Block v. Meharry Medical College
Filing
73
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re #14 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. For reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff's initial motion for leave to amend his complaint be denied as moot, and that Plaintiff's amended motion for leave to amend his complaint be denied as futile. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 5/26/2016. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ROBERT M. BLOCK,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
v.
MEHARRY MEDICAL COLLEGE,
Defendant
No. 3:15-0204
Chief Judge Sharp/Bryant
Jury Demand
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Block has filed his motion for leave to amend
his
complaint
(Docket
Entry
No.
14)
to
which
Defendant
has
responded in opposition (Docket Entry No. 19). Plaintiff thereafter
filed his amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (Docket
Entry No. 43) to which Defendant responded in opposition (Docket
Entry No. 45).
For reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s initial motion for leave to amend
his complaint be denied as moot, and that Plaintiff’s amended
motion for leave to amend his complaint be denied as futile.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Robert M. Block has filed this action pursuant
to Title VII alleging that his employer, Defendant Meharry Medical
College (“Meharry”) unlawfully discriminated against him because of
his race and color and unlawfully retaliated against him because of
his protected activities, including opposition to and complaint of
racial discrimination (Docket Entry No. 1). Defendant Meharry has
denied liability and asserted affirmative defenses (Docket Entry
No. 4).
ANALYSIS
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a motion for leave to amend a complaint filed later
than 21 days after the answer is filed requires the opposition
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. This rule further
provides that the court should freely give leave “when justice so
requires.” The Sixth Circuit has directed that courts in deciding
a motion to amend “should consider undue delay in filing, lack of
notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.”
Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th Cir.
2005). A proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended,
could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pascarella, 2011 WL 3468729 at *3 (E.D.
Tenn. Aug. 8, 2011).
Plaintiff Block by his first motion for leave to amend
his complaint (Docket Entry No. 14) sought to add a new claim for
relief pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act and a new claim
for violating Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-1-102. This latter
2
statute provides a private right of action for procuring employees
by means of false or deceptive representations. By his amended
motion for leave to amend his complaint (Docket Entry No. 43),
Plaintiff Block seeks to withdraw his claim for relief under the
Tennessee Human Rights Act, but preserves his request for leave to
include a claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-102. Defendant Meharry
opposes this proposed amendment on the ground that this new claim
is barred by the statute of limitations.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-102 does not contain its own
statute
of
limitations,
and
the
parties
disagree
about
the
appropriate limitations period to be applied. Defendant Meharry
argues that the one-year statute of limitations provided in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104, applicable to civil actions sounding in tort,
should be applied here (Docket Entry No. 19 at 3). Plaintiff Block,
on
the
other
hand,
argues
that
the
three-year
statute
of
limitations applicable to property tort actions and codified in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 should apply. Neither party has cited
any Tennessee case that has applied the statute of limitations to
a claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-102.
Defendant Meharry argues in the alternative that, even if
a three-year statute of limitations applies to this claim, the
claim is nevertheless barred. As grounds for this argument, Meharry
relies upon Plaintiff Block’s statement in paragraph 47 of his
3
proposed amended complaint which state the following: “Plaintiff
Block did not learn until February 2012 that Defendant Meharry’s
representations
were
false
and
that
he
would
be
working
as
Associate Professor instead of Professor” (Docket Entry No. 14-1 at
12). Accepting arguendo Plaintiff’s argument that a three-year
statute of limitations applies, Meharry asserts that the statute of
limitations nevertheless expired on this claim in February 2015.
Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was filed on March 3, 2015
(Docket Entry No. 1), and, according to Meharry, the new claim
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 is therefore barred.
In
response,
Plaintiff
argues
that
the
doctrine
of
equitable tolling is applicable here to toll the running of the
statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff Block relies upon
a written report of a “final evaluation” of Plaintiff Block that
was apparently conducted by the executive vice dean of Meharry on
August 16, 2012 (Docket Entry No. 44-1). Under the category
entitled
“Scholarly
Activity
and
Special
Development,”
the
following sentence appears: “It is recommended that you submit your
promotion packet for consideration.” Plaintiff Block argues that on
August
16,
2012,
the
vice
dean
of
Meharry
recommended
that
Plaintiff Block submit his “promotion packet for consideration.”
