Anderson v. Rutherford County Jail et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 11/16/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am) Modified Text on 11/16/2015 (am).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOSHUA ANDERSON, #527057,
Plaintiff,
v.
RUTHERFORD COUNTY JAIL and
SHERIFF ROBERT ARNOLD,
Defendants.

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No. 3:15-cv-01016
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joshua Anderson’s pro se complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). For the reasons set forth herein, the complaint must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
I.

Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, the court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought by a prisoner

if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from government entities or officials, 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner’s conditions of confinement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon
conducting this review, the court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that
the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those
statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, “a district court must (1)

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view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed
and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
II.

Factual Allegations
The plaintiff is an inmate at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (“RCADC”). He brings suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the RCADC and Sheriff Robert Arnold.
The plaintiff alleges that (1) he was bunked three to a cell from September 4th through the 12th; (2)
“outdoor rec” takes place inside and he does not have access to sunlight; (3) he gets only two cooked meals
per day and they are both served cold; (4) county and state inmates are housed together; (5) the plaintiff was
sentenced to serve a term of incarceration in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, not
Rutherford County, where he receives only 6 or 8 days a month of “good time,” instead of the 16 days a
month he would accrue if he were in a state facility; and (6) he does not have access to a law library or the
Jailhouse Lawyers’ Manual, 9th Edition, and has been deprived of legal help.
The plaintiff demands compensatory damages resulting from sleeping on the floor and being housed
three to a cell. He also seeks equitable relief in the form of being sent to a prison where he will have access
to a law library and being granted the good time he has lost by being at jail instead of prison.
III.

Discussion
The plaintiff seeks to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate alleged violations of his federal

constitutional rights. Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who, acting
under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.”
Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A.

Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that involve “the wanton and

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unnecessary infliction of pain,” that are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,” or that result in
the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). “But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not
unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. Rather, to violate the constitution,
the alleged conditions must result in the deprivation of a basic human need, such as food, warmth, or
exercise. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). In other words, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a
prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987).
The plaintiff’s allegations, though they implicate the Eighth Amendment, do not demonstrate that the
conditions at the RCADC “fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a
contemporary standard of decency.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Specifically, overcrowding per se does not violate the constitution, and the plaintiff
does not claim that the allegedly overcrowded conditions actually caused him harm or resulted in an
unconstitutional denial of a basic need. Cf. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that “double-celling” did not
violate the Eighth Amendment); Argamonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App'x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“[O]vercrowding is not, in itself, a constitutional violation, and the plaintiffs have not alleged that the allegedly
overcrowded conditions resulted in an unconstitutional denial of such basic needs as food, shelter, or
sanitation). The fact that the plaintiff was only housed three to a cell for a period of just over a week further
supports the conclusion that the overcrowding about which the plaintiff complains did not give rise to a
constitutional violation.
The plaintiff alleges that he is served only two “cooked” meals per day, implying that a third,
uncooked meal is provided. He does not allege that his caloric intake is insufficient or that the meals do not
provide sufficient nutrition, nor does he allege that he has lost weight or suffered any detriment to his health.
While cold meals may be unpleasant, complaints about the preparation or quality of prison food are generally
“far removed from Eighth Amendment concerns.” Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659–60 (6th Cir.
1977). Moreover, “cold food apparently is an ordinary incident in prison life.” Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d

