Munson v. Bryan et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 7/8/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ds)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
KENNETH H. MUNSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT C. BRYAN, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No: 3:15-cv-0078
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Sheriff Robert
C. Bryan and Detective Michael Barbee, in their individual and official capacities (Docket No.
29), to which plaintiff Kenneth H. Munson has filed a Memorandum of Law & Argument in
Response (Docket No. 41), and Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee have filed a Reply (Docket
No. 42). For the reasons discussed herein, the Partial Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part
and denied in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from the arrests and prosecution of Plaintiff Kenneth H. Munson in
connection with crimes committed in Wilson County and Marshall County, Tennessee, allegedly
by a different man with the same name.
On January 23, 2015, Mr. Munson filed a Complaint (Docket No. 1) against, among
others, Sheriff Robert C. Bryan, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wilson
County, Tennessee; and Detective Michael Barbee, individually and in his official capacity as an
1

employee of Wilson County, Tennessee (collectively, the “Wilson County Defendants”). Mr.
Munson asserts causes of action against the Wilson County Defendants under: 1) 42 U.S.C. §
1983, for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States of America; 2) TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 and 8-8-301; and 3) Tennessee common
law for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, “abuse of arrest,”
and negligence.
On February 12, 2015, Mr. Munson filed a First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 11),
which only corrected an error as to the name of one of the other defendants but did not make any
changes to the legal claims or factual allegations or any other changes that would impact the
Wilson County Defendants.
On April 1, 2015, the Wilson County Defendants filed the pending Partial Motion to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 29) along with a Memorandum in Support
(Docket No. 30), seeking to dismiss: 1) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Bryan and
Detective Barbee in their official capacities; 2) claims against Sheriff Bryan in his individual
capacity arising under both § 1983 and Tennessee common law; 3) claims for punitive damages
arising from (a) § 1983 individual and official capacity claims against Sheriff Bryan and
Detective Barbee, and (b) Tennessee common law claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective
Barbee in their individual capacities; and 4) claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee,
in their individual and official capacities, for violations of TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-101. 1 Also

1

Two clarifications regarding the scope of the motion are necessary. First, the motion purports
to seek dismissal of all official capacity claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee (as
well as associated claims for punitive damages), but the accompanying Memorandum does not
substantively address official capacity claims under Tennessee common law. Conversely, the
motion is styled as seeking to dismiss only the § 1983 claims against Sheriff Bryan in his
individual capacity, but the accompanying Memorandum, as well as the Response, also address
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on April 1, 2015, the Wilson County Defendants filed an Answer to the First Amended
Complaint. (Docket No. 31.) On April 22, 2015, Mr. Munson filed a Memorandum of Law &
Argument in Response to the Wilson County Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Docket
No. 41.) On April 29, 2015, the Wilson County Defendants filed a Reply. (Docket No. 42.)
On June 19, 2015, with leave of court (Docket No. 45), Mr. Munson filed a Second
Amended Complaint (Docket No. 48) that substituted the City of Lewisburg for previous
defendant Chuck Forbis. Aside from the substitution of this defendant, the Second Amended
Complaint contained no material differences from the First Amended Complaint.2
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS3
On the morning of January 25, 2014, Mr. Munson was arrested at his home in West

individual capacity claims against Sheriff Bryan under Tennessee common law (and the
associated claims for punitive damages). The court will review what has been substantively
briefed, which includes the Tennessee common law claims against Sheriff Bryan in his
individual capacity, but not against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee in their official
capacities.
2

As a matter of procedure, Mr. Munson’s Second Amended Complaint technically renders moot
the Wilson County Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. Because the changes made in the
Second Amended Complaint do not at all impact the underlying issues, however, the court will
decide the motion anyway, and treat it as a partial motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. Mr. Munson argues that, where a complaint is accused of being insufficient, a nonmoving party can ask the court to delay ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion and allow discovery to
proceed. He cites no legal authority for this position. In addition, he has now had two
opportunities to amend his pleadings, including one amendment made after the Wilson County
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed. Accordingly, the court will not further
delay ruling on the Partial Motion to Dismiss.

