Awad et al v. Tyson Foods, Inc. et al

Filing 168

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion to ascertain status (Docket Entry No. 123 ) is GRANTED as evidenced by the ruling in this order. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 5/18/2016. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
FARAH AWAD, et al.,
Plaintiffs
v.
TYSON FOODS, INC., et al.,
Defendants

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No. 3:15-0130
Chief Judge Sharp/Bryant
Jury Demand

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants have filed their motion for protective order
or, in the alternative, motion to quash third-party subpoenas
(Docket Entry No. 101), and Plaintiffs have filed a response in
opposition (Docket Entry No. 107). Defendants have filed a reply
(Docket Entry No. 114) and Plaintiffs have filed a surreply (Docket
Entry No. 119). Plaintiffs have filed a motion to ascertain status
of Defendants’ motion for protective order (Docket Entry No. 123)
and Defendants have filed a response (Docket Entry No. 124).
Plaintiffs have filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 125).
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for
protective order and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to ascertain status.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs have filed this collective action on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., at

Defendants’ meat processing facility in Goodlettsville, Tennessee
(Docket Entry No. 17). Defendants have denied liability (Docket
Entry No. 122).
SUMMARY OF FACTS PERTINENT TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
Hanaa Abadeer and others filed an earlier action (“the
Abadeer case”) in February 2009 alleging FLSA violations at the
Tyson Goodlettsville facility. The Abadeer case was settled in
October 2014. (Case No. 3:09-0125 at Docket Entry No. 420).
Defendants in this action seek a protective order forbidding the
disclosure of certain deposition testimony taken in the earlier
Abadeer

case.

Plaintiffs

here

have

attempted

to

obtain

this

testimony by serving Rule 45 subpoenas upon counsel for Plaintiffs
in the Abadeer action.
ANALYSIS
Rule 45(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the court for good cause to issue an order to protect a
party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense including, but not limited to, the forbidding of certain
disclosure or discovery.
Defendants argue that the Court should forbid discovery
of the subject deposition transcripts because (1) this testimony
was

designated

as

confidential

pursuant

to

the

terms

of

a

protective order entered in the Abadeer case, (2) the deposition

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testimony sought is irrelevant in this action, and (3) the Rule 45
subpoenas served by Plaintiffs were untimely. Plaintiffs disagree.
On January 12, 2010, the Court entered a protective order
in

the

Abadeer

action

(Docket

Entry

No.

127

in

that

case).

Paragraph 4 of that order provides a procedure by which Defendants
could designate deposition testimony by a present or former Tyson
employee or agent as “confidential.” According to this paragraph,
defense

counsel

could

have

designated

such

testimony

as

confidential on the record during the deposition or, alternatively,
defense

counsel

could

designate

testimony

as

confidential

by

written designations served on Plaintiffs’ counsel within 11 days
after the court reporter mailed the deposition transcripts to
counsel.
This protective order also provides that deposition
testimony designated as confidential “shall be used solely for the
prosecution

or

defense

of

this

litigation

and

for

no

other

purpose.” (Docket Entry No. 127 in the Abadeer action at 3).
Finally, paragraph 9 of the Abadeer protective order provides that
any deposition transcriptions classified as confidential pursuant
to the protective order, as well as any copies thereof, shall be
turned over to defense counsel or destroyed within 30 days of the
termination of the litigation.

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A district court enjoys broad discretion in managing
discovery. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993). The
undersigned

Magistrate

Judge

finds

that

the

protective

order

entered in the Abadeer case should be enforced. If defense counsel
in the Abadeer action designated any deposition testimony as
specified by the terms of the protective order in that case, such
testimony

should

have

been

returned

to

defense

counsel

or,

alternatively, destroyed by Plaintiffs’ counsel within 30 days
after the case was settled in 2014. The undersigned finds that the
Court in this action should regard that as done which should have
been done. Therefore, if Defendants here can demonstrate that the
subject deposition testimony was designated as confidential in the
Abadeer action in accordance with the protective order in that
case, Defendants’ motion here for a protective order forbidding the
disclosure of such testimony should be granted.
Defendants’ arguments based upon relevance and timeliness
are less persuasive. Defendants argue that at least some of the
deposition testimony sought by Plaintiff here is not relevant
because

the

testimony

described

work

practices

at

the

Tyson

facility that existed prior to the time period covered by the
claims in this case. Also, Defendants argue that the subject
subpoenas were untimely because they were served four days after
the October 30, 2015, deadline for completion of written discovery.

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Plaintiffs say that they provided defense counsel copies of the
subject subpoenas on October 30, 2015, prior to the expiration of
this deadline. The undersigned finds that Defendants’ arguments
based upon relevance of the deposition testimony and timeliness of
service of the subpoenas lack merit. Therefore, the undersigned
concludes that, to the extent that any of the subject testimony was
not properly designated as confidential pursuant to the Abadeer
protective order, Defendants’ motion for protective order should be
DENIED

and

such

deposition

testimony

should

be

produced

to

Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ motion to ascertain status (Docket Entry No.
123) is GRANTED as evidenced by the ruling in this order.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

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