Moore et al v. Piedmont Business Colleges, Inc. et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs shall be granted leave to file a second Amended Complaint before June 2, 2015. It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/19/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JESSICA NICHOLE MOORE and
AUSTIN WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PIEDMONT BUSINESS COLLEGE, INC. F/K/A
MILLER-MOTTE TECHNICAL COLLEGE,1
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:14-cv-2390
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for a More
Definite Statement (Docket No. 11) filed by the defendant, Piedmont Business Colleges, Inc.
F/K/A/ Miller-Motte Technical College (“Miller-Motte” or the “school”), to which the plaintiffs
have filed a Response (Docket No. 16), and the defendant has filed a Reply (Docket No. 19).
For the reasons discussed herein, the defendant’s motion will be granted without prejudice.
BACKGROUND2
Miller-Motte, the defendant, is a technical college that operates a facility located in
Madison, Tennessee. The plaintiffs, Jessica Moore and her fiancé, Austin Walker, are former
students of Miller-Motte. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 24, 2014, alleging that,
during the time that she attended the school, Ms. Moore was sexually harassed and assaulted by

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The defendant explains in its Motion to Dismiss that its correct title is Piedmont Business
Colleges, Inc. F/K/A/ Miller-Motte Technical College. The plaintiffs do not dispute this title.
Going forward, the court and the parties will refer to the defendant according to its correct title.
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Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 5.)
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other students and, consequently, was subjected to a hostile educational environment in violation
of federal law. (Docket No. 1.) The plaintiffs allege that Mr. Walker, who was also a student of
the school, attempted to stop the sexual harassment and informed school administrators of the
victimization of Ms. Moore, but that Miller-Motte failed to take any reasonable action to
alleviate or cure the hostile environment caused by its students or to protect Ms. Moore. The
plaintiffs further allege that, because the school did not take any action to protect Ms. Moore, the
school violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (“Title
IX”). The Amended Complaint is unclear as to additional causes of action against the defendant,
but appears to plead various negligence claims related to its allegation that the school negligently
supervised students, faculty, and employees.
The defendant filed the pending motion on April 21, 2015. (Docket No. 11.) The
defendant’s motion asserts that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the Amended Complaint fails to meet the pleading
standard set forth in Rule 8(a)(2). The plaintiffs responded to the defendant’s motion on April
29, 2015. (Docket No. 15.) The plaintiffs do not appear to oppose the defendant’s motion to
dismiss but request in their Response that the court permit them an opportunity to amend their
pleading to cure its deficiencies. The defendant filed a Reply on May 12, 2015, essentially
reiterating the arguments made in its Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 17.) The defendant does
not mention (and does not oppose) the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend in its Reply.
ANALYSIS
Despite the request made in their Response to the pending motion, the plaintiffs have not
yet filed a motion for leave to amend the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the court will

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consider the defendant’s pending motion as it applies to the operative pleading—the Amended
Complaint.
I.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

will “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487
F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a plaintiff provide “a short and plain statement
of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The court must
determine only whether “the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,” not
whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The complaint’s allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To establish the
“facial plausibility” required to “unlock the doors of discovery,” the plaintiff cannot rely on
“legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” but, instead,
the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
II.

Application to the Amended Complaint

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The parties appear to agree that the Amended Complaint fails to meet the requirements of
Rule 8. Specifically, as the defendant explains, the plaintiffs fail to assert factual content with
respect to the incidents of assault and harassment that appear to be the premise for their Title IX
claim. Critically, the Amended Complaint fails to allege necessary facts underlying the
plaintiffs’ claims, including (1) the identities of Moore’s perpetrators; (2) the identities of the
school authorities to whom the harassment and assault were reported; (3) the dates and times of
the harassment and assaults; (4) the dates and times that Moore and Walker reported the
incidents of abuse to the administration; and (5) the location(s) where the harassment and assault
occurred. Without such factual allegations, the Amended Complaint is so vague or ambiguous
that it fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
Additionally, other than their Title IX claim premised upon sexual harassment against
Ms. Moore, the plaintiffs fail to clearly identify the additional causes of action that they are
asserting against the defendant. The allegations of the pleading appear to indicate that the
plaintiffs intend to plead various negligence claims against the defendant, but the court is unable
to discern—and therefore, the defendant cannot be expected to respond to—the plaintiffs’
intended causes of action from the scattered ramblings of the Amended Complaint.
Mr. Walker, too, has failed to plead sufficient allegations for a plausible cause of action
pursuant to Title IX. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any educational proram or activity receiving financial assistance.” 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a). It is well settled that sexual harassment of a student in a federally-funded
school by a teacher or employee of the school can render the school liable for damages under
Title IX. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992). Moreover, some
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federal courts, including a court in this district, have held that Title IX authorizes a cause of
action for student-on-student harassment. As the defendant notes in its motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs have alleged (although with some deficiencies) that Ms. Moore was a victim of peer
sexual harassment. The plaintiffs have not, however, alleged that Mr. Walker was subjected to
discrimination on the basis of his sex. Accordingly, even if the plaintiffs had properly pled a
Title IX claim on behalf of Ms. Moore, the court would grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss
as to Mr. Walker’s Title IX claim.
III.

Going Forward
In light of the foregoing, the court will grant Miller-Motte’s motion and dismiss the

plaintiffs’ claims against it. However, given the unopposed informal request by the plaintiffs for
leave to amend, the dismissal of these claims will be without prejudice.3 The plaintiff shall be
given 14 days to file a motion for leave to amend the Amended Complaint or to otherwise move
for an extension of this deadline upon a showing of good cause. If neither motion is filed by the
aforementioned deadline, the court will enter a final judgment in this case dismissing the
plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further ORDERED that the
plaintiffs shall be granted leave to file a second Amended Complaint before June 2, 2015.
It is so ORDERED.

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Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading
“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” The Sixth Circuit has found that “[t]he thrust of
Rule 15 is . . . that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleading.”
Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Enter this 19th day of May 2015.
_______________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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