Williams et al v. McDonald
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 4/5/2016. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CELIA WILLIAMS and BRIGITTE COX,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT A. McDONALD as Secretary of
the Department of Veterans Affairs,
Defendant.
Civil No. 3:15-CV-1108
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Robert A. McDonald has filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 8), to which plaintiffs Celia Williams (“Williams”) and Brigitte
Cox (“Cox”) have filed a Response (Docket No. 14), and the defendant has filed a Reply (Docket
No. 19). For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Background
A.
Complaint Allegations
The court focuses on the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint. Williams is a
resident of Sumner County, Tennessee. Cox is a resident of Rutherford County, Tennessee.
Defendant McDonald (the “VA”) is Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs, sued in his official capacity as responsible for the compliance by his department’s
employees with relevant law.
Williams and Cox, both African-Americans, are employed as Medical Billing
Reimbursement Specialists by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs at the Mid-South
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Consolidated Patient Account Center. On April 15, 2015, the plaintiffs were working when they
began to receive a chain of emails in which their co-worker, Wendy Jeans, referenced people
from New Orleans and stated, “The less I have to deal with those ‘NOLA’ freaks the better I
feel!!!1” [sic]. In response to that comment, another co-worker, Misty L. Lingle, stated “In
Mississippi, they call those folks coon asses Wendy,” [sic]. In response to these emails, Cox
responded separately with, “WTH??” and “That comment can be taken waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaay
out of context. I’ve only been back in the South for a short time.” Another co-worker of the
plaintiffs, Jason D. Dennis, entered the chain by stating, “I prefer to talk slang about Asians.
Now that’s funny. Sorry not sorry Mo. Lol I love you.” As pleaded, Mr. Dennis also has a
history of emailing material that is discriminatory and harassing of homosexuals.
At that point, the Specialty Billing Supervisor, Jerry Plaisance, stated, “maybe we should
all just go back to billing.” Jason L. Tate, another co-worker stated “I am offended.” Plaisance
then issued a “history lesson” explaining the origin of the term “coon ass,” but did not make any
further effort to end the inappropriate exchange or apologize to those who were offended by it.
At that point, Williams advised Plaisance, as well as the others involved, that the term “coon” has
also been used as an extremely disparaging and derogatory term for African-Americans by citing
dictionary.com.
On April 23, 2015, after Plaisance took no action to correct the situation, Cox reported the
incident to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs Office of Resolution Management. That same
day, Williams was cautioned by her supervisor about disturbing her co-workers, although she had
done nothing to cause a disturbance. In fact, Plaisance attempted to counsel Williams regarding
racially vulgar words and, in the course of doing so, used those words in a racially vulgar
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manner. On May 22, 2015, the informal counseling which had been generated as a result of the
plaintiffs’ complaints was closed without any adverse action having been taken against Plaisance
or anyone else. Prior to her complaint about the racially charged email, Williams had received no
discipline and had received very high marks on her performance reviews for the year.
B.
The Plaintiffs’ Claims
The plaintiffs bring a claim for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000, which prohibits discrimination based upon race.1
More specifically, the plaintiffs allege two violations of Title VII; first, that the plaintiffs were
discriminated against as the result of an adverse employment action in the form of an official
reprimand for causing a disturbance, and, second, that the plaintiffs suffered a hostile work
environment due to being subjected to racially vulgar material and the VA’s failure to address the
resulting racially hostile conditions toward African-Americans.
II.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
will “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487
F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a plaintiff provide “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
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The plaintiffs also brought a claim under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, but they
have abandoned it in response to the pending motion. The plaintiffs have also abandoned their
claim for punitive damages. The court, therefore, need not discuss these claims further.
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P. 8). The court must determine only whether “the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims,” not whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)).
A complaint’s allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To establish the
“facial plausibility” required to “unlock the doors of discovery,” the plaintiff cannot rely on
“legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” but, instead,
the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79
(2009). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.
Analysis
The VA’s brief is not a model of clarity. From the outset, it confuses the standards
employed at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The VA argues that the
Complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead every element of
the prima facie case of a hostile work environment. Specifically, the VA contends that the
plaintiffs do not establish in the Complaint that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment. (Docket No. 9, pp. 3-4.) However, it is clear from governing caselaw that it is
inappropriate to demand that the plaintiffs meet the high burden of pleading the prima facie case
they would have to establish in a McDonnell Douglas summary judgment analysis at this early
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stage of the case. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The . . . requirement that [a] complaint establish a prima facie case . . . is
contrary to Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. In Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading
requirement. 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). As the Court reasoned, “it is not
appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie
case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every
employment discrimination case.” Id. at 511. The court explained that the
precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the
context and before discovery has unearthed the relevant facts and
evidence, it may be difficult to define the appropriate formulation. Id. at
512. Significantly, the Supreme Court identified the possibility that
discovery may produce direct evidence of discrimination, rendering the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework inapplicable to a
plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 511-12. The Supreme Court concluded that the
ordinary rules of notice pleading apply and upheld the complaint because it
gave “fair notice” of the basis of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 514.
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not
alter its holding in Swierkiewicz. Twombly distinguished Swierkiewicz,
explaining that the prior case “did not change the law of pleading,” but
simply reemphasized that application of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case at the pleading stage “was contrary to the Federal Rules’
structure of liberal pleading requirements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
(explaining that a plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those
necessary to state [her] claim and the grounds showing entitlement to
relief”).
Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012). Since Twombly and Iqbal, the Sixth
Circuit has also recognized the continuing viability of Swierkiewicz’s holding. See, e.g., Pedreira
v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is not a pleading requirement and that “the ordinary rules
for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply”); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir.
2008) (same). Again, in HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, the Sixth Circuit recognized the
applicability of Swierkiewicz’s holding and further noted that it would be “inaccurate to read
[Twombly and Iqbal] so narrowly as to be the death of notice pleading and we recognize the
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continuing viability of the ‘short and plain’ language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” 675
F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit has expressly found it to be error
for a district court to require a plaintiff to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas in
order to survive a motion to dismiss. Keys, 684 F.3d at 609. Yet that is precisely what the VA
seeks.
The Supreme Court established a “plausibility” standard in Twombly and Iqbal for
assessing whether a complaint’s factual allegations support its legal conclusions, and that
standard applies to discrimination claims. Keys, 684 F.3d at 610. Thus, although the Complaint
need not present “detailed factual allegations,” it must allege sufficient “factual content” from
which a court, informed by its “judicial experience and common sense,” could “draw the
reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679, that the VA either discriminated against the
plaintiffs with respect to an adverse employment event or a hostile work environment. Keys, 684
F.3d at 610. According to the Supreme Court, “plausibility” occupies that wide space between
“possibility” and “probability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a reasonable court can draw the
necessary inference from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has
been satisfied.
While a close question, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ Complaint contains more than
the “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” that Twombly and Iqbal
prohibit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). As to the racial
discrimination claim, the elements are (1) that a plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) she
has suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was performing her job satisfactorily; and (4)
similarly-situated employees who are not members of the protected class were treated more
favorably. The Complaint alleges that, after Cox made a formal complaint, Williams, an African-
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American, was formally cautioned by her supervisor about disturbing her co-workers, although
she had done nothing to cause a disturbance. This formal warning was issued even though,
according to the Complaint, Williams was a model employee satisfactorily performing her job
and had done nothing to deserve it other than expressing offense at the racially charged
environment caused by the email chain. Moreover, the VA’s “investigation” was closed without
any other steps being taken to address or remedy the situation, or to redress the discipline that had
been issued to Williams. The court finds that, as to Williams, the Complaint states plausible
content that allows the court to draw the necessary inference to find a viable claim and to
conclude that the Complaint puts the VA on sufficient factual and legal notice of that
discrimination claim to survive the Motion to Dismiss. However, because there was no adverse
employment action against Cox, the court finds that her Title VII racial discrimination claim
cannot be sustained on this pleading.
As to the hostile work environment claim, the plaintiffs must plead conduct that was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive, and that the plaintiffs regarded it as such. Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993). The “mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a
employee” does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII. Id.
Rather, Title VII comes into play when there is a “discriminatorily abusive work environment”
that can detract from employees’ job performance or keep them from advancing in their careers.
Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that “simple teasing, offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
terms and conditions of employment.” See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
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(1988).
Plaintiffs have pleaded that Cox immediately took action to advise her co-workers that
she believed that the email chain in question, which used the term “coon asses,” was
inappropriate for the workplace. Despite the fact that she took such action, the only response
came from another co-worker who stated that he preferred to discriminate against Asians.
According to the Complaint, Mr. Dennis, the co-worker who preferred to target Asians, has a
history of making inappropriate and vulgar comments about homosexuals to his co-workers via
his work email. Instead of confirming that this line of discussion was inappropriate or that such
language did not belong in the workplace, the plaintiffs’ supervisor, Mr. Plaisance ignored the
situation by stating only, “maybe we should all just go back to billing.” When a third co-worker,
Mr. Tate, stated that he was offended, Mr. Plaisance’s response was to issue what he referred to
as a “history lesson,” wherein he explained that the term “coon ass” is generally used as vulgar
slang against Cajuns. At that point, Plaintiff Williams felt it necessary to advise her co-workers
that the term “coon” is used derogatorily towards African-Americans. The Complaint goes on to
reference the fact that the hostile environment created by this racially charged email exchange
continued through the “disciplining” of Williams for causing a “disturbance” and the closing of
the VA’s investigation without any corrective action against Mr. Plaisance or anyone involved in
the email chain, strongly suggesting that the question of the hostility in the workplace has not
been resolved at all. While admittedly thin on detail, the court finds that the plaintiffs have
pleaded enough factual content to allow the court to draw the necessary inferences regarding the
plaintiffs’ claim of a hostile work environment. The plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that the
email chain and the VA’s follow-up response to it created a hostile work environment that
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negatively impacted their reputation at work and ability to do their jobs and caused them
personal consternation. The VA is on notice of the plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claim
and can defend against it appropriately in dispositive motion practice.2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 8) will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion will
be granted as to the plaintiffs’ THRA claims, claims for punitive damages, and the Title VII
racial discrimination claim concerning Cox. The motion will be denied as to the Title VII racial
discrimination claim concerning Williams and the Title VII hostile work environment claim
concerning both Cox and Williams.
An appropriate Order will enter.
_____________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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The VA raises a request, in the alternative, for summary judgment. This is based
primarily on the evidentiary argument that the term “coon asses” has historically tended to be
used to refer not to African-American people, but rather to Cajun people, and, as such, this term
is not offensive to the plaintiffs and cannot form a basis for the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs
dispute this factual assertion (see Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts (Docket No. 15, ¶¶ 1-2)), making summary judgment inappropriate on this basis
alone. But summary judgment is also inappropriate because it is premature. The current record
as to the meaning of “coon asses” consists solely of dueling interpretations of citations to
dictionary.com. Because this case has not even advanced to the discovery phase, the plaintiffs
have not had the opportunity, for example, to depose the individual who utilized the term to
discover the intended meaning. The plaintiffs should have an opportunity to develop the record
prior to summary judgment.
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