Johnson v. Doe et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/7/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MARCUS JOHNSON
Plaintiff,
v.
JANE AND JOHN DOE, et al.
Defendants.

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No. 3:16-2740
Chief Judge Sharp

M E M O R A N D U M
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is an inmate at the Bledsoe
County Correctional Complex in Pikeville, Tennessee. He brings this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various state parole
and prison officials seeking injunctive relief and damages.
On April 30, 2015, U.S. Marshals served the plaintiff with a
parole revocation warrant and took him into custody. A hearing was
held a few months later after which plaintiff’s parole was revoked
and he was returned to prison. The plaintiff alleges that his
parole was improperly revoked and that he is being “illegally
restrained of my liberty”.
A prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his
continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his
continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

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by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has
been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994).
The principles expressed in Heck apply to § 1983 actions
challenging state parole revocations. King v. City of Highland
Park, 2008 WL 723514, 4 (E.D. Mich. 3/17/08). Thus, where the
plaintiff does not come forward with a decision declaring the
parole revocation invalid, a § 1983 action is barred. Lovett v.
Kinkela, 1999 WL 644323, 1 (6th Cir. 8/19/99).
Nowhere in the complaint does it suggest that the plaintiff
has already successfully tested the validity of his confinement in
either a state or federal court. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims
are not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.
In the absence of a cognizable claim, the Court is obliged to
dismiss the instant action sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
An appropriate order will be entered.

____________________________
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief District Judge

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