Abriq v. Hall et al
Filing
136
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr on 2/26/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ABDULLAH ABRIQ, on behalf of
)
himself and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DARON HALL, in his official capacity )
as Sheriff of Davidson County, and the )
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
)
OF NASHVILLE/DAVIDSON COUNTY,)
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Defendants.
)
NO. 3:17-cv-00690
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court, among other things, is the Metropolitan Government’s Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket No. 61).1 For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
INTRODUCTION
This purported class action is one of several such cases filed across the country in recent
years challenging the constitutionality of local law enforcement’s detaining immigrants subject to
detainers from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). Plaintiff Abdullah Abriq is a foreign national who immigrated to the United States under
an F-1 student visa. Plaintiff resided in Davidson County and attended Tennessee State University.
Plaintiff alleges that he has never been arrested for or convicted of a crime.
Plaintiff alleges that, on April 6, 2017, ICE officials took custody of him, pending civil
removal proceedings. Plaintiffs contends that, also on April 6, 2017, ICE officials transferred custody
1
Defendant Hall was dismissed from this action on July 10, 2017 (Docket No. 59).
of him to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) at the
Davidson County Jail, where he was held until April 11, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that ICE had no
warrant or probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff also alleges that Metro had no warrant or probable
cause to believe Plaintiff had committed a criminal offense2 or to take custody of him, and that Metro
had no lawful authority to hold him as an immigration detainee.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., ICE may enter
into written agreements with state, local or private entities (“§ 287 agreements”) that authorize nonfederal officials to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the “investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Plaintiff avers that
Metro entered into a § 287 agreement with ICE, under which Metro assumed physical custody of
immigration detainees while ICE had legal custody. Metro does not dispute that its § 287 agreement
with ICE began in 2007 and expired in 2012. Plaintiff asserts that the Metro Council did not
authorize Sheriff Hall to renew the § 287(g) agreement with ICE or to enter into any further
agreement with ICE, and that Sheriff Hall publicly announced, in October 2012, that Metro would
not renew the § 287(g) agreement with ICE.
Plaintiff contends that, despite the agreement’s expiration and having no new § 287
agreement, Metro, through an ongoing custom, policy and practice and at the direction of Sheriff
Hall, has continued to “seize” and hold administrative detainees for ICE, including Plaintiff, with
no lawful authority to do so. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Metro for:
Count I - - - violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
2
Individuals held for immigration violations are not charged with a crime but, rather,
they are civil “administrative detainees” of ICE. Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas, 229 F. Supp.3d
501, 511 (N.D. Texas 2017).
2
Count II - - - violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Count III - - - false imprisonment under Tennessee law
Count IV - - - unjust enrichment under Tennessee law
Count V - - - declaratory judgment for ultra vires actions
(Docket No. 26).
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at
1950. A legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation need not be accepted as true on a motion
to dismiss, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Fritz v. Charter
Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Metro first argues that, to the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Metro’s detention of him is
illegal because it was done without a valid contract, in violation of the Metro Charter and Tennessee
law about immigration, there is no private right of action to enforce either the Charter or that
Tennessee statute. Plaintiff, however, is not suing to enforce the Metro Charter or a Tennessee
3
statute. Plaintiff alleges that Metro did not have a § 287 agreement with ICE when Plaintiff was
detained. Plaintiff’s claims are based on Metro’s alleged lack of authority to detain him without
probable cause, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and state tort law.
Plaintiff’s claims against Metro arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a right of
action against state actors who violate the U.S. Constitution, and under Tennessee state law, not
under the Metro Charter or a Tennessee statute. Plaintiff has a private right of action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and under Tennessee common law.
Plaintiff asserts that he was detained in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures because Metro had no authority to detain him. Plaintiff further asserts that both
Metro and the federal government lacked authority to hold him, contractual or otherwise. Deciding
whether Metro had authority to detain Plaintiff involves more than the Metro Charter and a state
statute. Whether Metro had authority to detain him involves federal law and regulations concerning
the interplay between ICE and local law enforcement. Moreover, whether Metro falsely imprisoned
Plaintiff or was unjustly enriched at his expense are causes of action under state common law.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s private right of action is available under both federal and state
law, and Metro’s motion on this basis is denied. Therefore, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s
argument about taxpayer standing.
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
As noted, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private
right of action against anyone who subjects any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Rehbueg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). A Section 1983 plaintiff
4
must demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right caused by a defendant acting under color of
state law. Epperson v. City of Humboldt, 183 F. Supp. 3d 897, 903 (W.D. Tenn. 2016); Carl v.
