Shearon v. Womack et al
Filing
144
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Despite admitting to the test results in the Answers to the Complaint (Doc. No. 9 ), First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20 ), and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 37 ), and failing to object to the test results at s ummary judgment (Doc. No. 72 ), Womack now objects, on the eve of trial, to using the factual allegations to which he admitted in his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint at trial because the Pretrial Order (Doc. No. 127 ) supplants the pleadings . (Doc. No. 131 .) The Court holds that Shearon may use any factual allegation admitted, so long as Womack admitted the allegation verbatim, and therefore SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Womack's objections. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 12/14/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DAVID SHEARON,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLEMAN WOMACK,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:15-cv-01061
CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a false arrest and malicious prosecution case under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 that arose after
Officer Coleman Womack arrested David Shearon for Driving Under the Influence. (Doc. No. 37.)
Subsequent to his arrest, Shearon took multiple tests for drugs and alcohol, all which were
negative. Potentially the strongest evidence for Shearon are the results of the drug tests. See Green
v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 863 (6th Cir. 2012) (“What matters here . . . [is] that a subsequent
test for drugs and alcohol shows that the driver was in fact sober.”). Despite admitting to the test
results in the Answers to the Complaint (Doc. No. 9), First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20),
and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 37), and failing to object to the test results at summary
judgment (Doc. No. 72), Womack now objects, on the eve of trial, to using the factual allegations
to which he admitted in his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint at trial because the Pretrial
Order (Doc. No. 127) supplants the pleadings. (Doc. No. 131.) The Court holds that Shearon may
use any factual allegation admitted, so long as Womack admitted the allegation verbatim, and
therefore SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Womack’s objections.
The Pretrial Order states that all “pleadings are hereby amended to conform to this Pretrial
Order, and this Order supplants the pleadings for David Shearon’s claims against Officer
Womack.” (Doc. No. 127 at 1.) Indeed, the parties’ theories and statement of the issues are
amended and only those in the Pretrial Order will be tried. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S.
310, 314 (1960). Adding additional claims to a Pretrial Order constitutes amending the pleadings,
Hance v. BNSF Ry. Co., 645 F. App’x 356 (6th Cir. 2016), while leaving issues out of the Pretrial
Order waives those issues for trial and beyond, McGehee v. Certainteed Corp., 101 F.3d 1078,
1080 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, the Pretrial Order stated the same issues in the Complaint and therefore
the pleadings were not amended.
The Pretrial Order does not supplant the factual averments in the pleadings, but instead
only supplants the pleadings regarding the claims and defenses to be presented at trial. While the
authority Womack cites holds that the pretrial order supplants the pleadings with regard to the
claims and defenses to be tried, he does not cite any authority that the facts in the pleadings
supporting the claims are somehow supplanted by the parties’ theories. The Pretrial Order
“controls the course of the action,” but is not meant to include every single fact that will be
presented at trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d); see A. Wright & C. Miller, 6A Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1526 (3d ed. 2017) (stating that the pretrial order “further[s] the purposes of the
[pretrial] conference” and “controls the subsequent course of the action”); see also Serv. Source,
Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 259 F. App’x 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2008) (allowing the defendant to assert
four new affirmative defenses in the Pretrial Order that were not in the pleadings because the
plaintiff waived the issue by signing the Pretrial Order); Howard v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Co., 499 F.2d
330, 333 (6th Cir. 1983) (reversing the district court, which did not allow the defendant to assert a
new affirmative defense in the pretrial order); Brown v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., No. 00-0116,
2005 WL 3358872, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 9, 2005) (Knowles, M.J.) (holding that the plaintiff
2
waived two claims in the pretrial order). When the issues in the Complaint mirror the issues in the
Pretrial Order, any judicial admissions regarding those issues remain.
It is true that “admissions in the pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the
Court. Judicial admissions in the pleadings . . . have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue
and dispensing wholly the need for proof of the fact.” Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
201 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2000). They “‘eliminate the need for evidence on the subject matter of
the admission,’ as admitted facts are no longer at issue.” Ferguson v. Neighborhood Housing
Servs. of Cleveland, Inc., 780 F.2d 549, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Seven-Up Bottling Co. v.
Seven-Up Co., 420 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (E.D. Mo. 1976)); see also Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
215 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date she alleged
in her complaint rather than in a subsequent affidavit). It would be contrary to the purpose of
judicial admissions if the Court allowed Womack, on the eve of trial, to force Shearon to prove
those facts that were considered binding throughout the course of discovery and dispositive
motions. See C. Wright & A. Miller, 8B Federal Practice and Procedure § 2264 (3d ed. 2017) (the
purpose of judicial admissions “would be defeated if the party were free to deny at trial what he or
she has admitted before trial”). Had Womack not admitted these facts in the Answer, Shearon
likely would have taken discovery on these issues and presented an expert regarding the toxicology
report results. (See Doc. No. 132 (asking the Court to reopen discovery and continue the trial
should it sustain Womack’s objections)). This would prejudice Shearon here, who has relied on
Womack’s admitted facts throughout the course of this two-year plus litigation, only to have
Womack rescind those admissions days before the trial. Accordingly, the Court will allow any
judicial admission Womack made in his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint to be used at
trial.
