Waddle v. Commissionor Tenn. Department of Corrections et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 12/9/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
BOBBY WADDLE,
No. 157508,
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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONOR1 TENN. DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 3:15-cv-01309
Chief Judge Sharp
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Bobby Waddle, an inmate of the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Clifton,
Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, the Warden of the West Tennessee State
Prison, Jane Does 1 and 2, John Does 1-8, the unidentified outside clinic where the plaintiff was
treated on November 6, 2015, and Captain f/n/u Mumford. (Docket No. 1). The plaintiff sues all
defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at p. 5). The plaintiff previously was an
inmate of the West Tennessee State Prison and the alleged events described in the complaint
occurred at the West Tennessee State Prison.
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.
PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
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The plaintiff likely intends to name the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Corrections.
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filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
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(citation omitted).
II.
Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates
a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under § 1983,
the plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III.
Alleged Facts
The complaint alleges that, on November 6, 2015, while the plaintiff was incarcerated at the
West Tennessee State Prison in Unit 10B, the plaintiff was attacked in his cell by three gangaffiliated inmates from Unit 10A. According to the complaint, two unit officers (one officer
working Unit 10B and the other officer working Unit 10A) conspired with the three inmates,
allowing those inmates to exit their cells and Unit and to enter the plaintiff’s cell and Unit. The
three inmates told the plaintiff that they “were going to kill [him] and [it] would do no good to yell
cause the officer was taken care of.” (Docket No. 1 at p. 6). The three inmates then stabbed the
plaintiff with a knife, beat him, and stomped him in an attack that lasted 30 minutes.
After the attack ended because the plaintiff “played dead,” the plaintiff left his cell and could
not locate an officer in his unit. The plaintiff walked to the cafeteria and found an officer, who
escorted the plaintiff to the clinic. The clinic staff then called an ambulance, and the plaintiff was
transported to an outside clinic and later returned to the prison.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff sustained numerous serious injuries to his left
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shoulder, back, legs, hips, left eye, nose, head, right hand, and left wrist, as well as some internal
injuries during the attack. The plaintiff believes that he has not received proper medical care for his
injuries. According to the plaintiff: “The blows [he] took in [his] head from this makes it very hard
to read or concentrate, and [he] can’t see clear out of [his] left eye and reading very long at all causes
[him] migraine headaches.” (Id. at p. 7).
IV.
Analysis
A.
Claims Subject to Dismissal
1.
Claims against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of
Correction, Captain f/n/u Mumford, Warden of the West Tennessee
State Prison, Warden of Security at the West Tennessee State Prison,
and the Captain of the Shift on November 6, 2015
The plaintiff names the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, Captain
f/n/u Mumford, Warden of the West Tennessee State Prison, Warden of Security at the West
Tennessee State Prison, and the Captain of the Shift on November 6, 2015 as defendants to this
action. However, the plaintiff has not alleged any personal involvement by any of these defendants
in the events of November 6, 2015 or thereafter. None of these defendants are even mentioned in
the narrative section of the complaint. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 6-7).
Supervisors cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts or inactions of employees
absent allegations that the supervisor acquiesced, participated or condoned the employees' wrongful
acts. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981); Miller v.
Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[P]roof of personal involvement is required
for a supervisor to incur personal liability.”). Other than naming them as defendants, the plaintiff
does not allege any facts that would establish that these defendants were personally involved in, or
even aware of, any of the issues about which the plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the complaint
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fails to state claims for which relief can be granted against defendants Commissioner of the
Tennessee Department of Correction, Captain f/n/u Mumford, Warden of the West Tennessee State
Prison, Warden of Security at the West Tennessee State Prison, and the Captain of the Shift on
November 6, 2015. All claims against these defendants must be dismissed.
B.
Actionable Claims
1.
Failure to protect claims against John or Jane Does # 1 and # 9
The complaint alleges that, while incarcerated at the West Tennessee State Prison, the
plaintiff was attacked by three inmates from another unit on November 6, 2015. According to the
complaint, defendant John or Jane Doe #1 (Officer of Unit 10B) was not at his or her assigned post
at the time of the incident which prevented him or her from stopping or responding to the attack.
