Doe et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee
Filing
62
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alistair Newbern on 7/9/18. (gb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
T.C, ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD,
S.C.,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01098
Plaintiffs,
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Newbern
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE D/B/A METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
JOHN AND JANE DOE #1, ON BEHALF
OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, JANE DOE #2,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01159
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Newbern
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE D/B/A METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
1
SALLY DOE, ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILD, SALLY DOE #2,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01209
v.
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Newbern
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE D/B/A METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
MARY DOE #1, ON BEHALF OF HER
MINOR CHILD, MARY DOE #2,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01277
v.
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Newbern
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE D/B/A METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
TOMMY DOE AND TAMMY DOE #1, ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD,
TAMMY DOE #2,
Case No. 3:17-CV-01427
Plaintiffs,
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Newbern
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE D/B/A METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiffs in these actions, which are consolidated for purposes of discovery, bring
claims alleging that their daughters were subjected to unwanted sexual contact while enrolled as
students in the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS), in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1982, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before
the Court are MNPS’ motion to take Rule 35 psychiatric examinations of the minor plaintiffs,
MNPS’ motion for an order authorizing the release of the minor plaintiffs’ medical records, the
parties’ joint motion for resolution of multiple discovery issues, MNPS’ motion to expedite a
ruling on the discovery issues, and the plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for discovery regarding
MNPS’ contact with student witnesses.
The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on these motions and the parties have filed
supplemental briefing. In consideration of the parties’ arguments in their filings and in court, and
for the reasons that follow, MNPS’ motion to take Rule 35 psychiatric examinations is
GRANTED, subject to the limitations set out below; MNPS’ motion for an order authorizing
release of the minor plaintiffs’ medical records is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
the plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for discovery regarding MNPS’ contact with student witnesses
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal; the parties’ joint motion for resolution of
multiple discovery issues is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as discussed below;
and MNPS’ motion to expedite a ruling on the discovery issues is FOUND MOOT.
3
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
A. Statement of Facts
Plaintiffs T.C., Sally Doe, John and Jane Doe, Mary Doe, and Tommy and Tammy Doe
bring five separate lawsuits against MNPS on behalf of their children, alleging violations of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
claims brought by T.C., John and Jane Doe, Sally Doe, and Mary Doe arise from alleged instances
of “exposing” at two MNPS schools. The plaintiffs state that exposing is a practice of videoing
sex acts without the knowledge of one or more students involved, circulating the videos to other
students or on the internet, and deriding the victims as “sluts” or “whores.” 1 The plaintiffs allege
that the practice of exposing is widespread within MNPS and that officials at the minor plaintiffs’
schools were aware that exposing took place in their schools and throughout the MNPS system.
Tommy and Tammy Doe’s claims address the alleged long-term sexual harassment of their
daughter by a MNPS teacher. All plaintiffs allege violations of Title IX and the minor plaintiffs’
equal protection rights based on MNPS’ failure to train its personnel to handle incidents of sexual
harassment and its deliberate indifference to the ongoing sexual harassment of female students.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that MNPS did not fulfill its responsibilities under Title
IX to prevent discrimination against female students both before and after the alleged incidents of
harassment. 2 See Doe v. Univ. of Tennessee, 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (setting
out theory of “before” and “after” Title IX claims). The plaintiffs’ “before” claims allege that
MNPS did not adequately train its employees as to what Title IX requires to prevent harassment
1
The claims brought by John and Jane Doe and Mary Doe arise out of the same incident.
T.C. and Sally Doe’s claims describe two instances of similar conduct.
2
The Title IX cause of action raised in Tommy Doe is not stated as “before” and “after”
claims, but makes many of the same allegations.
4
in educational settings or adequately notify students about the protections available to them under
the statute. The plaintiffs further allege that, by failing to take appropriate steps to supervise
students and curtail “exposing” through disciplinary measures, MNPS created an environment that
allowed unwanted sexual harassment to occur. The plaintiffs’ “after” claims allege that, once it
learned of the incidents of harassment, MNPS did not inform the plaintiffs of the remedies and
resources available to them under Title IX, adequately punish the alleged harassers, or implement
a plan that would allow the minor plaintiffs to continue as students in the MNPS system without
fear of ongoing harassment.
The plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims again allege that MNPS did not adequately train its employees
to comply with Title IX or to handle incidents of sexual harassment involving students, as
evidenced by “the system-wide prevalence of known severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
sexual harassment and bullying” taking place within the schools. The plaintiffs state that this
failure to train results from MNPS’ deliberate indifference to the rights of female students because
the foreseeable consequence of MNPS’ failure is a violation of female students’ equal protection
rights. They further allege that MNPS’ inadequate response to the alleged incidents of harassment
was also deliberately indifferent to the female students’ rights.
The plaintiffs seek damages for physical and emotional injuries, severe humiliation,
embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of educational opportunity, past and future medical
expenses, past and future pain and suffering, and past and future emotional injuries. They also seek
punitive damages, injunctive relief requiring MNPS to comply with Title IX, and attorneys’ fees.
The facts of each case as alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaints or amended complaints and
the defendant’s answers are summarized below.
5
1. T.C. v. MNPS, Case No. 3:17-cv-01098
T.C. alleges that her daughter, S.C., was sexually harassed when she was a 15-year-old
ninth-grade student at Hunters Lane High School. T.C. alleges that, on April 17, 2017, S.C. was
pulled into an unlocked classroom and subjected to unwelcome sexual contact by a male student
while a third student “surreptitiously lurk[ed] in the back of the classroom, unnoticed by S.C.” and
videoed the incident. T.C. alleges that this assault was planned and was able to take place because
the classroom where it occurred was “unsupervised and improperly unlocked.”
T.C. states that school administrators at Hunters Lane were “aware that at least three
incidences of ‘exposing’ had occurred within [MNPS before this incident], two of which took
place at Hunters Lane High School” and resulted in the female students “being unable to remain
in school due to ongoing harassment and bullying.” Hunters Lane administrators “became aware
of the incident involving S.C. and the recording of the incident as the videotape began circulating
on students’ phones and on the internet.” In response, “[t]he school’s administration chose to
discipline the male student who participated in the unwelcome sexual activity, the student who
recorded and circulated the videotape, as well as the victim, S.C., with a three-day suspension
each.” The school did not punish any of the students who circulated the video. S.C. did not return
to school at Hunters Lane “due to fear and severe emotional distress resulting from multiple threats,
harassment, and bullying she received as a result of the circulation of the videotape, as well as the
inadequate punishment those responsible had received[.]” S.C. completed her classwork from
home. The complaint states that S.C. “is aware that the videotape of the incident continues to
circulate in [the MNPS system] and on the internet, causing S.C. severe emotional distress.”
T.C. alleges that punishing S.C. for this incident was in violation of Title IX guidance
against disciplinary policies that may chill students’ reporting of sexual harassment. T.C. further
6
states that the school administration deferred to a police investigation and did not conduct the
independent investigation that Title IX requires. T.C. also alleges that the Hunters Lane
administration “was aware that students engaged in inappropriate behavior, including intimate
interactions in common areas in the presence of school staff,” which she had witnessed when
picking S.C. up from school.
MNPS admits that sexual conduct occurred between S.C. and a male student in an unlocked
classroom on or about April 17, 2017. MNPS asserts that S.C. was “fully aware” that she was
videoed at the time and that the video “demonstrably” shows that the contact was consensual.
MNPS denies “that the administration is to assume sexual behavior will necessarily occur because
a door is unlocked.” According to MNPS, Hunters Lane Principal Dr. Sue Kessler promptly began
an investigation of the incident after it was brought to her attention, interviewed all the students
whom she could identify as having a role in the incident or distribution of the video, and disciplined
them appropriately. MNPS also asserts that school administrators took “reasonable measures
within their power to curtail circulation of the video” and that Dr. Kessler was not aware of the
alleged practice of exposing before the lawsuit was filed.
2. John and Jane Doe v. MNPS, Case No. 3:17-cv-01159, and Mary Doe v. MNPS,
3:17-cv-01277
John and Jane Doe and Mary Doe allege that their daughters, Jane Doe 2 and Mary Doe 2,
were sexually harassed as fourteen-year-old ninth-grade students at Maplewood High School.
They state that, on September 21, 2016, the girls were “involved in unwelcome sexual conduct
with 18-year-old male students in a stairway at Maplewood High School.” This conduct took place
after the end of regular classes when the stairway was unsupervised and was videoed by one or
more of the male students involved.
