Holley v. Metro Nashville Police Department et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 11/10/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JASON HUNT HOLLEY #182163,
Plaintiff,
v.
METRO NASHVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-01148
Senior Judge Nixon

MEMORANDUM
Jason Hunt Holley, an inmate of the Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility, has filed
a pro se complaint for alleged violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The

complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1916(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.

Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, the court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought

by a prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from
government entities or officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner’s conditions of
confinement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state

a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, “a district
court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all wellpleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
II.

Factual Allegations
The plaintiff alleges that on the night of October 30, 2013, Metro police officers

Tuberville and Straub used excessive force on him in the course of taking him into custody for
reasons not specified in the complaint. Specifically, he alleges that defendant Tuberville hit him
repeatedly in the face, and that defendant Straub dragged him some distance across the ground
by his feet. The plaintiff alleges that the assault ended when other officers arrived on the scene.
He alleges that as a result of the officers’ excessive force, he suffered a fractured jaw, injuries to
his teeth, a busted eardrum and “road rash burns” to his face. Further, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant officers arrested him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. He alleges

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that he lodged a complaint about the officers’ actions, and that on May 26, 2015, he learned that
Metro’s internal affairs office has sustained a finding of failure to cooperate/withholding
information against defendant Straub and abusive treatment and false/inaccurate reporting
against defendant Tuberville.
The plaintiff also alleges that he has received inadequate medical treatment for his
injuries while incarcerated, due to the “negligence and failure of the Davidson County Sheriff’s
Office to transport me to receive proper medical treatment.”

Specifically, he alleges that

although he was not treated for his injuries Nashville General Hospital at Meharry immediately
after the incident, and was transported to the Davidson County Jail, where staff diagnosed the
injuries to his jaw, teeth and ear by x-ray three days after the incident. The plaintiff alleges that
two weeks later he was taken back to Meharry for dental evaluation, but did not receive
reconstructive surgery for his jaw. He was returned to Meharry more than a year later, on April
9, 2015, where someone “determined they would not perform the surgery” but did remove an
injured tooth.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ actions have violated his rights under the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments seeks unspecified compensatory and punitive damages.
III.

Discussion
The plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate alleged violations of his

federal constitutional rights. Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d
580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1)
a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that

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“the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316
F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Whether the plaintiff is a convicted inmate, whose claims would be analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment, or a pretrial detainee, whose claims would be analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the standard for adequate medical care is the same: to state a claim for relief under
§ 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs, meaning that the defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious
harm to the plaintiff’s health. Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Estate of
Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2005) and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 835–37 (1994)).
For the purpose of satisfying the objective component of this test, the Sixth Circuit has
defined a “serious medical need” as “either one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 570 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, the fact that the plaintiff was
repeatedly taken to the hospital about his injuries presumably indicates that staff had found that
such intervention was necessary. Construing the facts liberally in the plaintiff’s favor for the
purpose of initial review, the court finds that his injuries were sufficiently serious that this claim
is not objectively frivolous on its face.
The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires an inmate to show
that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown
v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate

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indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can
be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or
with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To establish the subjective component of this
alleged violation, a prisoner must plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied
reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where
the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.”
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). A defendant’s state of mind is sufficiently
culpable to satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim when it amounts to
a reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; behavior that is merely negligent will
not suffice. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36. Consequently, allegations of medical malpractice or
negligent diagnosis and treatment fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Thus, when a prisoner has received some
medical attention but disputes the adequacy of that treatment, the federal courts are generally
reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments of prison officials and thus to constitutionalize
claims which sound in state tort law. Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5. Notwithstanding, the Sixth
Circuit has also recognized that “in some cases the medical attention rendered may be so
woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Id.
Construing the plaintiff’s complaint liberally, as the court must at this stage, the plaintiff
might plausibly state a claim for deliberate indifference to his need for surgery to repair his
broken jaw. The plaintiff fails, however, to name a proper defendant to this claim. He does not

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allege that either defendant Tuberville or Straub had any responsibility for his medical care after
he was incarcerated. A defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of constitutional
rights is required to establish his or her liability under § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 325 (1981); Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2005).

The only

other defendants plaintiff names are the police department and the sheriff’s office, neither of
which is a proper defendant to a suit under § 1983. Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th
Cir. 1994). Even construing claims against those agencies as claims against Metro itself, the
plaintiff’s claim would fail because he has not alleged any governmental policy or custom
underlying the alleged violation of his rights, as necessary to establish the liability of a local
government. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 694 (1978).
Because this claim fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted against any of the
named defendants, the court need not address the extent to which it may be untimely. See Bruce
v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 389 F. App’x 462, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that continuing
violations doctrine did not apply to prevent acts of deliberate indifference occurring more than a
year before date of § 1983 complaint from being barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of
limitations).
B. Assault and Arrest
All of the plaintiff’s claims arising directly from his encounter with defendants Straub
and Tuberville on October 30, 2013, however, are barred by the statute of limitations. Although
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district courts may apply it sua sponte on
initial review where the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint. Stephens v. Corr.
Med. Servs., No. 3:04 CV P596 H, 2006 WL 2734432, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2006) (citing
Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988)).

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The statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is one year.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a); Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005).
Under the prison mailbox rule, the plaintiff’s complaint is deemed filed on October 27, 2015.
(Docket Entry No. 1, at 4.) The plaintiff’s claims for excessive force and unlawful arrest accrued
on or within days of October 2013, regardless of whether they would implicate the invalidity of
whatever criminal charges were brought against him, and the statute of limitations proceeded to
run from that point without being tolled by any such charges or even a conviction. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 392–95 (2007) (rejecting the argument that Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), delays accrual of claim for unlawful arrest and holding that limitations period
for such claim began to run as soon as plaintiff appeared before magistrate and was bound over
for trial); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Wallace to hold claims for
excessive force and unlawful arrest barred by statute of limitations). Those claims are thus filed
too late by almost a full year.
Where exhaustion of state remedies is required by the PLRA to bring a § 1983 action, the
applicable statute of limitations is tolled for the period that that those remedies are being
exhausted. Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000). But the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims do not relate to prison conditions, and his complaint affirmatively establishes
that he did not pursue such remedies. (Docket Entry No. 1, at 2.) Likewise, while the statute of
limitations bar can conceivably be overcome by equitable tolling, the distraction of facing
criminal charges itself does not provide a basis for equitable tolling, Wallace, 549 U.S. at 396,
and plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support application of equitable tolling to this
case. See Howard v. Rea, 111 F. App’x 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining in § 1983 case that
“[t]he statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, however, if the plaintiff lacked actual or

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constructive notice of the filing requirements, diligently pursued his rights, tolling would not
prejudice the defendant, and the plaintiff was reasonably ignorant of the notice requirement.”).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this action must be dismissed as time-barred and for

failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. An appropriate order is filed herewith.

John T. Nixon
Senior United States District Judge

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