Nash v. McHugh
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting 11 Motion to Transfer Case ; case transferred to Middle District of Tennessee. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 1/29/2015. cc: Counsel(KJA) [Transferred from Kentucky Western on 1/30/2015.]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-209
PATRICIA A. NASH
Plaintiff
v.
JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY, et al.
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant John McHugh’s Motion to Dismiss, or
Alternatively, to Transfer Case. (Docket No. 11). Plaintiff Patricia Nash has responded, (Docket
No. 12), and Defendant has replied, (Docket No. 13). This matter is now ripe for adjudication.
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or
Alternatively, to Transfer Case.
BACKGROUND
During the time period from June 1, 2011 to August 4, 2012, Nash was employed by
Eagle Applied Sciences, LLC (“EAS”), a subsidiary of Bristol Bay Native Corporation (“Bristol
Bay”). She worked for the Department of the Army pursuant to a contract between the Army
and EAS. Nash worked in the Behavioral Health unit, located at 2506 Indiana Avenue, Fort
Campbell, KY. (Docket No. 1). The Defendant John McHugh lists the same street address for
Nash’s place of work, but with the city and state of Fort Campbell, TN. (Docket No. 11).
Nash alleges that her direct supervisor, Christopher Egan, made “inappropriate,
aggressive, and offensive sexual advances.” (Docket No. 1). Nash alleges that Egan regularly
asked her if she wanted sex and called her on her personal cell phone after business hours.
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Further, Nash alleges that Egan exposed his genitals to her in June on 2011 and describes several
incidents of non-consensual and offensive touching perpetrated by Egan. Nash alleges that these
events culminated in two incidents on November 3, 2011 and November 8, 2011, where Egan
allegedly sexually assaulted Nash. Nash made a formal complaint with the Equal Employment
Office on December 21, 2011. She alleges that before she made the complaint, she had been
named as a recipient for a permanent psychologist technician position. Nash alleges that this
position was taken away from her because she filed a formal complaint.
Nash brings claims alleging sexual discrimination (harassment and hostile work
environment) and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq., intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and sex discrimination under KRS § 344.101, et seq. McHugh argues the Western
District of Kentucky is not the proper venue for this action.
STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including complaints,
contain a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a claim or case because the complaint fails
to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). When considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must presume all of the factual allegations in the
complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Total
Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v.
Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). “The court need not, however, accept
unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12
(6th Cir. 1987)).
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Even though a “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
omitted). Instead, the plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). A complaint should contain enough facts “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If, from the well-pleaded facts, the court cannot “infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Only a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Nash alleges that she was subjected to retaliation and discrimination on the basis of her
sex by her employer. Additionally, she has filed a decision of the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission noting her right to sue. McHugh argues the Western District of
Kentucky is not the proper venue for this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–5(f)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–5(f)(3) controls the venue for cases brought under Title VII. It
states:
(3) Each United States district court and each United States court of a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in [1] any judicial
district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
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been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial
district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged
unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such
district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the
respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of
Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall
in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–5(f)(3). “This statutory scheme indicates that Congress intended to limit
venue in Title VII cases to those jurisdictions concerned with the alleged discrimination.” Darby
v.. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 277 (D.D.C.2002). Only one of Title VII's venue
provisions must be satisfied for venue to be proper. Turnley v. Banc of America Inv. Servs. Inc.,
576 F.Supp.2d 204, 212 (D.Mass.2008).
McHugh argues that venue is not proper under any of the three venue provisions. The
first provision states that venue is appropriate in “any judicial district in the State in which the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–5(f)(3).
Nash lists the address of her place of work as being located in Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
(Docket No. 1). Further, she argues that because the unlawful employment activities took place
at Fort Campbell, which is federal property straddling both Kentucky and Tennessee, venue is
appropriate in either state.
McHugh provided the declaration of Robert G. Brundage, the
Installation Geospatial Information and Services Manager for Fort Campbell. (Docket No. 111). Brundage is responsible for geospatially tracking the location of real property in and around
Fort Campbell. He analyzed the location of the building located at 2506 Indiana Avenue and
concluded that although it has a Kentucky mailing address, the installation actually straddles the
state line; he stated that the building where Nash was employed is located in Montgomery
County, Tennessee. Similarly, Nash alleges that were she not subject to retaliation, she would
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have been given a different position, still located in the same building. Thus she argues that this
makes venue appropriate under the third provision as well, which gives venue “in the judicial
district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful
employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–5(f)(3). Again, Nash and McHugh contest which
state the building at 2506 Indiana Avenue is located in. The Court finds that because the
installation is technically located in the state of Tennessee, venue is not appropriate under the
first or third provision of the statute.
The second statutory provision states that venue is proper in the “judicial district in which
the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)–5(f)(3). Nash does not argue that venue is proper under this provision, noting that as
discovery has not yet occurred, she is unsure where employment records are kept. McHugh
argues that as Nash was an employee of EAS and Bristol Bay, the employment records would
not be maintained at Fort Campbell by the Army, with the exception of her complaint filed at the
Fort Campbell EEO office. McHugh argues that the EEO office is located in the state of
Tennessee. Thus, it does not appear that venue is proper under the second statutory provision.
Although the Court has decided that venue is not proper in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, the Court declines to dismiss the case. Rather, it will
transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The
Court finds that the transfer of this case would “be in the interest of justice” under 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a). Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant's motion and transfer this case to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a).
CONCLUSION
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For these reasons, and consistent with the Court’s conclusions above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively,
to Transfer Case, (Docket No. 11), is GRANTED and this case is TRANSFERRED to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
January 29, 2015
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