7
The plaintiffs state that Maplewood administrators became aware of the incident when the
girls’ parents independently went to the school to report it. Mary Doe notified Maplewood’s
principal and school resource officer that her daughter “had come home with hickeys on her neck
and told [her] that she had been involved in sexual activity in the stairway and that the conduct
was unwelcome.” The administrators “spoke to the Senior male students involved but otherwise
failed to provide any assistance” and informed Mary Doe that Mary Doe 2 “could simply return to
class the following day.” Jane Doe informed the school that the incident had been videoed, but the
school did not notify Mary Doe of the video, even though she had asked the school to investigate
whether a video existed. Jane Doe 2 was similarly told to return to class. A police report was filed,
but the school did not conduct an independent investigation. The plaintiffs allege that the school
did not substantially punish any of the male students involved andthat their daughters are suffering
continuing emotional distress because the video of the incident still exists on the internet.
MNPS admits that it became aware of the incident involving Jane Doe 2 and Mary Doe 2
when John and Jane Doe and Mary Doe alerted Maplewood authorities, but asserts that the contact
involved was consensual. MNPS further asserts that it is not “to assume sexual behavior will
necessarily occur because high school students are allowed to interact in unsupervised areas.”
MNPS admits that Jane Doe 2 withdrew from school in October 2016 but denies that this was due
to its actions. MNPS denies that it did not inform Mary Doe of the video after she asked about its
existence. MNPS also denies that it did not substantially punish any of the students involved in the
incident.
3. Sally Doe v. MNPS, Case No. 3:17-cv-01209
Sally Doe alleges that her daughter was sexually harassed when she was a fifteen-year-old
ninth-grade student at Hunters Lane. Specifically, she alleges that, in late March 2017, her
8
daughter was “taken into the men’s bathroom” and subjected to “unwelcome and/or pressured
sexual contact by a male student.” The incident allegedly was videoed without Sally Doe 2’s
knowledge and released to “other students and the public.”
Sally Doe notified the Hunters Lane principal and school resource officer of the incident
on April 5, 2017. She states that the administrators “failed to provide any assistance and merely
suggested that the parents file a police report.” Sally Doe alleges that the school did not effectively
discipline any of the students involved or conduct an independent investigation after the police
report was filed. Sally Doe 2 “was forced to withdraw from school due to the severe harassment
and physical threats she received as a result of the circulation of the videotape” and “was unable
to complete the semester at Hunters Lane High School due to the failure of the administration to
address the safety concerns of her parents.” The video allegedly continues to circulate at Hunters
Lane and on the internet, causing Sally Doe ongoing emotional distress.
MNPS responds that it is not “legally responsible under Title IX or § 1983 for placing a
monitor in every bathroom to ensure that Plaintiff does not enter the bathroom of the opposite sex
voluntarily to engage in intimate interactions.” MNPS asserts that it conducted a thorough
investigation of the incident and determined that Sally Doe 2 “voluntarily entered the boys’
bathroom and engaged in consensual kissing with a male student.” It denies that further sexual
activity occurred, that there was a video of the incident, or that it was aware of any alleged video.
MNPS asserts that, “[h]ad it been brought to the attention of school administrators prior to this
lawsuit that sexual activity occurred or that there was a videotape of the activity, further
investigation and discipline would have been impl[e]mented.”
9
4. Tommy Doe and Tammy Doe v. MNPS, Case No. 3:17-cv-01427
Tommy and Tammy Doe’s action on behalf of their daughter differs from the other four
actions in that it alleges that Tammy Doe 2 was sexually harassed by a teacher when she was a
fourteen-year-old ninth-grade student at Maplewood High School. The complaint alleges that, in
the fall of 2015, another female student asked Tammy Doe 2 to meet with a female teacher. The
teacher allegedly asked Tammy Doe 2 if she was a lesbian and made sexually suggestive
comments. The two students began spending time in the teacher’s classroom after school, with the
other student serving as a lookout while the teacher “kissed and touched” Tammy Doe 2 in the
locked classroom.
In April 2016, Maplewood administrators contacted Tommy and Tammy Doe and
informed them of this conduct. The complaint alleges that Maplewood’s Principal Dr. Woodard
“partially blamed Tammy Doe 2 for the relationship” and stated that she was “not innocent.”
