Zirker v. Southern Health Partners et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 7/2/2015. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
VINCENT ZIRKER,1
Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS,
et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:15-cv-00724
Chief Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Vincent Zirker, an inmate at the Robertson County Detention Center in Springfield,
Tennessee, brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Southern Health Partners, Brandon Smith, Melissa Wilson, the Robertson County Detention Center,
the Knoll Crest Surgical Alliance, and Sheriff f/n/u Holt, alleging that the plaintiff is not receiving
proper medical treatment while incarcerated. (Docket No. 1). As relief, the plaintiff seeks money
damages. (Id. at p. 2).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
I.

PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly

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No inmate number is provided on any of the plaintiff’s materials.

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requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).

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III.

Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff Zirker seeks relief pursuant to § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
IV.

Alleged Facts
The complaint alleges that, while incarcerated at the Robertson County Detention Center,

the plaintiff has been denied medical treatment for painful and bloody urination and defecation for
a period of two weeks. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 1-2). The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff
specifically sought help from defendant Brandon Smith who “lied” about medication for the plaintiff
and refused to observe the plaintiff’s conditions “for the record.” (Id.) The plaintiff claims that
Southern Health Partners and Knoll Crest Surgical Alliance failed to train their employees to
properly treat inmates such as the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 1). The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the
defendants’ failure to treat his health problems, he is anemic, in pain, and weak. (Id. at pp. 1-2).
V.

Analysis
The plaintiff names Southern Health Partners, Brandon Smith, Melissa Wilson, the

Robertson County Detention Center, the Knoll Crest Surgical Alliance, and Sheriff f/n/u Holt as
defendants to this action.
A.

Claims against the Robertson County Detention Center

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As to the plaintiff’s claims against the Robertson County Detention Center, a jail or justice
center is a building where prisoners are held and therefore is not a “person” that can be sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July
27, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley County Justice Center on the same basis);
Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005)
(“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable entity within the meaning of § 1983.”). Thus,
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the Robertson County
Detention Center.
To the extent the claims against the Robertson County Detention Center might be liberally
construed as claims against Robertson County, Tennessee, in order to sue a local government under
§ 1983, the plaintiff must allege that “it is [the] execution of [the] government's policy or custom
. . . [that] inflicts the injury . . . .” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018,
56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In other words, for Robertson County to be liable to the plaintiff under §
1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official policy or custom and the alleged
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Here, the plaintiff offers nothing to suggest that his rights were violated pursuant to a policy
or regulation of Robertson County. Consequently, whether construed as a claim against the
Robertson County Detention Center or against Robertson County, Tennessee, the complaint fails
to state claims upon which relief can be granted under § 1983. Those claims, therefore, will be
dismissed.
B.

Claims against Sheriff Holt and Melissa Wilson

Although the plaintiff names Sheriff Holt and Melissa Wilson as defendants to this action,

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the complaint does not allege that either Sheriff Holt or Melissa Wilson played any role whatsoever
in the alleged unconstitutional conduct about which the plaintiff complains. (Id. at pp. 1-2).
A plaintiff “must allege how each defendant was personally involved in the acts about which
the plaintiff complains.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375 (1976). The plaintiff must “allege ‘with
particularity’ all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has
violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834,
842 (6th Cir. 2002). Because the plaintiff’s allegations omit how Sheriff Holt and Melissa Wilson
were personally involved in the acts about which the plaintiff complains, the Court will dismiss the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against those defendants for failure to state claims upon which relief can
be granted.
C.

Denial of medical treatment claims

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes an obligation to provide
prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, recreation, and medical care.
Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1119-1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). The failure to provide such
necessities is a violation of an inmate’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Bellamy
v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the failure of Smith, Southern Health Partners, and
Knoll Crest Surgicial Alliance to treat the plaintiff’s health problems, he is anemic, in pain, and
weak. Thus, the plaintiff alleges that he has suffered and continues to suffer as a result of the alleged
denial of medical treatment. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 401 (6th Cir. 1999)(to set forth
a viable claim for the denial of medical care, the plaintiff must argue that his health suffered as a
consequence of such alleged denial). The court finds that these claims are not frivolous under the

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PLRA. However, the court cautions that this finding is preliminary; the record should be developed
for further consideration of the plaintiff’s allegations.
VII.

Conclusion
As set forth above, the plaintiff has stated non-frivolous denial of medical treatment claims

against defendants Southern Health Partners, Knoll Crest Surgical Alliance, and Brandon Smith
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. These claims will be allowed to proceed for further
development.
However, the plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Holt, Melissa Wilson, and the Robertson
County Detention Center, whether construed as a claim against the Detention Center or against
Robertson County, fail to state § 1983 claims upon which relief can be granted, and those claims
must be dismissed under the PLRA.
An appropriate order will follow.

___________________________________
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief United States District Judge

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