Sanders v. Young et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 12/3/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICHARD LEE SANDERS
v.
SHERIFF DARRELL YOUNG,
et al.

)
)
) NO. 3-15-0098
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
)

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant Genney Murray’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 35).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
FACTS
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 31) alleges violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights based upon alleged abuse and mistreatment
suffered by Plaintiff while incarcerated in the Cannon County Detention Facility. Plaintiff alleges
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Defendant Murray has filed
a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff’s claims against her are time-barred.
Plaintiff alleges that he first sought medical treatment in jail on February 18, 2014. He filed
his original Complaint in this Court on February 2, 2015 (Docket No. 1). That Complaint did not
name Genney Murray as a Defendant, although it alleged claims against “Jane Doe Nurse.” Plaintiff
did not serve Nurse Murray with the original Complaint.
On March 20, 2015, Defendants Young, Nichols, Mingle, Edwards, Bush and Brown filed
an Answer (Docket No. 11) to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in which they asserted the affirmative defense

of comparative fault1 and stated: “While County Defendants do not believe that Dr. Spurlock or any
nurses or other medical providers contracting with Cannon County did anything wrong in this action,
should this Court find otherwise, Cannon County is entitled to the defense of comparative fault
against those individuals.”2 Defendant Murray was not named in Defendants’ Answer.
The Initial Case Management Order (Docket No. 19), filed April 15, 2015, does not identify
Nurse Murray as a witness who may have discoverable information. Plaintiff contends that
Defendants’ counsel disclosed to Plaintiff the identity of Nurse Genney Murray on May 18, 2015.
On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Docket No. 25) to
name the various “Doe” Defendants in his original Complaint3 and to add Defendant Murray.
On July 2, 2015, the Magistrate Judge granted the portion of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to File Amended Complaint dealing with Nurse Murray, finding that Plaintiff was allowed to add
Defendant Murray based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, which deals with the affirmative
defense of comparative fault (Docket No. 30). Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on July
8, 2015, and Defendant Murray was served with the First Amended Complaint on July 17, 2015.
On August 7, 2015, Defendant Murray filed an Answer (Docket No. 34) and the pending Motion
to Dismiss (Docket No. 35).
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
1

Comparative fault does not apply to Section 1983 claims. Plaintiff asserts,
however, a negligence claim (Count III) under state law as to all Defendants.
2

In his separate Answer, filed May 28, 2015, Defendant Spurlock reserved the
right to plead the comparative negligence of Plaintiff or any other person or entity, without
identifying any such person. Docket No. 24.
3

Substituting a named defendant for a “John Doe” defendant is considered a
change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties. Cooper v. Rhea County, Tenn., 302 F.R.D.
195, 199 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
2

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation need not be accepted as true on a
motion to dismiss, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Fritz v. Charter
Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
DEFENDANT MURRAY’S MOTION
Defendant Murray contends that the claims against her are time-barred. According to the
First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Murray accrued no later than
February 18, 2014. The applicable statute of limitations for this civil rights action is one year.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a). Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Murray expired on February 18, 2015. Defendant Murray claims that she did not learn
of the claims against her until July 17, 2015, five months after the statute of limitations had expired.
Plaintiff argues that his claims against Defendant Murray are saved by Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-1-119, the statute cited by the Magistrate Judge in allowing Plaintiff’s Motion to File Amended

3

Complaint.4 That statute provides that when a defendant “alleges in an answer or amended answer”
that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the
plaintiff seeks recovery, “the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first answer
or first amended answer alleging that person’s fault,” amend the complaint to add the person as a
defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-1-119(a).
A cause of action brought within ninety days under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a) shall not
be barred by any statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(b). Thus, the plaintiff’s right
to assert a claim against a third party is revived under Section 20-1-119(a) for ninety days from the
date of the answer making the assertion that a third party is at fault. Soper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
923 F.Supp. 1032, 1038 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that successful amendments under Section 20-1-119
require four discrete actions within ninety days: (1) the filing and (2) granting of a motion to amend,
(3) the filing of an amended complaint, and (4) the issuance of process. Jones v. Professional
Motorcycle Escort Servs., L.L.C., 193 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tenn. 2006). Tennessee courts have
consistently held that the plaintiff’s motion to amend must be filed and granted, the amended
complaint must be filed, and process must be issued, all within ninety days to comply with Section
20-1-119. Id.
Defendant Murray argues that the Defendants’ Answer, in which comparative fault was first
pled, did not sufficiently identify Genny Murray. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that Tenn.

