Boyd v. Halley

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 4/11/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
KENNETH BOYD,

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Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY f/n/u HALLEY,
Defendant.

No. 3:16-cv-00697
Judge Campbell

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Kenneth Boyd, a pre-trial detainee being held at the Dickson County Jail in
Charlotte, Tennessee, brings this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Deputy f/n/u Halley in his individual capacity only, alleging that the defendant used excessive force
against the plaintiff on January 30, 2016. (Docket No. 1). As relief, the plaintiff seeks damages in
the amount of $480,000 and “the case that’s pending against [the plaintiff] and [his] Lady Ashlee
Hill to be dismissed.” (Id. at p. 6).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.

PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
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dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
II.

Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates

a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges,
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or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under § 1983, the
plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III.

Alleged Facts
According to the complaint, on January 30, 2016, at the Dickson County Jail, defendant

Deputy f/n/u Halley refused to allow the plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, to eat lunch unless he was
wearing his jail-issued orange shirt. However, earlier that day Deputy Halley had confiscated the
plaintiff’s only jail-issued orange shirt because the plaintiff had been using it in his cell to block the
sunlight from his bunk while he was sleeping.
The complaint alleges that, when the plaintiff told Deputy Halley that he did not have another
orange shirt, Deputy Halley told the plaintiff he could not eat lunch without the orange shirt. The
plaintiff obtained a lunch tray anyway but, before he could eat, Deputy Halley told the plaintiff to
put his tray down. The plaintiff complied, but Deputy Halley grabbed the plaintiff’s wrist “with
brute force” and cuffed the plaintiff. Twice the plaintiff told Deputy Halley that the cuffs were too
tight but Deputy Halley did not loosen them. Instead, he jerked the plaintiff’s arm “with brute force”
and “kept twisting” the plaintiff’s arm “while telling [the plaintiff] to chill” as he escorted him to
booking. When the cuffs were taken off, the plaintiff’s wrist was bleeding. The plaintiff asked for
medical assistance, but did not receive any treatment until 10:40 p.m. when he was given an ice pack
by another deputy. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 5-7).
IV.

Analysis
The plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the alleged events, he was a a pre-trial detainee. The
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legal status of an alleged victim of excessive force is significant because the conduct of the offending
officer must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to the applicable constitutional provision.
See Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 538 (6th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has
recently clarified that when assessing pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims we must inquire into
whether the plaintiff shows “that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)).
The inquiry is highly fact-dependent, and must take into account the “perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.”

Id.

It should also account for “the ‘legitimate interests that stem from [the

government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’” id., and defer when
appropriate to “‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 540 (1979)). The Court further instructs:
Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the
need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of
the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to
limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id. This list is not exclusive. Kingsley also reaffirms that pretrial detainees cannot be subjected to
“the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment,” id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.
10, 109 S. Ct. 1865) precisely because they “cannot be punished at all,” id. at 2475.
In light of this Fourteenth Amendment standard and the facts alleged in the complaint,
Plaintiff Boyd’s excessive force claims should proceed for further development. However, the court
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notes that, as part of his requested relief, the plaintiff asks the court to dismiss pending criminal
charges against the plaintiff and another individual. This court cannot order such relief. However,
the plaintiff also asks for money damages, a form of relief that is authorized by law against a deputy
defendant in his individual capacity.
To the extent that the complaint proposes a claim based on the delay of medical treatment
for the plaintiff’s wrist injury, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes an
obligation to provide prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
recreation, and medical care. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1119-1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
The failure to provide such necessities is a violation of an inmate’s right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984).
In order to state an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must “allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The deliberate indifference requirement is satisfied when an
official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing
to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). “A serious
medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.’”
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d
890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004)). “The failure to address a serious medical need rises to the level of a
constitutional violation where both objective and subjective requirements are met.” McCarthy v.
Place, 313 Fed. Appx. 810, 814 (6th Cir. 2008). “The objective component requires an inmate to
show that the alleged deprivation is ‘sufficiently serious’” and ‘that he is incarcerated under
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conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.
2000)(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must
show that prison officials had ‘a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Id. Claims of negligence are
insufficient to entitle a plaintiff to relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Delays in providing medical care may give rise to a violation of a prisoner’s rights under the
Eighth Amendment. Such delays do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless a
plaintiff complains that he suffered a detrimental effect to his health as a consequence of the alleged
delay. Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2005)(citing Napier v.
Madison County, Kentucky, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the court is not persuaded that a cut to the plaintiff’s wrist as described in the complaint
constituted a sufficiently “serious medical need” requiring medical treatment beyond what the
plaintiff was afforded on the day of his injury. Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the
delay in providing medical care (i.e., the ice pack) for the plaintiff’s injury caused the plaintiff to
suffer a detrimental effect to his health or that the plaintiff has suffered because he did not receive
a different treatment for his injury. Therefore, the court finds that the complaint fails to state an
Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. Any such claim alleged in the
complaint will be dismissed.
V.

Conclusion
As set forth above, the plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, has stated a colorable Fourteenth

Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Deputy Halley in his individual capacity under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. That claim will be allowed to proceed for further development.

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However, the plaintiff’s denial of or delay in providing medical treatment claim against
Deputy Halley fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted, and that claim must be
dismissed under the PLRA.
An appropriate order will be entered.

Todd J. Campbell
United States District Judge

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