
“The grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is within the informed discretion of the district court,
reversible only for abuse.” Scotts Co. v. Central Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir.
2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
While the Sixth Circuit has not ruled on the exact definition of “clear error,” it has made
clear that it is an exacting standard and that a successful Rule 59(e) motion must “clearly
establish a manifest error of law.” Roger Miller Music, 477 F.3d at 395. As one court has
described it, “[i]n essence, a [prior] judgment must be ‘dead wrong’ to qualify as being clearly
erroneous.” Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 809-810 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
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To constitute “newly discovered evidence,” the evidence must have been “previously
unavailable.” GenCorp, 178 F.3d at 834 (citing Charles A. Wright, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2810.1 at 127–28 (1995)). It is not evidence that was available to the movant
before the judgment in question issued, but which the movant did not discover until post
judgment. See id.; see also Gritton v. Disponett, 332 F. App’x 232, 239 (6th Cir. 2009).
Finally, although the “manifest injustice” ground for a Rule 59(e) motion appears to be a
catch-all provision, it is not meant to allow a disappointed litigant to attempt to persuade the
court to change its mind. See, e.g., GenCorp, 178 F.3d at 834. Instead, whether manifest
injustice would result from denying a Rule 59(e) motion is, by definition, a fact-specific analysis
that falls squarely within the discretionary authority of the court. Id. In exercising this
discretion, the court should weigh the importance of bringing litigation to a firm conclusion and
the need to render fair and just rulings. Id.
II.

Heithcock’s Arguments
As an initial matter, Heithcock attempts to introduce more detailed factual allegations,

through her Affidavit, concerning the events at issue in the Amended Complaint. (See Docket
No. 39 at pp. 1-2; see generally Docket No. 40.) Heithcock appears to argue that these additional
facts cut against the court’s prior dispositive findings as to the grants of absolute and qualified
immunity to defendant social worker Jamila Sugri (“Sugri”), as well as bolster the strength of
Heithcock’s prior allegation concerning Sugri’s purportedly illegal entry of Heithcock’s home.
(Id.) However, it is beyond dispute that the evidence (i.e., statements) contained in the Affidavit
was available to Heithcock at the time that the Amended Complaint was drafted and filed (and at
the time that the plaintiff responded to the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss). Put simply,
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Heithcock provides no basis, nor can the court ascertain any, to support a finding that these
additional details were unavailable to Heithcock prior to the court’s judgment.1 Accordingly,
Heithcock’s Affidavit does not represent newly discovered evidence and is improper under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for the purposes of the pending motion. GenCorp, 178
F.3d at 834.
Next Heithcock argues that the court was wrong to find that Sugri was entitled to absolute
testimonial immunity. The primary basis for this argument appears to be, once again, that Sugri
was in reality a complaining witness in league with M.H.’s father, and the court improperly
characterized her as an independent testifying witness. Heithcock offers several unpersuasive
grounds to support this argument. First, Heithcock argues that, because she was not served with
M.H.’s father’s petition for custody until the day of Sugri’s testimony, the court must infer that
Sugri was the real complainant that day, not the father. Not only is this allegation as to late
service not in the Amended Complaint, it is of no moment. The Amended Complaint explicitly
alleged that (1) M.H.’s father’s petition was filed on January 21, 2014 (six days before the
hearing at which Sugri gave testimony), and (2) the Juvenile Court informed Heithcock of the
filing of the petition on January 24, 2014 (three days before the hearing). (See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶
38-39.) Accordingly, M.H.’s father’s petition was undisputedly filed and Heithcock had notice
of it prior to Sugri’s testimony. Moreover, by the representations made in the Motion to Alter,
the petition was actually served on Heithcock the day of the hearing. As discussed in the Motion
to Dismiss Order, it was this petition that became the subject of the proceedings in which Sugri
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Heithcock’s observation that “the facts of this case are mired in complexity,” (see
Docket No. 39 at p. 1), is not an excuse under the law for failing to make factual allegations or
adduce available evidence. Regardless, this characterization is an overstatement.
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testified. As the court previously held, this pending petition made Sugri a testimonial witness on
January 27, 2014. Indeed, at the time that Sugri testified, there was no petition pending that was
filed by Sugri or the Department of Children’s Services. Only later, as discussed in the Motion
to Dismiss Order, did Sugri file a petition on behalf of the Department of Children’s Services at
the express direction of the Juvenile Court judge (an action for which, as the court explained in
the Motion to Dismiss Order, she cannot be held liable).
Heithcock also touches on previously-made arguments that Sugri conspired with M.H.’s
father, violated Heithcock’s Fourth Amendment rights, and (essentially) manipulated the
Juvenile Court. However, as discussed, “[a] motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to
reargue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 146 F.3d at 374. The court thoroughly addressed these
legal issues in its Motion to Dismiss Order. Heithcock merely disagrees with the court’s
previous evaluation of the allegations in the Amended Complaint and its application of the
relevant law. But, aside from referencing her previous arguments, Heithcock identifies no legal
authority for the assertion that the court has made a clear error other than Spurlock v. Satterfield,
167 F.3d 995, 1001 (6th Cir. 1999). Spurlock stands for the proposition that immunity for pretestimonial acts should be analyzed differently than immunity for testimonial acts – that is, for
example, that constitutional wrongs completed out of court by a witness or prosecutor may be
actionable, even if they lead to immunized acts in court. Id. Indeed, however, the Motion to
Dismiss Order is aligned with Spurlock in this regard; therein, the court explained that, under
Sixth Circuit precedent, Sugri was eligible for (and entitled to) only qualified, not absolute,
immunity for her pre-testimonial investigative acts. Spurlock does not alter the qualified
immunity analysis previously conducted by the court, and Heithcock has offered no argument to

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the contrary in the Motion to Alter. (Docket No. 33 at pp. 18-21.)
In sum, Heithcock has not convinced the court that its decisions regarding the application
of absolute or qualified immunity were made in clear error or represent a manifest injustice.2
Accordingly, the court concludes that none of the grounds for granting a motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) apply here.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Order of Dismissal (Docket No. 36)
is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
Enter this 14th day of October 2015.

_____________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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Heithcock requests relief in the form of either (1) discovery from the Williamson
County Juvenile Court to be presented to this court or (2) reinstatement of this matter and denial
of the motion to dismiss. The court finds both requests without merit.
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