Woodard allegedly stated that he intended to remove the teacher but “advised that the incident
should be ‘swept under the rug’ for the benefit of Tammy Doe 2.” Tammy Doe 2 was sent home
from school for a week and, other than the removal of the teacher, no further action was taken by
the Maplewood administration. Tommy Doe and Tammy Doe contacted the Metro Nashville
School Board, but did not receive any information about actions taken in response to this incident.
They were “given the name of an individual to call at the school system; however, when [they]
attempted to reach the named contact, they were told that the individual had retired and was not
replaced.”
Tammy Doe 2 was subjected to ongoing bullying and harassment arising out of this
conduct and the teacher’s removal. She has experienced “depression, weight loss, and difficulty
completing her schoolwork due to the severe emotional trauma caused by the incident itself and
10
the subsequent harassment by her peers, which has forced her to seek counseling and treatment.”
A criminal investigation is pending against the teacher.
MNPS states that it conducted a thorough investigation of these allegations within twentyfour hours of learning them and that the teacher was immediately placed on administrative leave
pending the outcome of the investigation. MNPS denies that Dr. Woodard mentioned “sweeping
anything under the rug” and further asserts that he issued a memorandum to the MNPS Executive
Director of Employee Relations recommending that the teacher be fired. MNPS asserts that
Tammy Doe 2 was sent home for a week at her mother’s request and that Dr. Woodard offered to
transfer Tammy Doe 2 to a school of her choice, but her parents declined.
B. Procedural History
The parties’ joint discovery motion presents issues in four major areas: (1) MNPS’ ability
to discover information about the minor plaintiffs’ sexual history; (2) MNPS’ ability to discover
information about the parent plaintiffs’ employment, health, and finances; (3) the plaintiffs’ ability
to access MNPS disciplinary files; and (4) MNPS’ ability to discover information from the
plaintiffs’ social media accounts. In addition to the issues raised in the joint motion, MNPS moves
to compel the minor plaintiffs to submit to psychiatric examinations under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 35. MNPS also seeks an order authorizing the disclosure of the minor plaintiffs’ medical
records. The plaintiffs have filed a supplemental motion seeking additional discovery regarding
MNPS’ alleged practice of calling student witnesses to the principal’s office during the school day
and interviewing them regarding the subject of this litigation not in the presence of their parents.
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II.
Legal Standard
The scope of discovery is “within the sound discretion of the trial court.” S.S. v. E. Ky.
Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229,
1240 (6th Cir. 1981)). As a general matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows discovery
of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2017). If a party fails to provide a proper or
complete response, Rule 37 authorizes the filing of a motion to compel the discovery. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(a). Conversely, Rule 26(c) provides for the issuance of a protective order limiting discovery
upon a finding of good cause that such an order is necessary to protect a party from “annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
The starting point for both inquiries is whether the requested discovery is relevant to the
subject matter of the litigation. Relevance for purposes of discovery is broadly construed, and the
information sought need not be admissible to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However,
the “desire to allow broad discovery is not without limits and the trial court is given wide discretion
in balancing the needs and rights of both plaintiff and defendant.” Scales v. J.C. Bradford and Co.,
925 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1991); Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288,
305 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the court “retains discretion to determine that a discovery request
is too broad and oppressive”).
III.
Analysis
The Court’s inquiry starts at relevance and therefore must begin with the legal framework
of the plaintiffs’ causes of action. Title IX provides, in relevant part: “No person . . . shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20
12
U.S.C.A. § 1681(a). To allege a Title IX violation, it is not necessary to demonstrate “physical
exclusion” from participation in or benefits from educational programs or activities. Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
To succeed on a Title IX claim arising out of an incident of student-to-student harassment,
a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or
benefits provided by the school, (2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of
the sexual harassment, and (3) the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to
the harassment.
Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 ).
Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights define sexual
harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature . . . [including] unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”
U.S. Dept. of Education Office of Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment
of
Students
by
School
Employees,
Other
Students,
or
Third
Parties,
§
1,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html#II (hereinafter, OCR Guidelines). 3
Whether conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment “depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 652 (quoting
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). Factors to be considered
include “the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved[.]” Id.
Although it has not addressed the question authoritatively, in an unpublished opinion, the Sixth
Circuit found that student-to-student conduct must be “unwelcome” to constitute sexual
3
MNPS argues that the Court should not consider the OCR Guidelines as controlling law.
