Spearman v. Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools

Filing 12

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 11) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Clifton Knowles on 9/15/2015. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

ANTONIA L. SPEARMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-00671
Judge Trauger / Knowles

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction and Background
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Docket No. 11. Defendant has contemporaneously filed a supporting
Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 11-1), and a copy of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of
Discrimination (Docket No. 11-2). As grounds for its Motion, Defendant argues that this action
should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination was untimely filed;
(2) Plaintiff did not allege discrimination based upon race, color, sex, religion, and national
origin in her EEOC Charge of Discrimination, yet alleges so in her Complaint; (3) Plaintiff’s
EEOC Charge of Discrimination alleges only age discrimination, yet Plaintiff does not allege age
discrimination in her Complaint; and (4) Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools is not an entity
that can be sued. Docket No. 11-1.
Plaintiff has not responded to the instant Motion.
Plaintiff, pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis
of her race, color, sex, religion, and national origin. Docket No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant failed to promote her and, in fact, “failed to give written reasons for the
downgrading” of her from an Assistant Principal to a classroom teacher. Id. Plaintiff further
alleges “poor leadership.” Id. Plaintiff avers that the circumstances under which Defendant
allegedly discriminated against her were as follows:
The Administrative team of the Metropolitan Nashville Public
Schools reduced me from Assistant Principal to classroom teacher
status after nine years of leadership on an Assistant Principal level.
The Principal and Executive Director agreed to give a written copy
of the reasons for the downgrading but, written reasons were never
received from the two Administrators. My concerns were made
known to the Associate Superintendent of Elementary Schools and
the Director of the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, but no
response.
Id.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as three years back pay at the
Assistant Principal level with “year level pay increase.” Id. Plaintiff additionally notes that she
has $111,000 in student loan debt. Id. It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks compensation for, or
reimbursement of, that debt.
Prior to filing the case at bar, Plaintiff took the following actions.
On February 6, 2014, Plaintiff completed her EEOC Intake Questionnaire. Docket No. 11, p. 3-7. The cover letter to that Questionnaire states in pertinent part: “NOTE: CHARGES
MUST BE FILED WITHIN 300 DAYS OF THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY ACTION.”
Id., p. 3 (Capitalization and underlining original). The cover letter also states, “My signature
acknowledges that I have read this notice.” Id. Plaintiff signed the letter. Id.
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The following day, on February 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge of
Discrimination which alleges discrimination based solely upon age. Docket No. 11-2. In her
Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
I was hired by [Defendant] in 1991 as a Teacher. In 2004, I was
promoted to Assistant Principal. On or about May 3, 2013, I was
told by Principal Melinda Williams and her supervisor, Mildred
Nelson, that I was going to be demoted to a Teacher position.. On
or about the afternoon of May 3, 2013, I requested retirement.
Despite asking Ms. Williams, Ms. Nelson, and Ms. Brenda Steele,
I was never told why I was to be demoted.
I believe that I was discriminated against because of my age (59),
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
as amended.
Id.
On April 30, 2015, Plaintiff received her EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue
letter. Docket No. 1-1. That Notice stated in relevant part:
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law
based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be
filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your
right to sue based on this charge will be lost.
Id. (Capitalization and emphasis original).
Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 16, 2015. Docket No. 1.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) - Motion to Dismiss
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a claim may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements to
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sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir.
2005). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not
suffice. Id. A complaint containing a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a
legally cognizable right of action is insufficient. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1965 (2007). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level”; they must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. At 1965,
1974. See also, Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th
Cir. 2007).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the appropriate
standard that must be applied in considering a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Iqbal Court stated in part as follows:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,
the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice . . . . Rule
8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of
Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not “show[n]” - “that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations omitted).