3
Womack also moves to prohibit Shearon from admitting nine of his admissions into
evidence for evidentiary reasons. Womack does not cite support for his proposition that Shearon
must clear evidentiary hurdles, such as hearsay, to introduce Shearon’s admissions. Indeed, it
appears the Sixth Circuit has not decided this issue. See Barnes, 201 F.3d at 829 (“The parties have
not directly presented the issue as a hearsay problem.”); see also Trimas Corp. v. Meyers, 572 F.
App’x 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Although the issue [in Barnes] was complicated by a hearsay
component . . . .”).
A “judicial admission is not itself evidence,” but instead has the “effect of withdrawing a
fact from contention.” Martinez v. Bally’s La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001). Indeed,
judicial admissions “‘eliminate the need for evidence on the subject matter of the admission,’ as
admitted facts are no longer at issue.” Ferguson, 780 F.2d at 550-51 (quoting Seven-Up Bottling
Co., 420 F. Supp. at 1251). As judicial admissions are not evidence, there is no reason why they
should be subject to the Rules of Evidence, such as hearsay. This also makes sense—the main
purpose of hearsay is to prevent unreliable testimony to be used at trial. K. Graham & M. Graham,
30 Federal Practice & Procedure: Federal Rules of Evidence § 6324 (1st ed. 2017) (discussing the
five dangers of hearsay, all arising from the fact that the testimony “will usually not have been
subject to some or all of the checks upon the validity of the testimonial assumptions”). When both
sides agree that, for example, Shearon informed Womack that Shearon was rear-ended, that
testimony becomes very reliable and a jury should be able to use that testimony in its
determination. Therefore, the objections to Admissions 2 (“Mr. Shearon stated to Womack, ‘the
guy hit me in the rear.’”), 5 (“Mr. Shearon advised that he had a valid, lawful handgun permit
issued by the State of Tennessee”), and 24 (“In late October 2014, General Hospital informed Mr.
4
Shearon that it had failed to preserve the second blood sample that they had taken from him on the
day of his arrest.”) on hearsay grounds are overruled.
Womack’s objection to Admission 13 (“Mr. Shearon asked Ms. Ray to take a second blood
sample at his expense because he wanted to make sure he would be able to prove his innocence”)
is sustained. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires all provisions in a Complaint to either be
admitted, denied, or responded that the defendant lacks information to form a specific belief.
Joseph v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-10274, 2009 WL 10680506, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2009)
(Hood, J.). “Any allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a
responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). This
allegation was admitted, which is a judicial admission. However, the Court has broad discretion
on relieving a party from the burdens of judicial admissions, especially if it involves an opinion.
MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that courts are
reluctant to find that opinions and legal conclusions are judicial admissions). A fair reading of
Womack’s Motion is that he should not have admitted to the allegation that Shearon wanted a
second blood test to prove his innocence, but instead he should have stated that he lacked
knowledge to admit or deny what Shearon believed. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5). Shearon’s belief is
just that—his opinion, and therefore the Court has discretion to relieve him from the burden of
admitting it. Given the limited probative value of this statement, as well as the fact that this
information likely can still be used as an evidentiary admission on cross-examination, the Court
sustains the objection to use Admission 13 as a judicial admission.
Womack based his objections to Admissions 21 (“Mr. Shearon presented to Skyline
Hospital on October 15, 2014, requested a nine-panel drug screen, and complained of some
soreness”) and 22 (“The Skyline drug test did not show the presence of any of the drugs that they
5
tested for”) on his sixth motion in limine, which has been denied, and these are therefore overruled
as moot. Womack’s objection to Admission 25 (“Mr. Shearon’s court date for his criminal cases
was continued multiple times to get results from his blood test”) is sustained. Shearon may only
use the exact language Womack used in the Answer Paragraphs 172 and 174. Womack’s objection
to Admissions 26 (“The TBI tests on Mr. Shearon’s blood came back negative for both alcohol
and drugs”) is sustained, although Shearon must use the language Womack used in his Answer
Paragraphs 173 and 175. The Objection to Admission 27 (“On June 2, 2015, the General Sessions
Court dismissed Mr. Shearon’s criminal charges”) is overruled. To the extent judicial admissions
must be of material facts, this fact is probative both to whether the case was resolved in favor of
Shearon as well as to whether Shearon appeared intoxicated at the scene, and the probative value
is not significantly outweighed by any unfair prejudice to Womack.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?