Anderson v. Riverbend Maximum Security Institution et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 1/8/2015. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

RANDY BEA ANDERSON
Plaintiff,
v.
RIVERBEND MAXIMUM SECURITY
INSTITUTION, et al.
Defendants.

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No. 3:15-0005
Judge Sharp

M E M O R A N D U M
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is an inmate at the West
Tennessee State Penitentiary in Henning, Tennessee. Because he has
been granted pauper status, see Docket Entry No.4, the Court is now
obliged to review the complaint (Docket Entry No.1) to determine
whether it is malicious, frivolous, or fails to state a claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution; the Medical
Staff at Riverbend; and four named Riverbend guards; seeking
unspecified relief.
On December 21, 2014, the plaintiff was being transported from
his present place of confinement to Riverbend so that he could
attend

a

court

date

in

Nashville.

During

his

transfer,

the

transport officers confiscated his cane. Upon arrival at Riverbend,
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the plaintiff was forced to exit the van without the assistance of
his cane. As a result, he fell and badly injured his right leg.
The plaintiff was placed in a wheelchair and escorted to the
infirmary. There, he was given an injection for the pain and
received a prescription for additional pain medication. When his
condition did not improve, the plaintiff flooded his cell. Later,
the plaintiff threw his food tray out into the hall. He also
refused to withdraw his arm from the “pie flap” in his cell door.
This arm was cut badly when officers freed the arm from the “pie
flap”.
The plaintiff claims that the transport officers violated his
rights by confiscating his cane. He further alleges that at least
one of the defendants made racially discriminatory remarks to him
and that he was denied adequate medical care for his maladies.
This action is being brought against the defendants in their
official capacities only.1 A suit against an individual in his
official

capacity

is

the

equivalent

of

a

suit

against

the

governmental entity of which the official is an agent. Matthews v.
Jones, 35 F.3d 1046,1049 (6th Cir.1994); see also Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). In

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Transportation Officer Wissner is the only defendant who
is being specifically sued solely in his official capacity. See
Docket Entry No.1 at pg.4. However, the remaining defendants are
only referred to in the complaint by rank and there is no
indication that they are being sued in their individual
capacities.
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essence, then, the plaintiff’s claims are against the State of
Tennessee,

the

entity

responsible

for

the

operation

of

the

Riverbend Maximum Security Institution. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21,25 (1991); see also Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th
Cir.2004).
The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit in federal court by a
citizen against a state unless the state has expressly consented to
suit by waiving its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly
overridden that immunity. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908 (1984); Will v. Michigan Department
of State Police, supra. Congress has not overridden a state's
sovereign immunity to civil rights complaints. Nor has the State of
Tennessee consented to waive its immunity to such actions. Berndt
v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.1986). As a consequence, the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendants acting
in their official capacities.
In the absence of an actionable claim, the Court is obliged to
dismiss the complaint sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
An appropriate order will be entered.

____________________________
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief District Judge

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