3

The facts recounted in this section are pulled from Mr. Munson’s Second Amended Complaint
and are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As explained above,
the Wilson County Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss is directed to the allegations in the
First Amended Complaint, but they apply with equal force to the identical allegations in the
Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter, the “Complaint”).
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Shelbyville, Tennessee (located in Bedford County) by the Bedford County Sheriff’s Department
and brought to the Bedford County Jail. His arrest was made in connection with a warrant for
the arrest of a suspect with the same name (Kenneth Munson), for “Theft of Property $1,000.00$10,000.00” in Wilson County on September 28, 2013.” (Complaint ¶ 15.)
Later that same day, Mr. Munson was transported to the Wilson County Jail by the
Wilson County Sheriff’s Department. Mr. Munson repeatedly protested his innocence to the
Wilson County deputy who transported him and to each Wilson County employee he interacted
with during the booking process. During questioning, Mr. Munson told the Wilson County
deputies that he had never before been to Wilson County or met the victim of the alleged car
theft there, where a man by the name of Kenneth Munson was said to have stolen a car from a
woman after discussing purchasing the vehicle from her and taking it for a test drive. He also
told them that he had never lived in Lewisburg, Tennessee (in Marshall County), where a man by
the name of Kenneth Munson was also said to have stolen a car, firearms, and other personal
items from his roommates. Mr. Munson paid $2,500 in bail and was released that evening.
On January 27, 2014, Mr. Munson and his wife went to Lebanon to speak with Detective
Barbee, the lead detective investigating the case in Wilson County. Detective Barbee told Mr.
Munson that he knew Mr. Munson had lived in Lewisburg, as a roommate to the victims of the
car theft there in Marshall County, and also that he knew Mr. Munson was the person responsible
for that car theft, as well as the one in Wilson County. Mr. Munson informed Detective Barbee
that he had never lived in Lewisburg but lived with his wife, his children, and his mother in West
Shelbyville. He also told Detective Barbee that he had never been to Wilson County before and
never met the victim of the Wilson County incident. Detective Barbee asked Mr. Munson if he
had ever lived in Indiana, and Mr. Munson replied that he had not. Mr. Munson also provided
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Detective Barbee with bank account and cell phone records, as well as the names of six
individuals who could verify his alibi that he was in Kentucky on September 28, 2013, when the
alleged Wilson County incident took place. Further, Mr. Munson does not fit the physical
description of the suspect that was provided by the Wilson County witnesses, nor does he fit the
(different) physical description of the suspect that was provided by the witnesses to the incident
in Lewisburg, Marshall County. Nevertheless, Detective Barbee allegedly stated to Mr. Munson,
“I don’t owe you anything. We got our man, case closed.” (Complaint ¶ 36), and the Wilson
County Sheriff’s Department continued its prosecution of Mr. Munson.
On March 11, 2014, while seated in the courtroom awaiting his first court appearance for
the Wilson County incident, Mr. Munson was arrested by the Wilson County Sheriff’s Deputy
for Aggravated Burglary in connection with the incident in Lewisburg, Marshall County. As a
consequence, Mr. Munson went before the judge in his Wilson County hearing in handcuffs and
shackles, where he “plead [sic] ‘not guilty’ and protested that he was not the correct person.”
(Complaint ¶ 41.) Mr. Munson was then detained in the Wilson County jail until 6 a.m. the next
day, when he was transported to Marshall County.4 While in the custody of Wilson County, he
was denied a phone call, denied his medication, denied a pillow and blanket, and was not offered
any food until 7 p.m. (after having been detained since 8:30 a.m.).
At a hearing on May 15, 2014, the charges against Mr. Munson in Wilson County were
dropped and the presiding judge ordered the state of Tennessee to pay to expunge Mr. Munson’s

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The Complaint goes on to allege misconduct by officers in Marshall County, who are also
named as defendants in the lawsuit. Those allegations are not relevant to this motion and are
therefore not discussed in detail.
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record.5
Mr. Munson also alleges that Sheriff Bryan, “through [his] failure to adequately train,
hire and supervise [his] staff,” caused Mr. Munson to suffer a violation of his constitutional
rights and that Sheriff Bryan was “aware that a lack of training or inadequate training created a
substantial risk that citizens may unnecessarily suffer serious harm, but failed to provide
adequate training despite that awareness.” (Complaint ¶¶ 71, 73.) Mr. Munson further alleges
that this “oversight constituted deliberate indifference” to his constitutional rights. (Complaint ¶
76.) Aside from these boilerplate allegations, Mr. Munson does not allege any additional facts
regarding: 1) the actual policies or training procedures in Wilson County, 2) events in Wilson
County beyond the circumstances of his own arrest and investigation (as recited above), or 3)
conduct by Sheriff Bryan.
ANALYSIS
I.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

will “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487
F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a plaintiff provide “a short and plain statement
of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The court must
determine only whether “the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,” not

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The charges against Mr. Munson for the incident in Lewisburg, Marshall County were likewise
nolled in April of 2014.
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whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The complaint’s allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To establish the
“facial plausibility” required to “unlock the doors of discovery,” the plaintiff cannot rely on
“legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” but, instead,
the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
II.

