Lackey v. Tennessee Corrections Institute et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 8/10/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (afs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DAVID D. LACKEY,
No. 00490308,
Plaintiff,
v.
TENNESSEE CORRECTIONS
INSTITUTE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:15-cv-00843
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff David D. Lackey, an inmate of the Wilson County Jail in Lebanon, Tennessee,
brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee
Corrections Institute, Jerry Scott, Wilson County Sheriff Robert Bryan, and the Wilson County
Sheriff Department, challenging the conditions of his confinement. (Docket No. 1).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
I.
PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
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1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
II.
Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff Lackey seeks relief pursuant to § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff
must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
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Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
III.
Alleged Facts
The complaint alleges that, while incarcerated at the Wilson County Jail, the plaintiff is not
allowed watch the news on television or read a newspaper “every day to keep up with what is going
on in the real world.” (Docket No. 1, Attach.). The complaint also alleges that inmates at the jail
are not provided ink pens to use for filing grievances and that the forms provided to the inmates for
filing grievances do not bear the state seal. (Id. at p. 5).
IV.
Analysis
First, the plaintiff names the Tennessee Corrections Institute as defendant. The Tennessee
Corrections Institute, established by state statute, is required to establish minimum standards for
adult local jails, lock-ups, workhouses, and detention facilities in the State; establishes the standards
to inspect and certify local correctional facilities; is responsible for educating local correctional staff;
and provides technical assistance and conducts research in relation to requests from local
correctional detention facilities, the Tennessee legislature, and other state agencies. See Tenn.Code
Ann. § 41-4-140. The Tennessee Corrections Institute is immune from suit under § 1983 as an arm
of the State of Tennessee.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
(1989)(holding that § 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties,
but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against the State for alleged
deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived
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its immunity . . . .”); Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir.2011) (assuming, without
deciding, that London Correctional Institute is an arm of the State and could have asserted sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). As such, the plaintiff has failed to state claims upon
which relief can be granted against the Tennessee Corrections Institute.
Next, the plaintiff names Jerry Scott, an employee of the Tennessee Corrections Institute, as
a defendant. Scott’s name is not mentioned in the complaint itself; it is only mentioned in an
attachment to the complaint that appears to be a form letter to the plaintiff from Scott on behalf of
the Tennessee Corrections Institute informing the plaintiff that the Institute “is not authorized by law
to investigate individual complaints of this nature.” (Docket No. 1, Attach.). The letter encourages
the plaintiff to “to try to resolve the issue with the facility administrator and/or the sheriff through
their grievances procedures.” (Id.) The complaint makes no allegation that Scott or the Tennessee
Corrections Institute deprived the plaintiff of any federal constitutional right. Moreover, any claims
for monetary damages against Scott in his official capacity would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989).
The court
therefore finds that the complaint does not state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted
against defendant Scott in his official capacity. Any claims against Scott must be dismissed.
Next, the plaintiff names the Wilson County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. However,
sheriffs' offices and police departments are not bodies politic and, as such, are not persons within the
meaning of § 1983. See Mathes v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:10–cv–0496,
2010 WL 3341889, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (“[F]ederal district courts in Tennessee have
frequently and uniformly held that police departments and sheriff's departments are not proper parties
to a § 1983 suit.”)(collecting cases)). Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes
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the plaintiff's claims against the Wilson County Sheriff's Department as claims against Wilson
County, Tennessee. In order to bring a Section 1983 claim against a county, the plaintiff must claim
that the alleged violations of his constitutional rights stemmed from a county policy, regulation,
decision, custom, or the tolerance of a custom of such violations. Otherwise, a § 1983 claim will
not lie. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412
(1989); Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978); Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 507-09 (6th Cir. 1996).
Here, the complaint alleges that Wilson County employs unconstitutional policies of
prohibiting inmates from daily access to news and refusing to provide inmates with pens and proper
grievance forms. With regard to these claims, the complaint also names Wilson County Sheriff
Robert Bryan in his official capacity as a defendant. “A suit against an individual in his official
capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity” of which the official is an agent.
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff
Bryan in his official capacity are claims against Wilson County, Tennessee.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides prisoners with a
constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). In addition
to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates
with “paper and pen to draft legal documents with notarial services to authenticate them, and with
stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. Despite this constitutional right, a prisoner must show “actual
prejudice” to ongoing or contemplated litigation to state a claim for relief. Moore v. Chavez, 36 F.
App'x 169, 171 (6th Cir. 2002)(citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)).
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Here, Lackey fails to argue or show any actual injury as a result of the alleged restriction on
ink pens or particular grievance forms. The plaintiff concedes that, although inmates are not
provided with pens, Wilson County does provide them with pencils; although the grievance forms
provided to the inmates may not bear the state seal, inmates are permitted to use these forms to
pursue grievances. The alleged limitations did not prevent the plaintiff either from filing this action
or the grievances he sent to the Tennessee Corrections Institute. Thus, the plaintiff has not been
denied access to any court, and he has not been hindered in his ability to pursue a legal claim.
