Schlueter v. Ingram Barge Company

Filing 187

ORDER regarding trial testimony of Dr. Benjamin Johnson signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 12/9/2019. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (ds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

BOBBY SCHLUETER,
Plaintiff,
v.
INGRAM BARGE COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:16-cv-02079
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

ORDER
This Order rules on an outstanding issue remaining from the pretrial conference on
December 6, 2019.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert opinion testimony:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,
they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them
to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Fed. R. Evid. 703. The Advisory Committee Notes recognize that experts may rely upon the
opinions of other experts: “Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information
from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including . . . reports and opinions from nurses,
technicians and other doctors. . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 703, advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed
rules; see also 4 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 703.04[3] (“The number of
sources on which experts in various fields of expertise might reasonably rely to obtain information
for the formation of opinions and inferences is virtually infinite. A few of those that the courts

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have considered with regularity are the following . . . opinions of other experts[.]”), quoted in
Eaves v. United States, No. CIV.A. 4:07CV-118-M, 2009 WL 3754176, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5,
2009).
However, under Rule 703, “the inadmissible evidence should not be shown to the jury
unless the judge finds that its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s testimony
outweighs its potential for prejudice.” Robert E. Larsen, Navigating the Federal Trial § 11:74
(2019 ed.); see also United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 759 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the expert
relies on facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible, then those facts ‘shall not be disclosed to
the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.’” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment));
see id. at 759 n.7 (“There is a presumption against disclosure to the jury of inadmissible
information used as the basis for expert’s opinion.” (citing Rule 703 (2000)).
Based on this authority, the court finds that Dr. Benjamin Johnson may testify to the effect
that, in arriving at his diagnosis of CRPS, he relied on information furnished by other doctors who
had treated the plaintiff, and he may identify the other doctors. However, he may not disclose the
actual opinions and diagnoses of the other doctors, because the probative value of that hearsay
would be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
It is so ORDERED.

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ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge