Molthan v. Vanderbilt University et al

Filing 20

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Vanderbilt University. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED. Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Ru les of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 2/12/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JASON STEVEN MOLTHAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:17-cv-00706
Judge Crenshaw / Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s sole
remaining claim in this action - a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Docket No. 9. Defendant has contemporaneously filed a supporting Memorandum of Law.
Docket No. 11. As grounds for its Motion, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s claim was brought
outside the applicable one year statute of limitations such that it should be dismissed as time-barred.
Docket Nos. 9, 11.
Plaintiff has filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion, arguing that his Complaint “does in
fact allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action” against Defendant for “unlawful deprivation of
rights and liberties via false arrest/imprisonment,” and that his Complaint was “filed timely and
within the time limitations set by statute.” Docket No. 14.
With leave of Court (Docket No. 17), Defendant has filed a Reply, reiterating its contention
that Plaintiff was provided legal process on April 6, 2016 when the judicial commissioner concluded
that there was probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, and that under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 394,
388-92 (2007), Plaintiff’s claims became time-barred one year thereafter. Docket No. 18.

Defendant notes that Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until April 10, 2017, after the limitations
period had run, and argues that Plaintiff has not established that this claims period should be subject
to equitable tolling. Id.
Without leave of Court, Plaintiff has filed a Sur-Reply, arguing that, “in order to be bound
over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges one must make an ‘initial appearance in Court’. A
Judicial Commissioner does not constitute a ‘Court’ and therefore cannot constitute an ‘initial
appearance in a Court’” that would begin the statute of limitations period. Docket No. 19.
Chief Judge Crenshaw, in the Memorandum issued with his Order granting Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, succinctly summarized the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s
Complaint as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that at 10:30 p.m. on April 5, 2016, he was
conducting research in the computer lab in the Sarratt Student Center
on Vanderbilt University’s campus, which is open to the general
public until 11 p.m. (Doc. No. 1, at 6, 8.) Plaintiff was approached at
10:30 by three Vanderbilt University police officers who said that a
Vanderbilt employee had recognized him from local news media
reports. The officers asked to see Plaintiff’s identification, then
asked him to gather his belongings and step outside, where they
searched his belongings and questioned him about the news
coverage. (Id. at 6.) Despite Plaintiff’s explanation that the media
coverage was “defamatory” and that he had not been “convicted of
the felony,” at 10:55 p.m. the officers told Plaintiff to leave the
Vanderbilt campus and never return. Plaintiff began to leave, but
before he could, the officers ordered him to stop and arrested him for
criminal trespassing. (Id. at 6-7.) On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff
pleaded not guilty in General Sessions Court; the charge was
dismissed, and Plaintiff was released from jail at approximately 8
p.m. (Id. at 7-8.) Since that incident, Plaintiff alleges that Vanderbilt
police officers have intimidated him in areas near the Vanderbilt
campus and have threatened him with arrest “if he does not find
another area of town to frequent.” (Id. at 8.)
Docket No. 4, p. 3.
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In finding, for purposes of initial review, that Plaintiff stated a nonfrivolous Fourth
Amendment claim that was timely,1 Chief Judge Crenshaw explained:
The Court also finds, again solely for the purpose of initial review,
that Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not arraigned until April 11,
2016, makes his April 10, 2017 Complaint for false arrest/
imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment timely. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (holding that plaintiff’s federal false
arrest/imprisonment claim accrued, and statute of limitations began to
run, on the date that his false imprisonment ended when the plaintiff
appeared in court and was bound over for trial); Tenn. Code Ann. §
28-3-104(a)(1)(setting one-year statute of limitations for actions for
false imprisonment and for actions brought under the federal civil
rights statutes). . . . Accordingly, from the face of the complaint, it
appears that the limitations period for Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
claim began to run, not on April 5 when he was arrested, but on April
11, 2016, when the charge against him was dismissed and he was
released after his initial court appearance.
Id. at 4-5.
The threshold issue presently pending before the Court is whether Plaintiff’s limitations
period began to run on April 6, 2016, when Plaintiff was bound over for process and the judicial
commissioner concluded there was probable cause for the arrest and ordered that Plaintiff be taken

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Chief Judge Crenshaw found that all other claims related to his arrest alleged by Plaintiff
were time-barred. Id. at 5 (“Accordingly, with the exception of his Fourth Amendment claim for
false arrest, all of Plaintiff’s state and federal claims arising from Defendants’ actions on the date
of his arrest - including his claims for conspiracy, official oppression, fraud, entrapment, extortion,
assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress - are untimely.”). Chief Judge
Crenshaw further found that Plaintiff’s post-release claim for harassment, “and any other claims
that could be liberally construed to relate to the alleged harassment he has experienced since his
release, are timely but fail to state any claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff bases his
claims for conspiracy, official oppression, fraud, entrapment, extortion, assault and battery, and
harassment on state criminal statutes that define crimes and their defenses; they do not create
private causes of action.” Id. at 6. Finally, Chief Judge Crenshaw found that Plaintiff’s claim for
conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) “fails because he has
not alleged that such conspiracy was based on his race or other ‘inherent personal characteristics.’”
Id., citing Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 672 (6th Cir. 2015).
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before the General Sessions Court to answer the charge, or on April 11, 2016, when Plaintiff was
arraigned. In Tennessee, there is a one-year statute of limitations for claims alleging a violation of
civil rights or personal injury pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3104(a)(1)(B); Laney Brentwood Homes, LLC v. Town of Collierville, 144 F. Appx. 506, 509 (6th
Cir. 2005). The statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853,
856 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir.
1997)).
In Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court stated, “Reflective of the fact that false
imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim
becomes held pursuant to such process—when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges.” 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007). The Kato Court continued, “If there is a false
arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process or
arraignment, but not more.” Id. at 391. The Kato Court ultimately held: “We conclude that the
statute of limitations on petitioner’s § 1983 claim commenced to run when he appeared before the
examining magistrate and was bound over for trial.” Id.
Pursuant to the Kato Court, therefore, Plaintiff’s accrual period began when legal process
was initiated against him. Although Plaintiff appeared in General Sessions Court on April 11, 2016,
during which he plead not guilty and his charge was dismissed, Plaintiff and his arresting officer first
appeared before Judicial Commissioner Carolyn Piphus for a probable cause determination on April
6, 2016, shortly after Plaintiff’s arrest. See Docket No. 9-1, Certified Copy of Plaintiff’s Arrest
Affidavit. Judicial Commissioner Piphus determined on April 6, 2016, that probable cause existed
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for Plaintiff to be held and taken before the General Sessions Court to answer the charge. Id. The
imprisonment of Plaintiff between April 6, 2016, and April 11, 2016, was, therefore, pursuant to legal
process, as set forth in Kato, supra.
Chief Judge Crenshaw’s determination during his consideration of Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and accompanying frivolity review that Plaintiff’s Complaint was timely
was based solely on his initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, omits
any mention of anything that happened between being booked “at roughly 12:30” on April 6, 2016,
and appearing in court five days later. See Docket No. 1 at 7. Thus, Chief Judge Crenshaw did not
have before him the information that Plaintiff and his arresting officer first appeared before Judicial
Commissioner Carolyn Piphus for a probable cause determination on April 6, 2016, shortly after
Plaintiff’s arrest, and that Judicial Commissioner Piphus determined on April 6, 2016, that probable
cause existed for Plaintiff to be held and taken before the General Sessions Court to answer the
charge. See Docket No. 9-1, Certified Copy of Plaintiff’s Arrest Affidavit.
In light of the fact that Plaintiff and his arresting officer first appeared before Judicial
Commissioner Carolyn Piphus for a probable cause determination on April 6, 2016, shortly after
Plaintiff’s arrest, and Judicial Commissioner Piphus determined on April 6, 2016, that probable
cause existed for Plaintiff to be held and taken before the General Sessions Court to answer the
charge, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s limitations period began to run on April 6, 2016, when
he was being held pursuant to legal process. The undersigned therefore finds that this action is
time-barred. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be
GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
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days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and
Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986);
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

________________________________
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

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