Plaintiff argues that he “believ[ed] that it would be approved and
that he would then be Professor.” However, Plaintiff Block later
4
received a letter dated November 1, 2012, from Dean Southerland
advising that his application for promotion had been denied (Docket
Entry No. 44-2). Plaintiff argues that he was misled by the vice
dean and “believed” that his application for promotion would be
granted and that he would be promoted to full professor.
Tennessee courts have held that successful assertion of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel or equitable tolling requires
that the plaintiff show that (1) the defendant knew or should have
known that its conduct would induce the Plaintiff to delay filing
suit, (2) the plaintiff’s reliance on this conduct was reasonable,
and (3) the plaintiff’s delay was not unreasonable or due to lack
of diligence. Northeast Knox Utility District v. Stanfort Const.
Co., 206 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hardcastle
v.
Harris,
170
S.W.3d
67,
85
(Tenn.
Ct.
App.
2004)).
Where
equitable estoppel has been raised, a court must determine whether
the defendant engaged in conduct specifically designed to prevent
plaintiff from suing in time. Fahner v. SW Manufacturing, Inc., 48
S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001). A clear example, and the one most
prominent in the case law, is a defendant’s promise not to plead
the statute of limitations, which he breaks once the plaintiff has
waited for the statute to expire before filing his complaint. Id.
“Equitable estoppel only applies when the defendant has taken steps
to specifically prevent the plaintiff from timely filing his
5
complaint (as where he promises not to plead the statute of
limitations).” Fahner 48 S.W.3d at 146.
Here, Plaintiff Block alleges that he was hired by
Defendant Meharry in September 2011 upon the representation that he
would be employed as a Professor and Chair of the Department of
Endodontics at Meharry’s School of Dentistry (Docket Entry No. 14-1
at 3-4). Plaintiff admits that he learned in February 2012 “that
Defendant Meharry’s representations were false and that he would be
working as Associate Professor instead of Professor.” (Docket Entry
No. 14-1 at 12). The undersigned finds from this admission that
Plaintiff’s cause of action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 accrued
in February 2012. In the absence of equitable tolling, the statute
of limitations, when viewed most favorably to Plaintiff Block,
expired at least by the end of February 2015.
Considering the facts alleged by Plaintiff Block in a
light most favorable to him, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds
that these facts are insufficient to support an application of the
doctrine of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Specifically,
evidence
that
the
vice
dean
recommended
that
Plaintiff Block submit his promotion packet “for consideration”
almost a year after he was employed by Defendant Meharry fails to
amount to conduct by Defendant Meharry “specifically designed to
prevent Plaintiff from suing in time.” Plaintiff has offered no
6
claim that such a recommendation by the vice dean was in any way
tied to Plaintiff’s assertion of a claim against Meharry. Moreover,
a willingness to consider Plaintiff’s promotion packet after almost
a year on the job cannot remotely compare to a defendant’s promise
not to plead statute of limitations, which is cited as the most
prominent example of an inducement that would support equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.
In conclusion, the undersigned finds that the facts
offered by Plaintiff Block, even viewed in a light most favorable
to him, cannot support an application of equitable tolling and,
therefore, the statute of limitations on his claim under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-1-102 expired, at the latest, by the of February 2015.
Therefore, this claim is barred and Plaintiff’s motion to amend his
complaint in order to assert his claim should be denied as futile.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends
that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint (Docket
Entry No. 14) should be denied as moot because it was superseded by
his later motion to amend. In addition, the undersigned recommends
that Plaintiff’s amended motion for leave to amend his complaint
(Docket Entry No. 43) be denied as futile.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any
party
has
14
days
from
receipt
7
of
this
Report
and
Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTER this 26th day of May, 2016.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge
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