As a result of this defendant’s failure to prevent or respond to the attack, the plaintiff sustained
serious injuries. The complaint also alleges that defendant John or Jane Doe # 9 (Officer of Unit
10A) as well as defendant John or Jane Doe #1 knew of, and even facilitated, the inmates’ plan to
attack the plaintiff by opening or leaving open cell and Unit doors.
The court finds that these allegations state actionable claims under the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution against defendants John or Jane Does #1 and #9 in their individual
capacities. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600
(6th Cir. 1998)(prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence suffered at the hands
of other prisoners). From the plaintiff’s allegations, it can be inferred that these defendants failed
to properly protect the plaintiff as they were required to do and may have been involved in the
inmates’ plan to harm the plaintiff. However, the court cautions that these are preliminary findings
only, as the plaintiff’s allegations require further development and clarification.
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2.
Denial or Delay of Medical Treatment Claims against the outside clinic,
John Does # 4, # 5 , # 6, and # 7, and Jane Doe # 2
The complaint also alleges that, once the plaintiff was taken by ambulance to another facility
for treatment (“the outside clinic”), he received inadequate or no care at all care for his injuries.
It is not entirely clear from the complaint, but the plaintiff appears to allege that defendant John Doe
#4 (the West Tennessee State Prison officer “who transported [the plaintiff] to outside clinic with
ambulance”)(Docket No. 1 at p. 5) returned the plaintiff to the prison before he could receive proper
or complete medical care at the clinic. An alternative reading of the pro se complaint is that the
doctors and/or nurses at the outside clinic did not treat the plaintiff’s injuries appropriately or at all,
but the plaintiff has not named any staff members of the outside clinic as defendants to this action.
In addition, the complaint alleges that once the plaintiff was returned to the prison, he
received inadequate care for his injuries. The defendants named in the complaint with regard to this
allegation are John or Jane Doe #5, the health administrator of the prison clinic; John or Jane Doe
#6, the doctor who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic; John or Jane Doe #7, the nurse
practitioner who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic; and Jane Doe #2, the head registered nurse
who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff continues to
suffer from his injuries for which he received no treatment or inadequate treatment.
The court finds that these allegations are sufficient to state Eighth Amendment claims based
on the denial of medical treatment or denial of appropriate medical treatment to the plaintiff against
defendants John Does # 4, 5, 6, and 7, Jane Doe # 2, and the outside clinic to which the plaintiff was
transported on November 6, 2015. Again, the court cautions that these are preliminary findings only
for purposes of the required PLRA screening; the plaintiff’s claims discussed above may be subject
to dismissal at a later date.
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As to the John or Jane Doe defendants and the unidentified clinic to which the plaintiff was
transported by ambulance on November 6, 2015, although designation of “John Doe” or “Jane Doe”
defendants is not favored, it is permissible when the defendants’ identities are not known at the time
the complaint is filed, but may be determined through discovery. See Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d
879, 882-84 (6th Cir. 1986). The court concludes that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the
complaint against the unidentified defendants at this juncture because of the likelihood that the
identities of these defendants will be determined during discovery.
V.
Conclusion
As set forth above, the plaintiff has stated colorable failure to protect claims against
defendants John or Jane Doe #1 (the Officer of Unit 10B at the West Tennessee State Prison on
November 6, 2015 at 4:35 pm) and against defendant John or Jane Doe # 9 (Officer of Unit 10A at
the West Tennessee State Prison on November 6, 2015 at or prior to 4:35 pm ) in their individual
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In addition, the plaintiff has stated colorable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the
denial of, or a delay in providing, appropriate medical treatment to the plaintiff against defendants
“outside clinic” (the unidentified non-prison clinic where the plaintiff was treated on November 6,
2015 after sustaining his injuries); John or Jane Doe #5, the health administrator of the prison clinic;
John or Jane Doe #6, the doctor who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic; John or Jane Doe #7,
the nurse practitioner who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic; and Jane Doe #2, the head
registered nurse who treated the plaintiff at the prison clinic in their individual capacities. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. These claims will be allowed to proceed for further development.
However, the plaintiff’s claims against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of
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Correction, Captain f/n/u Mumford, Warden of the West Tennessee State Prison, Warden of Security
at the West Tennessee State Prison, and the Captain of the Shift on November 6, 2015 fail to state
§ 1983 claims upon which relief can be granted, and those claims must be dismissed under the
PLRA.
An appropriate order will be entered.
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief United States District Judge
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