Muskegon County, 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff adequately pleads that Metro was
acting under color of state law when it seized him in April 2017.
Where, as here, claims are made against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish that the
plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation and that a policy or custom of the
municipality was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. Miller v. Sanilac
County, 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010); Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009).
Municipalities are liable for harms resulting from a constitutional violation only when the injury
resulted from an implementation of the municipality’s official policies or established customs. Id.
The plaintiff must also demonstrate a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged
constitutional violation in order to show that the municipality’s deliberate conduct can be deemed
the “moving force” behind the violation. Spears, 589 F.3d at 256.
Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Metro’s detention of him, without probable cause to believe he had
committed a criminal offense, and based solely on a civil ICE detainer, violated the Fourth
Amendment.3 The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3
Metro asserts that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to choose a detention facility.
Plaintiff is challenging Metro’s authority to detain him at all and contends that he must be held, not
at a specific facility, but at a facility with lawful authority to confine him.
5
Federal law authorizes immigration officials to interrogate, without a warrant, any alien or
person believed to be an alien and to arrest, without a warrant, an alien if the official “has reason to
believe” that the alien is in the U.S. illegally. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a). Immigration regulations provide
that ICE detainers are issued to advise another law enforcement agency that ICE seeks custody of
an alien presently in the custody of that agency, and a detainer is a request that such agency advise
ICE, prior to release of the alien, so that ICE can arrange to assume custody. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The
regulation also states: “Upon a determination by [ICE] to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise
detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period
not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, in order to permit assumption
of custody by [ICE].” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
In 2012, this Court found the detainer regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 to be ambiguous and
stated that the courts had not definitively resolved this issue. Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson County, TN,
2012 WL 3945354 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012). The Court, in holding that the regulation was
mandatory, relied upon Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2012), wherein
the court found that Section 287.7 “required” the local law enforcement agency to maintain custody
of an individual identified as an alien.
After the Rios-Quiroz opinion, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
Galarza. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014). The appellate court, in a thorough and
detailed discussion, concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 does not compel state or local law enforcement
agencies (“LEAs”) to detain suspected aliens subject to removal pending release to immigration
officials. “Section 287.7 merely authorizes the issuance of detainers as requests to local LEAs.”
Galarza, 745 F.3d at 645. Given this, stated the court, the county was free to disregard the ICE
6
detainer, and it therefore could not use as a defense that its own policy did not cause the deprivation
of Galarza’s constitutional rights. Id.
Recent opinions by other courts around the country have followed the reasoning of the Third
Circuit in Galarza.4 These cases, however, involved aliens who were already in the custody of the
local law enforcement agency. Here, Plaintiff was not in state custody when he was brought to
Metro; he was in ICE custody. Accordingly, while the aforementioned authority assists in providing
an understanding of the constitutional issues, that authority diverges from this case in a meaningful
way.
As explained above, the INA provides that the Attorney General of the United States may
enter into a written agreement with a state or any political subdivision of a state, pursuant to which
an officer or employee of the state or political subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney
General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the U.S., may carry out such function at the
expense of the state or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with state and local law. 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). In performing such a function, an officer or employee of a state or political
subdivision thereof shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General. 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Moreover, an administrative detainee held by local officials pursuant to such
an agreement remains under ICE custody and control. Partak v. Baker, 374 F. Supp. 2d 551, 557
(E.D. Mich. 2005), vacated on other grounds, Partak v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
2006 WL 3634385 (6th Cir. 2006); Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003).
4
See, e.g., Ochoa v. Campbell, 2017 WL 3476777 (E.D. Wash. July 31, 2017);
Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas, 229 F. Supp. 3d 501 (N.D. Texas 2017); and Orellana v. Nobles
County, 230 F. Supp. 3d 934 (D. Minn. 2017).
7
The law provides that nothing in § 1357(g) shall be construed to require any state or political
subdivision thereof to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9).5
However, the statute also states that nothing in § 1357(g) shall be construed to require an agreement
in order for an officer or employee of the state or subdivision to “otherwise cooperate” with the
Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention or removal of aliens not lawfully
present in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B).
Metro argues that it was acting in “cooperation” with ICE officials, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(10). In Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion County Sheriff’s Department, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017
WL 5634965 at * 6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2017), the county had argued that it held the plaintiff based
simply on the ICE detainer because it was required to “cooperate” with federal immigration officials.