Without deciding the Guidelines’ appropriate weight, the Court references them as persuasive
authority.
13
harassment. Winzer v. Sch. Dist. for the City of Pontiac, 105 F. App’x 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2004).
Courts within the Sixth Circuit have found that certain types of sex-related bullying may be
sufficiently severe to constitute sexual harassment, including circulating a nude photo of a student
and ridiculing her with insults like “slut” and “whore,” Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 1:09-CV-00885, 2012 WL 2011037, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2012); name-calling that referred
to a student’s genitalia, Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 05-74439, 2010 WL 455410, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2010); and intimidation and ridicule in the wake of an alleged rape, Doe v.
Forest Hills Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-CV-428, 2015 WL 9906260, at *11 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015).
“Deliberate indifference” requires a plaintiff to show that school administrators responded
to student-to-student harassment in a way that was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. A school cannot turn a blind eye to student-to-student
behavior or conduct sub-par investigations and claim that the harassment was unknown. If school
authorities knew or should have known about harassing conduct, the school’s duty to respond
under Title IX is triggered. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 9906260, at *11. Moreover, “Title
IX imposes many duties on a school that must occur before a final investigation substantiates a
complaint.” Id.
When a student’s Title IX claim arises out of an alleged incident of sexual harassment by
a teacher, the plaintiff must show that “an official of the school district who at a minimum has
authority to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf [had] actual notice of, and [was]
deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274, 277 (1998); see also Williams ex rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d
360, 366 (6th Cir. 2005). Because of the unique authority held by teachers in a school setting,
courts diverge as to whether “unwelcomeness” is a necessary element of a teacher harassment
14
claim. Compare Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1225–27 (7th Cir.
1997) (“Welcomeness is an improper inquiry to be made in Title IX cases involving sexual
discrimination of [children in kindergarten through eighth grade] . . . If [children of these ages]
cannot be said to consent to sex in a criminal context, they similarly cannot be said to welcome it
in a civil context. To find otherwise would be incongruous.”), with R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch.
Dist. I-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (finding that eighth-grade plaintiff failed
to establish Title IX claim resulting from her relationship with school basketball coach because
the parties agreed that the coach’s advances were “not unwelcome,” in spite of the fact that plaintiff
lacked the legal capacity to consent under state criminal law). At a minimum, the OCR Guidelines
advise, “[i]n cases involving secondary students, there will be a strong presumption that sexual
conduct between an adult school employee and a student is not consensual.” OCR Guidelines §
V.A.2.
Title IX plaintiffs often bring parallel claims under § 1983 for violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009). Here, the
plaintiffs allege equal protection violations on grounds of MNPS’ deliberate indifference to sexual
harassment evidenced, in part, by a failure to adequately train its employees. To succeed on their
§ 1983 claims, the plaintiffs must show “that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the
alleged injury.” Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir.
2006) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)). To prove failure to
train, the plaintiffs must show that “(1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks
performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3)
the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Id. at 700; see also City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1046 (6th
15
Cir. 1992). To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiffs “must demonstrate . . . that
the School District had actual knowledge of prior facts to which it responded unreasonably. A
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its response to the abuse, or lack
thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances,” although “no one particular
response is required.” Williams, 400 F.3d at 364 (emphasis in original).
A. Discovery of the Minor Plaintiffs’ Sexual Histories
Central to the parties’ motions is the question of whether MNPS may seek discovery of the
minor plaintiffs’ sexual histories. During Sally Doe’s deposition, 4 MNPS asked Sally Doe if she
knew whether her daughter had participated in sexual activity with her boyfriend or with “anyone
previously, other than the incident [addressed by the litigation].” (Doc. No. 33-1, PageID# 273.)
MNPS also asked Sally Doe whether her daughter used birth control “for the purposes of having
sex,” what Sally Doe taught her daughter about sex and sexual consent, whether her daughter had
formal sexual education, what her daughter knew about Sally Doe’s own sexual history, whether
her daughter had ever seen pornography, whether her daughter had an OB/GYN, and whether she
and her daughter had ever visited the Public Health Department or Planned Parenthood for any
reason. (Id. at PageID# 273–79.)