As for his other claim, the complaint alleges that restrictions on inmates' access to
newspapers, and/or their alleged inability to watch the news on television, violates their rights “to
keep up with what is going on in the real world.” (Docket No. 1, Attach.).
It is well settled that a “prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections systems.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). These rights include the right to
receive mail, including publications, subject to legitimate penological interests. Sheets v. Moore, 97
F.3d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted). “[R]egulations affecting the sending of a
‘publication’ ... to a prisoner must be analyzed under the Turner [v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct.
2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) ] reasonableness standard” to determine whether they are reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. Sheets, 97 F.3d at 166 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 413, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989)). The factors to be applied in determining
whether the reasonableness standard is met are: whether the governmental objective underlying the
regulation is legitimate and neutral and whether the regulation is rationally related to that objective;
whether inmates have alternative means of exercising the right; and the impact that accommodation
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of the asserted right will have on inmates and guards in the prison. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 414-18.
With regard to publications in the prison context, “neutrality” means “the regulation or practice in
question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of expression.” Id. at 415 (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224).
Legitimate penological interests include security, order, and rehabilitation. Procunier, 416 U.S. at
413.
Liberally construing the pro se complaint's allegations, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendants acted and are acting according to an unconstitutional policy or custom attributable to
Wilson County, Tennessee, and that defendant Bryan authorized, acquiesced in, and/or personally
implemented that policy (preventing inmates from accessing newspapers or television news). On
initial review, the record before the court is sparse; as such, the court is without information
concerning the rationale undergirding the Wilson County Jail's policy of prohibiting media and
newspaper, if such a policy exists as the plaintiff alleges. Nevertheless, the court finds that the
plaintiff has stated a colorable claim under the First Amendment with regard to this claim. See Terry
v. Calhoun County Correctional Facility, 2012 WL 5198376, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19,
2012)(finding that, at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the
sheriff had a policy or custom of preventing inmates from accessing newspapers or communicating
with newspaper reporters and permitting the plaintiff’s claim to proceed); Marcum v. Jones, 2009
WL 3172048, at **2–3 (S.D. Ohio 2009)(denying defendants' summary judgment motion as to
prisoner-plaintiff's First Amendment claim premised on jails' “no publications policy,” which
prohibited inmates from receiving any publications, magazines, tabloids, and newspaper through the
mail while incarcerated at the jails); Dunne v. Smith, 2009 WL 840651, at **4-5 (E.D. Cal.2009)
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(finding that prisoner-plaintiff stated a colorable First Amendment claim premised on the prison's
ban of magazines and newspapers); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 165
L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (finding that the prison's policy of restricting access to newspapers, magazines,
and photographs by inmates placed in most restrictive level of prison's long-term segregation unit
was justified by need to provide particularly difficult prisoners with increased incentives for better
prison behavior, and thus did not violate the First Amendment rights of such prisoners).
Accordingly, the plaintiff's First Amendment claims against defendants Wilson County and Sheriff
Bryan in his official capacity will be allowed to proceed for further development.
Finally, attached to the complaint is a list of grievances about conditions of confinement at
the Wilson County Jail made by the plaintiff followed by a page entitled “We the people (inmates)
reside at the Wilson County Jail agree with the grievance at hand.” The second sheet contains the
names and signatures of eleven inmates at the Wilson County Jail. (Docket No. 1, Attachs.).
To the extent that Lackey purports to assert additional claims concerning the conditions of
his confinement by way of this attachment to his complaint, he must file a proposed amended
complaint seeking to add these claims as they are not included in the instant complaint submitted to
the court. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged that he has exhausted his administrative remedies
with regard to any of these claims.
Furthermore, to the extent that Lackey purports to assert these claims on behalf of other
Wilson County Jail inmates, he cannot represent the interests of others. “[A] prisoner who initiates
a civil action challenging certain conditions at a prison facility in his individual capacity is limited
to asserting alleged violations of his own constitutional rights and, absent a request for class
certification, lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners.” Newson v. Norris,
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888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989). If Lackey wishes to initiate an action along with these eleven
inmates regarding these additional allegations, all plaintiffs must sign the complaint and equally split
the cost of the filing fee.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
claims upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Tennessee
Corrections Institute and Jerry Scott. These claims and defendants will be dismissed.
However, as to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against defendants Robert Bryan in his official
capacity and the Wilson County Sheriff Department, construed by the court as claims against Wilson
County, Tennessee, the court finds that the complaint states an actionable First Amendment claim
as to the plaintiff’s allegation that Wilson County Jail inmates are not permitted access to
newspapers or television news. However, the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against these
defendants based on the denial of ink pens and grievance forms bearing the state seal fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and those claims will be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
An appropriate order will follow.
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Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge
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