Official Capacity § 1983 Claims
As the parties agree, the court must construe § 1983 claims against Sheriff Bryan and

Detective Barbee in their official capacities as claims against Wilson County.6 For the reasons

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The Wilson County Defendants appear to argue in their Partial Motion to Dismiss (though later
appear to waive the argument in their Reply) that § 1983 claims against Sheriff Bryan and
Detective Barbee in their official capacities should be dismissed because they raise only claims
against Wilson County. The cases they cite, however, suggest merely that claims against an
agent of a governmental entity in his official capacity are to be construed as claims against the
governmental entity; they do not require that a court must dismiss all claims against a
governmental entity that are styled as against an agent in his official capacity, nor do these cases
require a plaintiff to amend his complaint to name the governmental entity instead of the agents
in their official capacity before these claims against the governmental entity can be reviewed.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978));
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The court acknowledges that, as the parties agree, any
liability arising from the claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee in their official
capacities belongs to Wilson County and not to Sheriff Bryan or Detective Barbee as individuals.
The court will not, however, dismiss the § 1983 claims naming Sheriff Bryan and Detective
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discussed below, these claims will be dismissed on the grounds that Mr. Munson has failed to
sufficiently plead a § 1983 claim against Wilson County.
A. Legal Standard For Municipal Liability Under § 1983
A governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat
superior for the actions of its agents, but can only be held liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that
the alleged federal violation was a direct result of a municipal policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In order to show an illegal policy or custom that
supports municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show one of the following: “1) the
existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; 2) that an official with final
decision making authority ratified illegal actions; 3) the existence of a policy of inadequate
training or supervision; or 4) the existence of a custom or tolerance of, or acquiescence in,
federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). Thus in order to
survive the motion to dismiss phase under Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint setting forth a § 1983
municipal liability claim must plead with specificity one or more of these grounds for showing
an illegal policy or custom. See Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 944
(M.D. Tenn. 2012); Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 2010 WL 3619790 at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
2010); Minick v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 2014 WL 3817116 at *2 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
There are no allegations in the Complaint or arguments in the briefing related to ground
2 (that an official with decision making authority ratified illegal action) as a theory of liability for
Wilson County. As discussed more fully below, Mr. Munson has failed to adequately plead facts
supporting grounds 1, 3 or 4 (theories of liability arising from an official policy, unofficial

Barbee in their official capacities on this ground, but will review them as a unitary claim against
Wilson County.
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custom of tolerating federal rights violations, or inadequate training), and therefore the § 1983
claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee in their official capacities must be dismissed.
B. Official or Unofficial Policy Theories of Liability
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality based on an official policy
theory, a plaintiff must “‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the [municipality] itself and
show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.’” Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820
F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987)). A theory of an unwritten policy of tolerating federal rights
violations requires “(1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of [illegal activity]; (2)
notice or constructive notice on the part of the [defendant]; (3) the [defendant’s] tacit approval of
the unconstitutional conduct, such that their deliberate indifference in their failure to act can be
said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the [defendant’s] custom was the
‘moving force’ or direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation.”

Thomas v. City of

Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495,
508 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Mr. Munson argues that he has met the requirements for pleading a § 1983 claim against
Wilson County because Wilson County has a policy of “arresting the incorrect man without
further investigation” and that this policy is the “moving force” behind the violation of his
constitutional rights. (Response at p. 4.) This boilerplate language does not even appear in the
Complaint. Moreover, this statement on its own cannot give rise to § 1983 liability against
Wilson County under either a theory of an illegal official Wilson County policy, or a theory that
Wilson County has a custom (or unofficial policy) of tolerating federal rights violations. The
Complaint lacks any factual allegations regarding a Wilson County policy or custom of this type
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of misconduct. Allegations that Wilson County officers arrested Mr. Munson without adequate
investigation do not equate to allegations that Wilson County has either a custom or policy of
“arresting the wrong man.” Mr. Munson does not allege any specific facts to suggest that the
misconduct giving rise to the alleged violation of his constitutional rights is part of a persistent
pattern in Wilson County. His argument is merely tautological: because he was allegedly injured
by the County, the County must have a policy that gives rise to injuries like his own.7 There is
therefore no basis to support an official policy theory of § 1983 liability against Wilson County.
C. Inadequate Training Theory of Liability
The inadequacy of police training serves as a basis for a municipality’s § 1983 liability
“‘where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the police come into contact.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference of a municipality in
this context can be shown by either 1) “failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable
consequences that could result from a lack of instruction,” or 2) failure to respond to repeated
complaints of constitutional violations by its officers that put the city on notice of deficiencies in
its training procedures. Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir.
2006), and citing Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 605 (6th Cir. 2012)). “However,
mere allegations that an officer was improperly trained or that an injury could have been avoided