Based upon this line of questioning and MNPS’ stated intent to pursue similar questions
with the minor plaintiffs, the plaintiffs now seek a protective order limiting MNPS’ inquiry into
the minor plaintiffs’ sexual histories. The plaintiffs’ counsel stated during oral argument that they
do not object to MNPS questioning the students about any history they may have with the male
4
Although the parties’ arguments may refer to facts specific only to one action, the parties
have agreed that the Court’s resolution of the issues raised is relevant to and will control in all
five related actions.
16
students involved in these incidents. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis addresses only MNPS’
proposed questioning regarding the minor plaintiffs’ sexual histories with unrelated persons.
“‘The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite
broad.’” Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lewis
v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998)). However, when a plaintiff asserts a
claim of sexual harassment, the parameters of discovery have long been narrowed by the courts’
interest in guarding against attempts to “harass, intimidate, and discourage the plaintiff in her
efforts to prosecute her cause.” Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Mitchell v.
Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 483 (D. Utah 1987) (“Broad discovery has been coupled, however,
with an array of protective orders designed to prevent discovery from being used as a tool of
oppression rather than as a legitimate inquiry into relevant issues.”). This balance is reflected in
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which bars the admission of “(1) evidence offered to prove that a
victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual
predisposition” in proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct. Fed. R. Evid. 412. Rule 412
reflects a determination that “prior sexual activity is of dubious probative value and relevance and
is highly embarrassing and prejudicial” and can be “used to harass the prosecuting victim.” Bell v.
Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1982). It “aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public
disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding
process.” Id. In a civil case, evidence of past sexual conduct is admissible only if “its probative
value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.
The court may admit evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the victim has placed it in
controversy.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2).
17
Although Rule 412 is an evidentiary rule that addresses admissibility, its advisory
committee notes recognize that, “[i]n order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412[,] . . . courts
should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect the victim against
unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.” Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note
to 1994 amendment. To that end, the advisory committee notes direct that “[c]ourts should
presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes
a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories
of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discovery.” Id. Courts now routinely
recognize that Rule 412 limits the scope of discovery into a litigant’s sexual history in a civil
action. See Hulec v. J.H. Bennett & Co., No. 1:14-CV-00492, 2014 WL 3449514, at*1 (N.D. Ohio
July 11, 2014) (“Evidence Rule 412 . . . limits the scope of discovery where the evidence sought
deals with an alleged victim’s past sexual conduct.”); Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-0903655-JSW(DMR), 2010 WL 2524587, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (“[O]ne guiding principle
in determining the proper scope of deposition questions in this case is that questions delving into
plaintiff’s sexual behavior or disposition should not be allowed absent an affirmative
demonstration by defendants that the information sought is relevant to a claim or defense.”);
Macklin v. Mendenhall, 257 F.R.D. 596, 604 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Given the sensitive and potentially
embarrassing nature of the information sought from Plaintiff, the fact that she is alleged to be a
victim in civil action involving sexual harassment, and the policies voiced in the Advisory
Comments to Fed. R. Evid. 412, the Court concludes that the fact that the information sought by
Defendants from Plaintiff might be discoverable under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b) does not limit or
absolve the Court of its responsibility to consider and fashion appropriate protective orders under
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c).”); Rhodes v. Motion Indus., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-251, 2008 WL 4646110,
18
at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2008) (“Although Rule 412 does not explicitly apply to discovery, it is
‘applicable and has significance in deciding’ certain discovery motions; namely, in deciding a
discovery motion a court must be careful it does not undermine the rationale of the rule.”);
Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 CIV. 5463 (LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2008) (“Courts quite properly are reluctant to permit discovery into . . . highly intimate matters.
Individuals’ privacy interests in such circumstances are important and deserving of protection.
Moreover, there is a risk that permitting such discovery would deter some individuals from
pursuing meritorious claims.”). But see Barnes v. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:06-CV-0532, 2007 WL
1236190, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2007) (“In the Court’s view, Rule 412 does not change [the]
result in this case . . . the Court notes that Rule 412 is a relevance rule that pertains specifically to
the admission of evidence at trial.”).
