American General Life Insurance Company v. Mason et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 12/14/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
WILLIAM D. MASON and
PATRICK T. DAVIS

)
)
) NO. 3-15-0340
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Defendant Davis’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.
35). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Davis’ Motion is GRANTED.
INTRODUCTION
This interpleader and declaratory judgment action was filed by American General Life
Insurance Company regarding a life insurance policy (“the Policy”) dated September 28, 1990,
covering the life of Patrick Davis. The Policy contained a Spouse’s Term Life Insurance Rider
(“Spousal Rider”) that provided for payment of the death benefit to the Insured (Davis) in the event
that the Spouse, Mia Davis, predeceased the Insured.
The Spouse’s Term Life Insurance Rider specifically provided: “If the Spouse dies before
the Termination Date of this rider, and while this rider is in force, we will pay the Death Benefit to
the Insured after we receive due proof of death and proper written notice of claim.” Docket No. 1-1,
p. 19.
On June 10, 1996, Patrick Davis executed a document called Absolute Assignment of Life
Insurance Policy (“the Assignment”), in which he assigned to William D. Mason, Sr., by gift, “all

incidents of ownership and control, and all right, title and interest in and to” the Policy. Docket No.
1-1, p.1. In that Assignment, Patrick Davis is listed as the Insured and Mia Davis is listed as the
Beneficiary. Id.
Patrick Davis and Mia Davis divorced, and Mia Davis died shortly thereafter, on November
27, 2013. Defendants Mason and Davis have submitted to Plaintiff competing claims to the death
benefit under the Spousal Rider. Plaintiff claims no title to or interest in the life insurance benefits
payable on the death of Mia Davis and has filed this action for declaratory judgment, asking the
Court to release Plaintiff from liability for the death benefit payable under the Spousal Rider and to
determine which Defendant is entitled to that money. By Order of the Magistrate Judge, the sum of
$55,000 plus accrued interest, was deposited into the Court’s registry until such time as the Court
makes a decision as to which party is entitled to receive the death benefit.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pennington v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). The party bringing the summary
judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and
identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material
facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this
burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the non-moving party’s claim
or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence, facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk
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Western Railroad, Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court does not, however, weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will be insufficient to survive summary
judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving
party. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595.
ANALYSIS
Defendant Davis argues that the Assignment to Mason transferred ownership of the Policy
but did not change the Beneficiary or the Insured. Therefore, as the Insured, Davis claims he is
entitled to the Spousal Rider’s death benefit.
Defendant Mason, on the other hand, contends that transfer of ownership through the
Assignment gave him control of the policy and all benefits, values, and privileges allowed by
Plaintiff, including being the beneficiary. Defendant Mason also contends that Mr. Davis submitted
a second Request Form changing the named beneficiary from Defendant Davis and naming his sisterin-law as the contingent beneficiary.
Mason supports this argument with the Affidavit of Charles Williams, an employee of
Plaintiff American General. Docket No. 39-1. Williams states that Defendant Davis executed not
only the Assignment of ownership of the policy to Mr. Mason, but also a form changing the
Beneficiary of the Policy from himself and his mother-in-law to his sister-in-law, Yolanda Jones “as
the contingent beneficiary.” Id.

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There are several problems with Mr. Mason’s argument. First, no one has presented a copy
of this change of beneficiary form - we have only the hearsay testimony of Mr. Williams. In addition,
even if Mr. Davis changed the Beneficiary under the Policy, as Mr. Mason claims, that change
(according to Mr. Williams) was to make Yolanda Jones a contingent beneficiary, not Mr. Mason.
Yolanda Jones is not a party to this action. Finally, and most importantly, the Spousal Rider provides
for payment to the Insured, not the Beneficiary, so even if the Beneficiary had changed, the language
of the Spousal Rider does not provide for payment to the Beneficiary.
Obviously, the Assignment could not have changed the Insured under the Policy. Mr. Davis
remained the Insured at all times, no matter if the Owner or Beneficiary changed. And the Spousal
Rider specifically provides for payment to the Insured.
The Court finds that Defendant Davis, as the Insured, is entitled to payment of the Spousal
Rider death benefit. The Court interprets the language of the Policy as written, and that language,
“we will pay the Death Benefit to the Insured,” will be enforced.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant Davis’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 35) is
GRANTED, and Defendant Davis is awarded judgment in the amount of the benefits deposited into
the Court, $55,000, plus interest. The Clerk shall award that money to Defendant Patrick T. Davis.
This action is DISMISSED, and the Clerk is directed to close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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