The court held that the circumstances under which state enforcement officers may be authorized to
assist or cooperate with the federal government in immigration matters are limited and clearly
defined under federal law. The Lopez-Aguilar court held that “the full extent of federal permission
for state-federal cooperation in immigration enforcement does not embrace detention of a person
based solely on either a removal order or an ICE detainer.” Lopez-Aguilar at * 10. “Such detention
exceeds the ‘limited circumstances’ in which state officers may enforce federal immigration law and
thus violates ‘the system Congress created.’” Id.
In addition, the “seizure” of aliens for known or suspected immigration violations can violate
the Fourth Amendment when conducted under color of state law, because the predicate for a seizure
5
Metro argues that nothing in the statute prohibits local agencies from providing
housing to detainees without a § 287 agreement, but neither does anything in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) give
local agencies the authority to provide that housing without probable cause, especially where, as
here, no § 287 agreement exists between Metro and ICE.
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is probable cause that the arrestee is committing or has committed a crime, and it is not a crime for
a removable alien to remain present in the United States. Lopez-Aguilar at * 11.3 Only when acting
under color of federal authority - that is, as directed, supervised, trained, certified, and authorized
by the federal government - may state officers effect constitutionally reasonable seizures for civil
immigration violations. Id. at * 13. Detainers, standing alone, do not supply the necessary direction
and supervision. Id. “[K]nowledge that an individual has committed a civil immigration violation
does not constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a criminal infraction” and therefore
cannot justify a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id.4
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Metro took custody of him with no probable
cause. If Metro had been acting pursuant to an agreement with ICE, it may have had authority to take
custody of Plaintiff, but Plaintiff alleges that Metro had no such agreement in April 2017. In Ochoa
v. Campbell, 2017 WL 3476777 (E.D. Wash. July 31, 2017), the court noted: “Courts around the
country have held that local law enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they
temporarily detain individuals for immigration violations without probable cause.” Ochoa at * 14
(citing cases). Similarly, the court in Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015), found
“clear law” establishing that the constitution requires probable cause for the immigration detention
that a detainer requests. Id. at 216.
3
Generally, a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a civil
offense is insufficient to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas,
229 F. Supp.3d 501, 511 (N.D. Texas 2017).
4
“The concept of probable cause makes sense only in relation to criminal offenses.”
McKinney v. Fields, 2010 WL 3583017 at * 6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2010) (citing Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)).
9
Citing Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Ore. April 11, 2014),
Metro points out that this case is different from the cases Plaintiff cites, because Plaintiff was not
already in the custody of Metro, so his detention was not a “continued detention.” Metro still
detained Plaintiff, however, and Plaintiff alleges that Metro’s detention of him exceeded the scope
of its lawful authority, constituted a seizure, and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
The court in Miranda-Olivares held that it was not reasonable for the county to believe it had
probable cause to detain the plaintiff based on the ICE detainer. Plaintiff has adequately alleged that
Metro lacked probable cause, an allegation that creates a recognizable claim under the
aforementioned authority.
Metro also contends that the sheriff has power, pursuant to Tenn Code Ann. § 8-8-201, to
hold individuals such as Plaintiff in the jail. Section 8-8-201 provides a list of the duties of a sheriff.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-101(a) provides that the sheriff (local law enforcement) may enter into a
written agreement with the Department of Homeland Security concerning the enforcement of
immigration laws, detention and removals. If such an agreement is executed, then the local law
enforcement officers may be trained to carry out such duties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-101(b).
Accordingly, Metro’s argument runs afoul of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, that
the provisions of a general statute must yield to those of a special one. Regardless, Plaintiff alleges
the lack of an agreement, so Section 50-1-101(a) appears to be inapplicable at this juncture.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, for purposes of a
motion to dismiss, that Metro had no probable cause and no lawful authority to detain him based
solely on an ICE detainer and, therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The motion to
dismiss on this issue is denied.
10
Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff also alleges that Metro’s seizure and detention constituted a significant deprivation
of life and liberty that requires due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Metro
asserts that Plaintiff cannot state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the Fourth Amendment protects against the type of conduct Plaintiff also alleges violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because the alleged conduct implicates a constitutional right
protected by another amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
If a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth
or Eighth Amendments, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific
provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process. United States v. Lanier, 117 S.Ct. 1219,
1228, n. 7 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). In a case involving the use of
excessive force, the Sixth Circuit held that alleged conduct that does not implicate a constitutional
right protected by another amendment will be analyzed under the substantive due process component
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
Lanier at n.7). Similarly, in Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2008), the court followed
Lanier in finding that because the plaintiff’s rights were not governed by the particular provisions
of the Fourth Amendment, the more generally applicable Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause applied. Id. at 681.
Here, Plaintiff’s claim for illegal seizure by Metro falls under the Fourth Amendment, not
the Fourteenth. The Fourth Amendment, as explained above, specifically prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and
Metro’s Motion to Dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim is granted.
11
STATE LAW CLAIMS
Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiff avers that Metro had no lawful authority to act as an immigration detention services
contractor after its agreement with ICE expired in 2012, and yet it has continued to accept payments
from the federal government for housing administrative detainees. Therefore, Plaintiff contends, it
would be inequitable for Metro to retain those payments. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to stop
future unjust enrichment and the creation of a constructive trust consisting of all payments
unlawfully detained by Metro.
Under Tennessee law, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim are (1) a benefit conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) appreciation of that benefit by the defendant, and (3)
acceptance of the benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for him or her to
retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof. Miller v. Driver, 2012 WL 2131230 at * 14
(M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2012) (citing United States v. Goforth, 465 F.3d 730, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2006)).
To establish an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must show that he conferred a benefit upon the
defendant. Perry v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 2003); Miller at * 14.
Metro contends that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for unjust enrichment because Plaintiff
has not sufficiently alleged that he conferred a benefit on Metro. Plaintiff alleges that Metro received
money for housing immigration detainees, including Plaintiff, from the federal government. Plaintiff
does not allege that he conferred a benefit to Metro. Instead, Plaintiff appears to allege that his
detention by ICE and placement in Metro’s facility served to confer a benefit to Metro. The alleged
connection between Plaintiff and any benefits received by Metro from ICE is too attenuated to
support a claim that Plaintiff, even indirectly, conferred benefits upon Metro. See Perry, 324 F.3d
12
at 851. For these reasons, Metro’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is granted,
and that claim is dismissed.
False Imprisonment
Plaintiff asserts that Metro’s detaining and restraining him without lawful authority
constituted false imprisonment. He seeks equitable, injunctive relief similar to that he seeks for his
unjust enrichment claim - an injunction prohibiting any future such false imprisonment and creation
of a constructive trust for all payments unlawfully obtained by Metro for falsely imprisoning
administrative detainees after their contract with ICE expired.
Metro asserts immunity from Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim under the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”). Historically, governmental entities have been held
immune from suit absent their express waiver of that immunity. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822,
826 (Tenn. 2005). The TGTLA waives, in part, the immunity previously afforded to governmental
entities in Tennessee. Immunity is removed, for example, for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-20-205; Sallee, 171 S.W.3d at 826. Where immunity is removed, the governmental entity is the
proper party defendant. Id.
The TGTLA specifically preserves immunity from claims arising out of “false imprisonment
pursuant to a mittimus from a court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2); Chalmers v. Clemons, 359
F.Supp.2d 700, 703 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). The government does not retain sovereign immunity for
injuries arising out of any and all false imprisonments, only those arising pursuant to a mittimus from
a court. Id. There is no allegation here of imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, so the
government may not claim immunity under the TGTLA for Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim.
13
Uhuru v. City of Memphis, 2008 WL 4646156 at * 10 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2008) (citing Chalmers,
359 F.Supp.2d at 703).
However, Chalmers also held that an action against the government under the TGTLA must
be an action for negligence. Chalmers, 359 F.Supp.2d at 703; Uhuru at * 11. Although the TGTLA
does not allow plaintiffs to hold governmental entities vicariously liable for intentional torts not
exempted under § 29-20-205(2), it does require a direct showing of negligence on the part of the
governmental entity.5 Id. Plaintiff, therefore, was obligated to plead facts that could establish the
elements of negligence. Id.
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not allege facts related to the false imprisonment
claim that could establish the elements of negligence. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that since September
1, 2012, Metro has intentionally detained administrative detainees without lawful authority. Docket
No. 26 at 28. Therefore, Metro’s Motion to Dismiss this claim is granted.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Metro’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, for unjust enrichment, and for false
imprisonment are DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.
___________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
As Plaintiff admits, the TGTLA removes sovereign immunity for injuries proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of a municipal employee. Docket No. 66 at 15; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-20-205.
14
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