Considering the plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c) in light of Rule
412’s instruction, the Court’s first determination is whether the minor plaintiffs’ sexual histories
are relevant to the claims and defenses raised in this case. MNPS asserts that this discovery is
“extremely relevant” because the plaintiffs allege that the sexual contact and videoing at issue in
this lawsuit was “unwanted” and “pressured” and that the minor plaintiffs suffered physical and
emotional harm because of it. MNPS states that, “by alleging physical and emotional sexual trauma
and developmental disorders creating damages of three million dollars, Plaintiff has placed [these]
discovery topics in play.” Accordingly, MNPS argues, information about the minor plaintiffs’
sexual histories is “critical to this case, since a finding that the conduct was not unwanted could
absolve Metro of all liability.” MNPS “accepts that these questions are not easy to answer for any
sixteen-year[-]old girl,” but states that, because the plaintiffs have “come forward with these
19
explicit[] and sexual allegations already in a public lawsuit,” they must provide the information
necessary for MNPS to defend itself at trial. 5
The logic supporting MNPS’ theory of relevance—that a plaintiff’s private sexual history
has some bearing on whether unrelated sexual contact was wanted—is hollow, as many courts
before this one have found. See, e.g., Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that “[w]hether a sexual advance was welcome . . . does not turn on the private sexual behavior of
the alleged victim”); Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., No. 17CV7093, 2018 WL
1936096, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2018) (finding that a similar theory of relevance is
“superficially appealing but advances a boorish, reductive narrative” of sexual predisposition);
Gowens v. Tidwell, No. 10–10518, 2013 WL 2285446, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2013) (noting
that “the distress of sexual assault is rooted in the violation of one’s body without consent and not
in the number of sexual partners that a person has chosen by act of free will”) (emphasis in
original); E.E.O.C. v. Donohue, 746 F. Supp. 2d 662, 667 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (finding “insidious”
the suggestion that plaintiff’s past willingness to engage in private sexual banter was relevant to
her reaction to such banter in the workplace); Macklin, 257 F.R.D. at 605 (finding relevancy of
evidence regarding plaintiff’s sexual conduct and social relationships “questionable”); Williams v.
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty. & Kansas City, 192 F.R.D. 698, 703–04
(D. Kan. 2000) (finding that inquiry into plaintiff’s sexual history was of “marginal relevance” to
claim regarding involuntary sexual encounter with police officer and presented “inordinate risk of
MNPS also argued that it must refute the minor plaintiffs’ claim that they will not develop
into healthy adults because of this conduct, which “puts Metro in the position where it will need
to ask personal questions to see how [the minor plaintiffs have] developed sexually to this point in
[their] lives.” The plaintiffs have submitted a statement from their proposed expert that he does
not intend to address developmental damages and will focus on “current psychological state,
causation, treatment, and long term prognosis.”
5
20
harm” to the plaintiff); Truong v. Smith, 183 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding evidence
of plaintiff’s “prior sexual activity with third parties has no bearing on the issue of whether she
consented to the sexual violence charged”).
It is now beyond question in the federal courts that “[t]he fact that the plaintiffs may
welcome sexual advances from certain individuals has absolutely no bearing on the emotional
trauma they may feel from sexual harassment that is unwelcome.” Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 484.
Simply put, sexual harassment is no less traumatic to a person who has had extensive experience
with sex than it is to a person who has had none. To find otherwise would be to suggest that, once
a person becomes sexually active, he or she welcomes sexual attention from all who might give it
and is immune to the harm that results from unwanted sexual conduct. That line of reasoning has
not been persuasive for decades. See, e.g., Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 52
(D.D.C. 1997) (“Since a man cannot seriously contend in 1997 that any woman who has a sexual
relationship with her co-worker is morally degraded . . . he is reduced to arguing that because a
woman took one co-worker as a lover he is justified in his belief that she will accept him and
welcome his sexual advances. That, in all but his imagination, is non sequitur.”); Mitchell, 116
F.R.D. at 485 (“Past sexual conduct does not . . . create emotional calluses that lessen the impact
of unwelcomed sexual harassment.”). MNPS’ argument has even less purchase when considered
in the context of the plaintiffs’ claims arising from the alleged incidents of exposing. Even if a
plaintiff welcomed sexual contact, the conclusion that she also welcomed the videoing and
broadcasting of that contact without her knowledge or consent is absurd.