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378, 404 (6th Cir. 1999) (Surheinrich, J., dissenting). The plaintiff’s complaints about the meals at RCADC do
not establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
The plaintiff also complains that he is not afforded the opportunity for outdoor recreation or exposure
to sunlight. The Eighth Amendment entitles prisoners to sufficient exercise to maintain reasonably good
physical and mental health. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 1985) (remanding for the
district court to consider “the minimum amount of yard time necessary for the inmates’ well-being under
minimal civilized standards”). Limitations on outdoor exercise may violate the Eighth Amendment in some
circumstances, but the Sixth Circuit has not set a minimum amount of outdoor recreation time that is
required. Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). Instead, it has held that “‘a total or near-total
deprivation of exercise or recreational opportunity, without penological justification,’” impinges on an inmate’s
Eighth Amendment right, because “‘[i]nmates require regular exercise to maintain reasonably good physical
and psychological health.’” Id. (quoting Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983)).
In this case, the plaintiff does not claim that he is denied all opportunity for recreation or physical
activity sufficient to maintain reasonably good health, nor does he allege any detriment to his health resulting
from being required to exercise indoors rather than outdoors. He therefore fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the alleged lack of access to sunlight.
The plaintiff’s allegation that state and county inmates are housed together does not state a claim for
a constitutional violation based on the conditions of his confinement. There is no constitutional prohibition
against housing state and county inmates together.
In sum, the court finds that the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show that he was subjected to
the type of extreme deprivations that are necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment conditions-ofconfinement claim.
B.

“Good-Time” Credits

The plaintiff complains about being housed at the RCADC instead of a state prison, on the basis
that, as he claims, he would accrue good-time credits at a faster rate and have access to other benefits if he
were at a TDOC facility. It is well-settled, however, that “prisoners have no liberty interest in opportunities to
obtain good-time credits.” Martin v. O’Brien, 207 Fed. Appx 587, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2006); see Hansard v.
Barrett, 980 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The United States Supreme Court has held that inmates have

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no inherent constitutional right to good time credit.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974))).
See also Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[t]he loss of the opportunity to earn
good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole,” does not constitute a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest which triggers the protection of the Due Process Clause” (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 229
n.8)).
Consequently, the fact that the plaintiff is housed in a county jail rather than a state prison, and has
fewer opportunities to earn good-time credit than he might if he were housed in prison, does not give rise to a
claim that his constitutional rights have been violated. In short, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the contention that being housed at a county jail
deprives him of the opportunity to earn good-time credits at a faster rate.
Moreover, insofar as the petitioner seeks a court order awarding him good-time credits to which he
believes he is entitled, he seeks relief that is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States
Supreme Court has made it clear that a § 1983 action cannot be used to challenge, directly or indirectly, the
length or validity of a prisoner's confinement, including deprivations of good-time credit, and that this can only
be done using habeas corpus remedies. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In
summarizing this line of cases, the Supreme Court stated:
These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the
target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005). Consequently, the plaintiff may not seek restoration of
good-time credits in this action.
C.

Access to Law Library and Legal Materials

It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The principal issue in Bounds was whether the states must protect the right
of access to the courts by providing either law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for
prisoners. Id. at 817. The Supreme Court held that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal
knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates with “paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial

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services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824–25. Bounds, however, did not create
an abstract, free-standing right to a law library, litigation tools, or legal assistance. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 351 (1996). In order to state a viable claim for interference with access to the courts, a plaintiff must
show “actual injury.” Id. at 349. In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the lack of access
to legal materials has hindered, or is presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Id.
at 351–53. Further, the Supreme Court squarely held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element
that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating
the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). Thus,
“the complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), just
as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy available
under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 417–18.
The plaintiff contends that he did not have access to a law library or legal assistance at RCADC, but
he has not demonstrated or even alleged that the denial of access to law books or a law library has hindered
him in the pursuit of a non-frivolous legal claim. It did not prevent him from filing his present complaint, and
the fact that the factual allegations fail to state a colorable claim under § 1983 cannot be attributed to the lack
of legal resources. Accordingly, the court also finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a colorable access-tocourts claim with respect to the lack of a law library or legal assistance at the RCADC. Cf. Catanzaro v.
Harry, 848 F. Supp. 2d 780, 802–03 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (“Plaintiff’s claim that the lack of access to a law
library caused any injury is purely conclusory. Plaintiff’s allegations provide no support for his assertion that
the denial of access to law books or a law library prevented him from amending either his complaint or his
habeas petition.”).
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief may be granted. The complaint will therefore be dismissed. An appropriate
order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge