Boyd v. Felts

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/12/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JAMES STACY BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAPTAIN RONDIA FELTS,
Defendants.

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No. 3:16-cv-0827
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James Boyd, a pretrial detainee at the Dickson County Jail in Charlotte, Tennessee, filed
a complaint in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is before the court for an initial review
pursuant to the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
I.

Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, the court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought by a

prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from government entities or
officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner’s conditions of confinement, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks
the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive
scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).

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In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, “a district court must
(1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be
liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
II.

Factual Allegations
The plaintiff alleges that he suffered a seizure that caused him to fall from the top bunk of his cell

to the concrete floor below, injuring his lower back, neck, and shoulder in the process. He was thereafter
incoherent and semi-conscious. He alleges that jail officials, rather than treating him properly by moving
him on a stretcher, made him stand up and walk, or be carried, to a medical holding cell on a lower level
of the jail. In the holding cell, he was given only a thin, worn mat to lie on, which exacerbated his
symptoms.
The plaintiff alleges that he has not received treatment for seizures and was never transported to
the local hospital for more thorough examination of his injuries. Instead, he waited two days before being
seen by the facility physician and another two weeks before receiving x-rays. He claims he is suffering
from “constant excruciating pain” in his lower back, neck, and shoulder. (ECF No. 1, at 8.) He has asked
for an MRI, which was refused, and the pain has gotten worse since his fall. He states both that jail
officials have been both deliberately indifferent and negligent in treating his serious medical needs.
The plaintiff explains that he has named only jail administrator Rondia Felts as the defendant in
this action, because the jail staff will not provide him with the “proper name” of nurse “Kim,” the individual
he holds responsible for the lack of care. (ECF No. 1, at 5.)
III.

Discussion
The plaintiff seeks to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate alleged violations of his

federal constitutional rights. Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who,
acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to
state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

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Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiff alleges that the jail nurse, whose first name is Kim, is responsible for the failure to
provide him with adequate medical care, that she has been both negligent and deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs. However, the plaintiff only names as a defendant Rondia Felts, jail
administrator, in both her official capacity and individual (or personal) capacity. Felts is clearly a person
who act under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 lawsuit. The question is whether the plaintiff has
alleged that she violated his constitutional rights.
To establish the liability of any individual defendant, the plaintiff must show that that particular
defendant was personally involved in the activities giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 371 (1976). See also Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting
that “[p]ersons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on their own
unconstitutional behavior”); Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Personal
involvement is necessary to establish section 1983 liability.” (citing Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532,
535 (6th Cir. 1991))). The plaintiff here does not allege that Felts was personally involved in the denial of
medical care or that she was even aware of it. The complaint therefore fails to state a claim against Felts
in her individual capacity.
With regard to the claim against Felts in her official capacity, such a claim is “equivalent to a
lawsuit directed against the public entity which that [official] represents.” Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d
350, 356 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The court presumes that Felts is an employee of Dickson
County. The county, as the operator of the county jail, may be subject to suit under § 1983 on the basis of
its obligation to provide medical care to individuals in the custody of the Dickson County Sheriff’s
Department. The county, however, cannot be liable solely on the basis that it employs a tortfeasor,
because “[r]espondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under § 1983.” McQueen v. Beecher
Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, a municipal entity cannot be held responsible for
an alleged constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom of the
entity and the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92

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(1978). To satisfy the Monell requirements, a plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the
city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner
v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d
170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir.
2001)).
The plaintiff arguably states the existence of a policy when he alleges that the jail officials will not
provide the last names of the individual(s) he seeks to hold accountable for the alleged constitutional
violations. The plaintiff, however, does not have a free-standing constitutional right to obtain the names of
jail officials. And, although the plaintiff’s complaint is generally directed toward the denial of medical care,
he does not expressly allege facts showing that he was denied care as a result of a jail policy or custom.
The court therefore finds that the plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against defendant Rondia
Felts in her official capacity.
Although the plaintiff did not name her as a defendant, the complaint alleges facts that might
support a claim against nurse Kim for failure to provide adequate medical care. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause grants pretrial detainees a right to adequate medical treatment—a
right analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners. Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407
F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment has been construed to prohibit
the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality
opinion), and conduct repugnant to “evolving standards of decency,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion). The amendment imposes affirmative duties on prison officials to “assume some
responsibility for [each prisoner’s] safety and general well-being,” and to “provide for his basic human
needs,” including medical care. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–
200 (1989).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court concluded that, although accidental
or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care to a prisoner would not violate the Eighth
Amendment, “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth
Amendment, because it constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” contrary to
contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 104. Under this analysis, what constitutes “unnecessary and

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wanton infliction of pain” will vary depending on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation, but the
Supreme Court has clarified that the question of whether a prisoner's claim based on prison officials’
failure to provide adequate medical care involves both a subjective and an objective component: The
objective prong asks whether the harm inflicted by the conduct is sufficiently “serious” to warrant Eighth
Amendment protection. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has defined a
“serious medical need” as “either one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or
omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under
Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must
plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the
face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue suffering or the
threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.1976). A defendant’s
state of mind is sufficiently culpable to satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim
when it amounts to a reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; behavior that is merely
negligent will not suffice. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36. Consequently, allegations of medical malpractice
or negligent diagnosis and treatment fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Thus, when a prisoner has received some medical
attention but disputes the adequacy of that treatment, the federal courts are generally reluctant to secondguess the medical judgments of prison officials and thus to constitutionalize claims which sound in state

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tort law. Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5. Notwithstanding, the Sixth Circuit has also recognized that “in
some cases the medical attention rendered may be so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment
at all.” Id.
Here, the facts appear to support a deliberate-indifference claim against nurse “Kim.” Although
the plaintiff indicates that he received some medical care—he was seen by a physician two days after his
fall and sent for an x-ray two weeks later—he also alleges that he has not received treatment for his pain
or medication to treat seizures, that his pain has continued unabated, and that he has made repeated
requests for additional medical attention.
Accordingly, rather than dismiss the complaint at this time, the court will grant the plaintiff 14 days
within which to file an amended complaint, naming as defendants nurse Kim and any other individuals
whom the plaintiff believes have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, and stating all
facts in the plaintiff’s possession to support such claims. If the plaintiff is unable to obtain the individuals’
names, he will have the opportunity to conduct limited discovery to obtain that information after he files
the amended complaint.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge