Olivier v. Montgomery County Courts et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Granting 2 Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Dismissing Case. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 6/26/17. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MARDOCHE OLIVIER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,
Respondents.
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No. 3:17-cv-00829
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mardoche Olivier, a resident of Clarksville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Docket No. 1). He also has filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket No. 2).
A review of the application shows that the petitioner has insufficient financial resources to
pay the filing fee in this action. Therefore, the petitioner’s application is GRANTED, and the Clerk
shall file the petition in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
The petition in this case is identical in most respects to the petitions previously dismissed in
the following cases, also brought by the petitioner: Olivier v. Tennessee, et al., No. 3:17-cv-00830
(M.D. Tenn. June 1, 2017)(Crenshaw, J.); Olivier v. Tennessee, et al., No. 3:17-cv-00831 (M.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2017)(Crenshaw, J.); Olivier v. Tennessee, et al., No. 3:17-cv-00832 (M.D. Tenn. May
25, 2017)(Trauger, J.); Olivier v. Tennessee, et al., No. 3:17-cv-0837 (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
2017)(Trauger, J.).
Each petition refers to a different state criminal action. In all cases, the
petitioner, who is free on bail awaiting trial in Montgomery County, alleges that his constitutional
rights have been violated in connection with his arrest and pending prosecution on state criminal
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charges. He has further alleges that he has been unable to have his claims adjudicated by a state court
because Tennessee courts will not entertain an appeal or habeas corpus action until after a defendant
is convicted. He asks this court to order the Montgomery County Court to dismiss the case against
him and order him released from his bond.
A § 2241 petition for federal habeas corpus relief will not be considered unless the petitioner
first exhausts all available state court remedies for each claim presented in the petition. Hamm v.
Saffle, 300 F.3d 1213, 1216 (6th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “federal habeas
corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense
to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court,” and explained that
Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings would tend to
remove federal questions from the state courts, isolate those courts
from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of
and hospitality to federally protected interests. [The exhaustion
doctrine] preserves orderly administration of state judicial business,
preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal habeas
proceedings.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489, 490 (1973) (quoting Note, Developments
in the Law–Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1094 (1970)). The Court found that the
district court had properly granted relief on a fully exhausted speedy trial claim, but “emphasize[d]
that nothing we have said would permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt
to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court,” and rejected the notion that its
decision would “convert[] federal habeas corpus into ‘a pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.’”
Id. at 493.
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has observed that exercise of the court’s power under § 2241
should be limited:
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[A]lthough § 2241 establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts to
consider pretrial habeas corpus petitions, the courts should abstain
from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition
may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by
other state procedures available to the petitioner. Abstention from the
exercise of the habeas corpus jurisdiction is justified by the doctrine
of comity, a recognition of the concurrent jurisdiction created by our
federal system of government in the separate state and national
sovereignties. Intrusion into state proceedings already underway is
warranted only in extraordinary circumstances.
Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, federal
courts have generally recognized that the “Younger abstention doctrine,” arising from Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), applies to petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., In re Justices
of Superior Ct. Dep’t of Mass. Tr. Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying abstention
principles to pretrial habeas petition); Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming
dismissal of pretrial habeas petition on abstention grounds). The Younger abstention doctrine
requires a federal court to abstain from interfering with pending state civil or criminal proceedings
involving important state interests, absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44;
see Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of
exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and
habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”).
Here, the petitioner’s case implicates Tennessee’s important interest in adjudicating alleged
criminal conduct. The petitioner has not alleged any extraordinary circumstances warranting this
court’s intervention before allowing time for him to present his constitutional claims to Tennessee
courts during the normal course of his criminal case. For these reasons, and those previously set
forth by the court in the petitioner’s previous cases, the petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT
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PREJUDICE to the petitioner’s ability to refile upon the exhaustion of his state court remedies.
Because the petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation
in this matter, the court DENIES a certificate of appealability. See Castro v. United States, 310
F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he ‘has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).”).
This order constitutes final judgment in this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER this 26th day of June 2017.
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge
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