Guzak v. Lawson

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 11/7/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CASEY JAMES GUZAK
Petitioner,

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v.
MICHAEL PARRIS, Warden
Respondent.

No. 3:16-1980
Judge Trauger

M E M O R A N D U M
The

petitioner,

proceeding

pro

se,

is

an

inmate

at

the

Northwest Correctional Complex in Tiptonville, Tennessee. He brings
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Michael Parris,
Warden of the facility, seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
I. Background
On

January

12,

2015,

the

petitioner

pled

guilty

in

the

Criminal Court of Wilson County to possession of heroin with the
intent to sell or deliver. Docket Entry No. 22-1 at pg.117. For
this crime, he received a sentence of twelve years in prison. Id.
Having

pled

guilty,

there

was

no

direct

appeal

of

the

conviction taken by the petitioner. Later, though, the petitioner
filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal
Court of Wilson County. Id. at pgs.121-129.
The petition for post-conviction relief was summarily denied
1

without prejudice. Id. at pg. 145. Once again, there was no appeal
taken to challenge the denial of post-conviction relief.
II. Procedural History
On July 14, 2016, the petitioner filed the instant petition
(Docket Entry No.1) for federal habeas corpus relief.1 The petition
contains three claims for relief. These claims include
1)

the petitioner’s sentence is
incorrect;

2)

the petitioner was denied the
effective assistance of counsel;
and

3)

vice officers tampered with the
evidence.

Upon its receipt, the Court conducted a preliminary review of
the petition and determined that the petitioner had stated a
colorable claim for relief. Accordingly, an order (Docket Entry
No.9) was entered directing the respondent to file an answer, plead
or otherwise respond to the petition. Rule 4, Rules - - § 2254
Cases.
Presently before the Court is the respondent’s Motion to

1

The petition was stamped by the Clerk’s Office as received
on July 29, 2016. A pleading from a prisoner, however, is deemed
filed on the day that it was given to a prison official for
posting. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). The petitioner
does not set forth exactly when he placed the petition in the
prison postal system for mailing. He does state, though, that the
petition was signed on July 14, 2016. Docket Entry No.1 at pg.15.
For purposes of determining timeliness, the Court shall assume
that the petitioner mailed the petition on the same date that it
was signed by him.
2

Dismiss (Docket Entry No.20), to which the petitioner has offered
no reply. Having carefully considered this pleading and the record
as a whole, it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not needed in
this matter. See Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir.
2003)(an evidentiary hearing is not required when the record
conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief).
Therefore, the Court shall dispose of the petition as the law and
justice require. Rule 8, Rules - - § 2254 Cases.
III. Timeliness of the Petition
In the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent argues that this
action is untimely.
A one year period of limitation has been placed on the filing
of § 2254 petitions. Thus, a prisoner in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court has one year from the “date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review” in which to file
his

petition

for

federal

habeas

corpus

relief.

28

U.S.C.

§

2244(d)(1)(A).2
The petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced on January 12,
2015. He did not seek a direct appeal of the conviction. The time
for filing a direct appeal expired thirty (30) days after the

2

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) actually provides that the limitation
period will begin to run from the latest of four dates, one of
which is the date the judgment became final. The other three
potential dates do not apply in this case.
3

petitioner was sentenced, Rule 4(a), Tenn. R. App. P., rendering
his

conviction

final

on

February

11,

2015.

Therefore,

the

petitioner had until February 11, 2016 in which to seek federal
habeas corpus relief.
After two hundred ninety five (295) days had past, on December
3, 2015, the petitioner filed a timely petition for state postconviction relief.3 Docket Entry No.22-1 at pgs.121-129. This
filing had the effect of tolling the limitation period during the
time that the post-conviction proceeding remained pending in the
state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The petitioner’s post-conviction petition was summarily denied
on December 17, 2015. Docket Entry No.22-1 at pg.145. There was no
appeal of this ruling, rendering the post-conviction proceedings
concluded thirty (30) days later, on January 16, 2016. Rule 4(a),
Tenn. R. App. P.
When the state court proceedings that tolled the limitation
period are no longer pending, the limitation period resumes at that
point where it was tolled rather than starting anew. DiCenzi v.
Rose, 452 F.3d 465, 468-469 (6th Cir. 2006). As a consequence,
having already expended two hundred ninety five (295) days of the
limitation period, the petitioner had seventy (70) days remaining

3

The 295 days are calculated as follows : 17 days (2/12 2/28/15) + 31 days (3/15) + 30 days (4/15) + 31 days (5/15) + 30
days (6/15) + 31 days (7/15) + 31 days (8/15) + 30 days (9/15) +
31 days (10/15) + 30 days (11/15) + 3 days (12/1 - 12/3/15) = 295
days.
4

(365 days - 295 days = 70 days), or until March 26, 2016, in which
to initiate the instant action.4
As noted above, the habeas corpus petition initiating this
action was filed on July 14, 2016, more than three months after the
limitation period had expired. Accordingly, the instant action was
not filed in a timely manner.
IV. Equitable Tolling of the Limitation Period
Nevertheless,

the

limitation

period

does

not

act

as

a

jurisdictional bar. Consequently, the one year limitation period is
subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. Griffin
v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir.2005). The doctrine of
equitable tolling, however, should be applied sparingly. Dunlap v.
United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir.2001).
The petitioner bears the burden of showing that he is entitled
to an equitable tolling of the limitation period. Keenan v. Bagley,
400 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir.2005). To satisfy this burden, the
petitioner must establish (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance has stood
in his way and prevented a timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U.S. 408,418 (2005).
The petitioner has not specifically addressed the issue of an
equitable tolling of the limitation period. He does state, however,

4

The 70 days are calculated as follows : 15 days (1/17 1/31/16) + 29 days (2/16) + 26 days (3/1 - 3/26/16) = 70 days.
5

with respect to the question of timeliness, that he did not receive
a copy of the order denying him post-conviction relief until
January 28, 2016. Docket Entry No.1 at pg.5. He asserts that this
prevented him from “refiling post-conviction”. Id. at pg.14. But
the petitioner has offered nothing from which the Court could infer
that he has been diligently pursuing his federal rights and that an
extraordinary

circumstance

prevented

him

from

initiating

the

instant action in a timely fashion.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the limitation period was
not equitably tolled so as to allow the untimely filing of this
action.
An appropriate order of dismissal will be entered. Rule 8(a),
Rules - - - § 2254 Cases.

____________________________
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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