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B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. Generally
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects employees from
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and
provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless the claimant
explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can reasonably be expected to grow out
of the EEOC charge. Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1998)
(citing Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1991)). Thus, as a
prerequisite to bringing a Title VII discrimination claim in federal court, a claimant is required to
file a charge of discrimination or retaliation with the EEOC and is precluded from seeking
judicial review until the Commission has made a final disposition of his claim. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5. See also, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 1887, 52

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L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977). The wording of the allegations in the EEOC charge does not, however,
have to be exact or all-encompassing; rather, the court may consider allegations not explicitly
stated in the EEOC charge if those allegations could reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination. Tipler v E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 433 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir.
1971) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1970); King v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F.Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968)).
2. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII, a
plaintiff must prove that:
1) she is a member of a protected class;
2) she was qualified for her job and performed it satisfactorily;
3) despite her qualifications and performance, she suffered an
adverse employment action;1 and
4) she was replaced by a person outside the protected class or
was treated less favorably than a similarly situated
individual outside her protected class.
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)) (footnote added).
A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII either by introducing
direct evidence of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence that would support an
inference of discrimination. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th Cir. 2000),
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An adverse employment action is one that causes a materially adverse change in a term
of employment, such as significantly diminished responsibilities, termination, a demotion
evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, or a material loss of benefits.
See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1996).
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citing Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir.1997). “The direct evidence
and the circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff need only prove one or
the other, not both.” Id.
Under the direct evidence approach, once the plaintiff introduces evidence that the
employer terminated him because of his protected status, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to prove that it would have terminated the plaintiff even had it not been
motivated by discrimination. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572, citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 244-45, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989)).
If the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, the circumstantial evidence
approach is used and the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine tripartite test is employed. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), as
later clarified by Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67
L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine tripartite test requires the plaintiff to
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff is able to do so, a
mandatory presumption of discrimination is created and the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.
Id. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason
was actually pretextual. Id. The plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that, 1) the stated
reasons had no basis in fact; 2) the stated reasons were not the actual reasons; or 3) the stated
reasons were insufficient to explain the defendant’s action. Id. See also, Cicero v. Borg-Warner
Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2002). “A reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext
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for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 407 (1993).
C. The Case at Bar
As discussed above, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless
the claimant explicitly files the claim in an EEOC Charge of Discrimination or the claim can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC Charge. Abeita, 159 F.3d at 254 (citing Ang,
932 F.2d at 544-45). In the instant action, Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination alleges
discrimination solely based upon age. Docket No. 11-2. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, does
not so allege; rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
religion, and national origin. Docket No. 1.
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination alleges as follows:
I was hired by [Defendant] in 1991 as a Teacher. In 2004, I was
promoted to Assistant Principal. On or about May 3, 2013, I was
told by Principal Melinda Williams and her supervisor, Mildred
Nelson, that I was going to be demoted to a Teacher position.. On
or about the afternoon of May 3, 2013, I requested retirement.
Despite asking Ms. Williams, Ms. Nelson, and Ms. Brenda Steele,
I was never told why I was to be demoted.
I believe that I was discriminated against because of my age (59),
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
as amended.
Docket No. 11-2.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, avers:
The Administrative team of the Metropolitan Nashville Public
Schools reduced me from Assistant Principal to classroom teacher
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status after nine years of leadership on an Assistant Principal level.
The Principal and Executive Director agreed to give a written copy
of the reasons for the downgrading but, written reasons were never
received from the two Administrators. My concerns were made
known to the Associate Superintendent of Elementary Schools and
the Director of the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, but no
response.
Docket No. 1.
As can be seen, Plaintiff explicitly stated in her EEOC Charge of Discrimination that she
believed she was discriminated against solely on the basis of her age. Docket No. 11-2. In her
EEOC Charge, she does not aver that she was discrimination against based upon race, color, sex,
religion, and national origin, nor can those claims reasonably be expected to grow out of the
allegations in her EEOC Charge. Abeita, 159 F.3d at 254 (citing Ang, 932 F.2d at 544-45).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to her race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin claims, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims.
Moreover, Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools is not an entity capable of being sued.
Haines v. Metropolitan Government of Davidson County, Tennessee, 32 F.Supp.2d 991, 994-95
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (“The Metropolitan Board of Public Education is not capable of being sued
separately and distinctly from the Metropolitan Government. . . . Under Tennessee law, such
capacity lies with the Metropolitan Government and not the Metropolitan Board of Public
Education.”).
Finally, taking the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint as true, they fail to state a prima
facie claim of discrimination. Plaintiff acknowledges that she chose to retire rather than be
demoted, and she does not aver facts that demonstrate either that she was replaced by a person
outside the protected class or that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated
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individual outside her protected class. Absent such a showing, Plaintiff cannot sustain her claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 11) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

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E. CLIFTON KNOWLES
United States Magistrate Judge

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