Harrison v. Parris

Filing 30

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: As set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2254 on any of his claims. Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court GRA NTS a COA only with respect to Claim 1. Petitioner's remaining claims are both procedurally defaulted and without merit. Because reasonable jurists could not debate whether Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claims 2 or 3, the Court DENIES a COA with respect to those claims. Petitioner may still seek a COA directly from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rule 11(a), Rules Gov'g § 2254 Cases. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 11/8/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
FREEMAN RAY HARRISON
#477504,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL PARRIS,
Respondent.

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NO. 3:16-cv-00565
JUDGE CRENSHAW

ORDER
Petitioner Freeman Ray Harrison, a state prisoner serving an effective sentence of 20 years
for two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of reckless endangerment, filed a pro
se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.)
As set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under
§ 2254 on any of his claims. Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED, and this action is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) when it enters a final
order adverse to a § 2254 petitioner. Rule 11, Rules Gov’g § 2254 Cases. A petitioner may not
take an appeal unless a district or circuit judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R.App.
P. 22(b)(1). A COA may issue only if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A “substantial showing” is made when the
petitioner demonstrates that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] COA does not require a showing

that the appeal will succeed,” but courts should not issue a COA as a matter of course. Id. at 337.
Reasonable jurists could debate whether Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim 1 that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated sexual battery in Count 2 of his
indictment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS a COA only with respect to Claim 1. Petitioner’s
remaining claims are both procedurally defaulted and without merit. Because reasonable jurists
could not debate whether Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claims 2 or 3, the Court DENIES a
COA with respect to those claims. Petitioner may still seek a COA directly from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Rule 11(a), Rules Gov’g § 2254 Cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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