4

Plaintiff has conceded that the “relation back” portion of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 does
not apply in this case.
4

Code Ann. § 20-1-119 requires that the potential nonparty tortfeasor be identified sufficiently to
allow the plaintiff to plead and serve process on such person. See Woodward v. City of Gallatin, 58
F.Supp.3d 862, 868 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (citing Brown v. Wal-Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785,
788 (Tenn. 2000)).
Section 20-1-119 will operate to lift the limitations bar only when the pleading of
comparative fault identifies the tortfeasors sufficiently to enable service of process upon them.
Woodward, 58 F.Supp.3d at 868. Here, Plaintiff could not have identified the individual nurse from
Defendants’ Answer because the answer referred only generally to “nurses” and did not name
anyone specific. Defendants’ general identification of “any nurses or other medical providers” is
insufficient to indicate specific potential defendants.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit and the Tennessee Court of Appeals both prohibit the use of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 when the potential nonparty tortfeasor is identified through a means
other than an original defendant’s answer. Woodward, 58 F.Supp. 3d at 869. Here, Plaintiff
acknowledges that he learned of the identity of Nurse Murray from counsel for other Defendants on
May 18, 2015, not through Defendants’ Answer.
By its own terms, the statute applies only where a defendant alleges in an answer or
amended answer that a person not a party caused or contributed to the alleged injury. Shaffer v.
Memphis Airport Authority, Service Mgmt. Systems, Inc., 2013 WL 209309 at * 7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 18, 2013). This language is clear and unambiguous. A letter, email, phone call or discovery
responses from Defendants’ attorney simply are not the same thing as an answer. Id.; see also
Grindstaff v. Bowman, 2008 WL 2219274 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2008) (letter from defendant’s

5

attorney, which was not made part of defendant’s answer, is simply not the same thing as an
answer).
In Wagner v. International Automotive Components Group North America, Inc., __
F.Supp.3d __, 2015 WL 5512899 at * 3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 15, 2015), this Court held that the nonparty must be named, as specified by the clear language of the statute, “in an answer or amended
answer,” not in a discovery response or other manner. See also Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d 289, 294
(6th Cir. 2007) (learning the identity of a third party through a discovery disclosure instead of an
answer precluded application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119).
Even if Defendants’ Answer was sufficient to provide reasonable notice to Plaintiff of the
identity of Nurse Murray, which it was not, and even if Plaintiff was allowed to learn Nurse
Murray’s identity through discovery rather than the Answer, which he is not, Plaintiff still did not
meet the ninety-day time requirement of Section 20-1-119.
Plaintiff contends that he filed his Motion to File Amended Complaint on June 3, 2015,
within the ninety-day window, and attached the proposed Amended Complaint to his Motion.
Plaintiff also argues that process issued for Defendant Murray on June 17, 2015, even though it was
not served upon her until July 17, 2015. Plaintiff’s Motion to File Amended Complaint was not
granted until July 2, 2015, however, and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was not filed until July 8,
2015.5
As stated above, one of the requirements of Section 20-1-119 is that the motion to amend be
granted. The motion to amend must be filed and granted, the amended complaint must be filed, and

5

Indeed, as a result of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to File
Amended Complaint, the Amended Complaint ultimately filed (Docket No. 31) was not the same
as the proposed Amended Complaint attached to his Motion (Docket No. 25-2).
6

process must be issued, all within ninety days to comply with Section 20-1-119. Jones, 193 S.W.3d
at 570 (citing Young v. Toys R Us, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 1035, 1036 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (holding
plaintiff’s claims to be time-barred, even though delay was attributable to trial court’s failure to
grant motion to amend within the ninety days) and Ward v. AMI SUB (SFH), Inc., 149 S.W.3d 35,
39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment where plaintiff filed
motion to amend and caused process to be issued but did not file amended complaint within the
ninety-day period)).
Plaintiff cites Soper to support his arguments, but in Soper, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
contentions and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff (despite reasonable
notice and available federal discovery tools) did not file his amended complaint against the
defendant within ninety days. Soper, 923 F.Supp. at 1038.
Plaintiff also cites Romine v. Fernandez, 124 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In Romine,
the court held that the original defendant’s answer provided reasonable notice of a third party claim,
although it did not specifically name that third party. In Romine, however, the plaintiff filed his
amended complaint within the ninety-day time period. Id. at 604; Shaffer, 2013 WL 209309 at * 6.
Plaintiff cites Jones to argue that the Tennessee Supreme Court requires only “substantial
compliance” with Section 20-1-119. In Jones, however, as with Romine, the amended complaint
was filed, service of process was obtained, and leave to amend was granted, all within the ninety-day
time frame required by Section 20-1-119; they just did not occur in that order, the motion to amend
being filed last. Jones, 193 S.W.3d at 570. The issue in Jones was not whether the ninety-day time

7

requirement was met; the issue was whether in order to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.01, a motion
for leave to amend must be filed before any other steps toward amendment take place.6
Finally, Plaintiff argues that granting Defendant Murray’s Motion would impose an “absurd
injustice” upon him. As the courts noted in Ward and in Young, enforcing this statute may yield a
harsh result, but there is neither a clear absence of legislative directive nor an ambiguity in the
statute, and it is not within the province of the Court to rewrite the plain language of a statute. See
Ward at 39 and Young at 1036.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Defendant Murray’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 35) is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Murray are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6

Here, Plaintiff has conceded any arguments based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
8