Batts v. State of Tennessee et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 9/28/2015. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ANTONIO BATTS,
No. 175461,
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Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 3:15-cv-01030
Judge Campbell
MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee currently held in the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office in
Nashville, Tennessee, brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action against the State of Tennessee;
Seth Norman, a judge for the Davidson County Criminal Court Division IV of the 20th Judicial
District in Nashville, Tennessee; Judge “Robinson, Gayle”1; and Tim Kernell, Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County Deputy Criminal Court Clerk. (Docket No. 1). The
plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, the dismissal of the pending state criminal
charges against him, the expungement of those charges, his immediate relief from custody, and a
reprimand of the defendants. (Id. at p. 4).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
I.
PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
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It seems likely that the plaintiff intends to name Gale B. Robinson, Davidson County General Sessions Court
Judge, as a defendant.
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filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
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(citation omitted).
III.
PLRA Screening
Plaintiff Antonio Batts seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1 at p. 2).
To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by
a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in
part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 15556 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of
this two-part test must be satisfied to support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932
F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
First, the plaintiff names the State of Tennessee as a defendant. The Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution bars civil rights against a state and its agencies and departments in
federal court. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Eleventh Amendment
immunity “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief” against a state and
its agencies. Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir.1993). The plaintiff's
claims against the State of Tennessee must therefore be dismissed.
As for the plaintiff’s claims against Judges Norman and Robinson, judges are absolutely
immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997).
Because of their judicial immunity, the plaintiff cannot recover damages from either Judge Norman
or Judge Robinson.
Next, the plaintiff names Deputy Clerk Kernell as a defendant and seeks monetary damages
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from him based on his refusal to expunge a charge that the plaintiff alleges has been dismissed.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 3). However, deputy court clerks such as Mr. Kernell are immune from suit for
monetary damages. In Riser v. Schnieder, 37 Fed. Appx. 763 (6th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff brought
suit against two state court judges, a state court magistrate, and a court clerk, alleging that “they
improperly denied his motion for a continuance, [improperly granted] a default judgment, and
misfiled his motion for relief from judgment.” Id. at 764. The Sixth Circuit held that “all of the
defendants are immune from suit,” and stated:
Accepting all of [the plaintiff's] allegations as true, it is clear that the
judges were acting in their judicial capacities and the clerk was acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity. Whether or not they committed any errors
in handling Riser's small claims case, they are immune from suit for
monetary damages.
Id. (citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir.1988)). Here, too, Deputy Clerk Kernell
was acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity when he refused to perform the requested
expungement by the plaintiff. Thus, as are Judges Norman and Robinson, Deputy Clerk Kernell is
immune from suit for monetary damages.
In addition to seeking monetary damages from the defendants, the plaintiff asks the court to
dismiss the pending state criminal charges against the plaintiff, to expunge his state criminal record,
and to reprimand the state court judges involved in the plaintiff’s case. (Docket No. 1 at p. 4).
To the extent that the complaint asks the court to intervene in the pending state criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff, the law is well-settled that a federal court should not interfere with
pending state court criminal proceedings, absent the threat of “great and immediate” irreparable
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injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). It is also clear that a federal court may sua
sponte raise the issue of Younger abstention. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143-44 n.10 (1976).
Younger abstention applies where the federal plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory judgment
relief. Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998).
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal equity
jurisdiction may not be used to enjoin pending state prosecutions. The Younger abstention doctrine
is based on the principle that the states have a special interest in enforcing their own laws in their
own courts. Id. at 44. The rule is “designed to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts, particularly where the party to the federal case may fully litigate his
claim before the state court.” Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir.1986) (internal
quotations omitted). Abstention in favor of state court proceedings is proper where there exists: (1)
an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) an important state interest; and (3) an adequate opportunity
in the state judicial proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 744
(6th Cir. 1996).
The three factors that support Younger abstention are present in this case. First, a state
criminal prosecution of the plaintiff appears to be underway. Second, important state interests such
as enforcing state criminal statutes and protecting the public are implicated in state criminal
prosecutions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 954 (6th Cir. 2000). Third, there is no
indication in the record before the court at this time that the state court would refuse to consider the
plaintiff’s claims; thus, presumably the state court proceedings provide an adequate forum in which
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the plaintiff can raise challenges to the charges brought against him.2 If the plaintiff raises his
challenges in state court and the trial court denies or otherwise fails to consider his claims, he may
exercise his right to an appeal under Tennessee law. The plaintiff also may oblige himself of state
post-conviction proceedings in the event he is convicted of the charged offense(s). Under these
circumstances, the court cannot interfere with an ongoing state court criminal case by dismissing
state charges or expunging records.
There are exceptions to the Younger doctrine: (1) “the state proceeding is motivated by a
desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611; (2) “the
challenged statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” Moore
v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979)(quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); or, (3) there is “an
extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 125 (1975). These exceptions have been interpreted narrowly. Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d
199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986). In order to overcome the bar of Younger abstention, a petitioner must do
more than set forth mere allegations of bad faith or harassment. See Amanatullah v. Colorado Board
of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir.1 999) (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d
885, 889 (10th Cir.1997)).
The plaintiff has not established that any exception to the Younger
doctrine is warranted in this case.
Finally, the plaintiff asks for this court to order his immediate release from state custody.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 4). The law is well established that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for
a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim
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For example, the plaintiff argues in his federal complaint that he has been charged with murder of a person who
is not deceased. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 3-4).
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may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994)(citing
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973)). A § 1983 claim challenging confinement must
be dismissed even where a plaintiff seeks only injunctive or monetary relief. Heck, 512 U.S. at
489-90 (claim for damages is not cognizable); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90 (claim for injunctive relief
is only cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Additionally, a state prisoner does not state a
cognizable claim under § 1983 where a ruling on his claim would imply the invalidity of his
conviction and/or confinement, unless and until the conviction has been favorably terminated, i.e.,
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U .S. at 486-87;
Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here, for the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim upon relief
can be granted under § 1983. The plaintiff’s claims seeking his immediate release from state custody
would be more appropriately brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
IV.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the court determines that the plaintiff’s
claims against all defendants must be dismissed.
An appropriate order will enter.
Todd J. Campbell
United States District Judge
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