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While there may be instances where a single decision can give rise to municipal liability under
§ 1983, that is generally reserved for instances where the liability results from an alleged final
policy decision that is itself unconstitutional, not where the following of a policy by agents of the
municipality gives rise to a single constitutional violation. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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with better training are insufficient to make out deliberate indifference.” Harvey v. Campbell
Cnty., Tenn., 453 F. App’x 557, 563 (6th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Munson does not actually argue that his § 1983 claim against Wilson County is based
on an inadequacy of officer training, despite the fact that the Wilson County Defendants
anticipate this potential argument in their Partial Motion to Dismiss. He therefore effectively
concedes that he has failed to state a § 1983 inadequate training claim. Moreover, the boilerplate
language in the Complaint, alleging that Sheriff Bryan failed to adequately train his staff, is
insufficient to support an inadequate training claim. Mr. Munson does not plead any specific
facts to suggest that Wilson County either has a history of prior constitutional violations or fails
to adequately prepare for recurring situations where a constitutional violation is likely to occur.
Nor does Mr. Munson raise any facts to suggest that Wilson County had constructive notice of a
deficit in its training procedures. Accordingly, there are no grounds to support a § 1983 claim
against Wilson County on an inadequate training theory of liability.
III.

Claims Against Sheriff Bryan In His Individual Capacity
Mr. Munson concedes that “Defendant Bryan was not involved individually.” (Response

at p. 5.) Therefore, any claims against Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity must rest on
either a theory of vicarious liability (or respondeat superior) for the actions of Detective Barbee,
or on a theory of negligence by Sheriff Bryan in performing his supervisory tasks. For the
reasons discussed below, these theories fail with respect to both the § 1983 claims and the
Tennessee common law claims against Sheriff Bryan individually, and accordingly these claims
will be dismissed.

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A. § 1983 Claims Against Sheriff Bryan In His Individual Capacity
County officials in their individual capacity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the
grounds of respondeat superior; liability can only be found if they “‘either encouraged the
specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Heyerman v.
Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Phillips v. Roane Cnty., Tenn., 534
F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., Tenn., 453 F. App’x 557, 562-63 (6th
Cir. 2011). Any attempt to hold a county official liable under § 1983 for the conduct of an
employee based on the supervisor’s role in policymaking or employee training must be treated as
an action against the supervisor not in his or her individual capacity, but in his or her official
capacity, or as an action against the county. Harvey, 453 F. App’x at 563.
Vicarious liability is thus unavailable as a ground for the § 1983 claim against Sheriff
Bryan, individually. In support of his claim, Mr. Munson argues only that the “[C]omplaint sets
forth plain statement allegations that would allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that
Defendant Bryan’s lack of proper training, policy enforcement, and responsibility directly led to”
the alleged misconduct by Detective Barbee. (Response at pp. 8-9.) To the extent that this
allegation gives rise to a claim of negligence in policymaking or employee training, it would at
best give rise to a § 1983 claim against Wilson County (though, as discussed above, it is actually
insufficient to support this claim), not against Sheriff Bryan as an individual. Accordingly, there
are no grounds for § 1983 liability against Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity and this claim
will be dismissed.

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B. Tennessee Common Law Claims Against Sheriff Bryan In His Individual
Capacity
In support of his common law claims against Sheriff Bryan individually, Mr. Munson
argues only that the alleged misconduct by Detective Barbee gives rise to the inference that
Sheriff Bryan may have been negligent in some capacity. Mr. Munson offers no argument
explaining his legal grounds for any Tennessee common law claim against Sheriff Bryan in his
individual capacity, let alone how the allegations in the Complaint could support these claims.
Mr. Munson does not argue a legal ground for vicarious liability to attach to Sheriff Bryan for
the actions of Detective Barbee with respect to any of the Tennessee common law claims. And
to the extent that the Complaint contains boilerplate allegations against Sheriff Bryan for
negligence in his supervisory role, these allegations are not accompanied by sufficient factual
pleadings to support a claim under Tennessee common law. There are thus no grounds for any
Tennessee common law claims against Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity to proceed, and
these claims will be dismissed.
IV.

Punitive Damages Claims Against Detective Barbee In His Individual Capacity
Because the § 1983 claims against Wilson County and the § 1983 and Tennessee

common law claims against Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity will be dismissed, the
punitive damages claims associated with these causes of action will also be dismissed without
further analysis. This leaves only punitive damages arising from claims against Detective
Barbee in his individual capacity. For the reasons discussed below, these punitive damages
claims will not be dismissed at this stage.
The parties agree that punitive damages may be granted in connection with Mr. Munson’s
claims against Detective Barbee in his individual capacity, under both state and federal law, if
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Mr. Munson can demonstrate that Detective Barbee acted with some form of recklessness,
callousness, or malice. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (punitive damages are available
under § 1983 where there is “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights”); Hodges v.
S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 2002) (in Tennessee, punitive damages may be
awarded where “a defendant has acted either (1) intentionally, (2) fraudulently, (3) maliciously,
or (4) recklessly.”) While the allegations in the Complaint are certainly not the most egregious
the court has seen, at this stage of the litigation, the court cannot rule out the possibility that Mr.
Munson’s allegations could give rise to a finding of malicious, callous, or reckless conduct, once
the record is developed further. In particular, Mr. Munson alleges that Detective Barbee looked
at exonerating evidence, continued the investigation anyway, and told Mr. Munson “I don’t owe
you anything. We got our man, case closed.” Construed in the light most favorable to Mr.
Munson, these allegations could support a finding of recklessness.8 Therefore, the punitive
damages claims against Detective Barbee in his individual capacity will not be dismissed.
V.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-101 Claims
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-101, which is part of the Tennessee Code of Criminal

Procedure, states simply: “An arrest may be made either by: (1) An officer under a warrant; (2)

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The Wilson County Defendants argue that Mr. Munson’s allegations that Detective Barbee
arrested him over his protests of his innocence cannot, without more, give rise to a claim for
punitive damages. They argue that such a holding would subject to punitive damages any officer
arresting someone who verbally claims their innocence (a significant number of arrestees).
While the court agrees that such an outcome would be unsound, the court notes that Mr. Munson
actually alleges additional misconduct by Detective Barbee beyond simply arrest over
protestations of innocence; Mr. Munson’s factual allegations also include possible disregard for
tangible evidence and the continuation of Mr. Munson’s prosecution – including cooperation in
Mr. Munson’s second arrest for related charges in another county – despite already having
acquired potentially exonerating evidence.
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An officer without a warrant; or (3) A private person.” In addition to the fact that, as the Wilson
County Defendants argue, the Tennessee Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for any
private right of action, there is not even any language in § 40-7-101 that addresses the type of
misconduct alleged in the Complaint. The language Mr. Munson quotes without attribution in
the Complaint to support this cause of action – “Defendants did not act ‘prudently, reasonably,
and use ordinary care in making arrests including the ascertainment that the right person is being
arrested.’” (Complaint ¶ 112) – is not found in § 40-7-101. Rather, this language appears to have
been pulled from Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions cited in Mr. Munson’s briefing, which
discuss only Tennessee common law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. State ex.
Rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 471 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971); Woods v. Harell, 596
S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). These cases – like the other cases cited by Mr. Munson on
this issue – do not refer at all to § 40-7-101. Mr. Munson’s invocation of § 40-7-101 thus
appears to be an attempt to shoehorn his Tennessee common law claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment (which are contained separately in the Complaint) into claims for statutory
violations. This construction of the Tennessee Code, however, is untenable, and any claims
brought pursuant to § 40-7-101 against the Wilson County Defendants will be dismissed with
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Wilson County Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss will be
granted in part and denied in part. The following claims will be dismissed without prejudice: 1)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee in their official capacities,
and 2) claims against Sheriff Bryan in his individual capacity arising under both 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Tennessee common law. In addition, the claims brought pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN.
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§ 40-7-101 against Detective Bryan and Detective Barbee in their individual and official
capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. The Partial Motion to Dismiss is denied with respect
to punitive damages arising from individual capacity claims against Detective Barbee under both
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee common law.
Based on the court’s construction of the Second Amended Complaint, the following
claims against the Wilson County Defendants will proceed: 1) official capacity claims against
Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee under Tennessee common law (and associated punitive
damages claims), 2) individual capacity claims against Detective Barbee under both 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Tennessee common law (and associated punitive damages claims), and 3) official and
individual capacity claims against Sheriff Bryan and Detective Barbee under TENN. CODE ANN. §
8-8-301 et seq.
An appropriate order will enter.

________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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