In contrast to the minimal relevance of the information MNPS seeks, the potential for it to
cause embarrassment, oppression, and undue burden is high. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 412 was
put in place, in part, “to reduce the inhibition women felt about pressing complaints concerning
21
sex harassment because of the shame and embarrassment of opening the door to an inquiry into
the victim’s sexual history.” Howard, 177 F.R.D. at 51. Even before Rule 412, Rule 26(c)
empowered courts to prevent discovery that could discourage plaintiffs from pursuing sexual
harassment claims—“contraven[ing] the remedial effect intended by Congress in enacting Title
VII.” Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 762. Rule 26(c) affords courts the same power—and protects the same
interests—in the context of Title IX litigation.
MNPS has not shown a purpose for discovery of the minor plaintiffs’ sexual histories that
overcomes the significant risk of harm presented. For that reason, the Court GRANTS the
plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order. MNPS may seek discovery regarding the minor plaintiffs’
sexual histories only as they may relate to the perpetrators of the alleged assaults.
B. Rule 35 Psychiatric Exams of the Minor Plaintiffs
MNPS asks the Court to order the minor plaintiffs to submit to psychiatric examinations
by a medical examiner of its choice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. Rule 35 authorizes
a court to “order a party whose mental or physical condition . . . is in controversy to submit to a
physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
35(a)(1). The moving party must show “good cause” why the court should compel an examination.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(2).
Rule 35’s “in controversy” and good-cause requirements are not “mere formalit[ies],” but
“plainly expressed limitation[s] on the use of [the] Rule.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
118 (1964). They require “affirmative showing[s] by the movant” as to why the examination is
necessary and why the information sought could not be obtained through other means. Id. “Rule
35, therefore, requires discriminating application by the trial judge, who must decide, as an initial
matter in every case, whether the party requesting a mental or physical examination or
22
examinations has adequately demonstrated the existence of the Rule’s requirements[.]” Id. “This
is because a more relaxed standard would allow parties to routinely compel each other to submit
to examinations, which would be contrary to both the spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, and the purposes underlying the substantive law at the center of many disputes.”
Winstead v. LaFayette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 315 F.R.D. 612, 614 (N.D. Fla. 2016). Close
adherence to Rule 35’s requirements is particularly necessary in the context of claims brought
under anti-discrimination statutes, where the prospect of being required to undergo a physical or
mental evaluation to vindicate protected rights might cause plaintiffs to abandon their claims. Id.
For this reason, courts are reluctant to find that a plaintiff places her mental condition “in
controversy” simply by making a claim of emotional distress. Johnson v. PPI Tech. Servs., L.P.,
No. CIV.A. 11-2773, 2013 WL 4508128, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2013). “‘The majority of courts
have held that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition in controversy merely by claiming
damages for mental anguish or “garden variety” emotional distress.’” Santifer v. Inergy Auto. Sys.,
LLC, No. 5:15-CV-11486, 2016 WL 1305221, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2016) (quoting GainesHanna v. Farmington Pub. Sch., No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 WL 932074, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
7, 2006)) (additional citations omitted). “Garden variety” emotional distress has been defined to
include “the generalized insult, hurt feelings and lingering resentment which anyone would be
expected to feel if he or she were the recipient of an adverse . . . action attributed to discrimination.”
Owens v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 660 (D. Kan. 2004). Instead, the majority of
courts will look for allegations of special circumstances that distinguish a case from more run-ofthe-mill claims. Courts may find those special circumstances present when:
(1) a tort claim is asserted for intentional infliction or negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (2) an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or
disorder is made; (3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress is made; (4)
plaintiff intends to offer expert testimony in support of a claim for emotional
23
distress damages; and/or (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental health condition is
in controversy within the meaning of Rule 35.
Id. (quoting Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 554 (N.D. Ga. 2001)) (additional
citations omitted); see also Hearring v. Sliwowski, No. 3:10-0746, 2011 WL 3897803 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 6, 2011) (ordering Rule 35 mental exam after discovery deadline had passed where plaintiff
alleged “grievous mental suffering, including but not limited to post-traumatic stress disorder”).
Also material to this determination is an “allegation of present, ongoing, or permanent mental
injury or disorder.” Bowen v. Parking Auth. of City of Camden, 214 F.R.D. 188, 195 (D.N.J. 2003).
MNPS argues that the plaintiffs have placed the minor plaintiffs’ mental conditions “in
controversy” by alleging that they have suffered severe emotional distress requiring medical care,
including “severe humiliation, embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of educational
opportunity,” and by seeking three million dollars in damages for those injuries. (Doc. No. 27,
PageID# 200.) The plaintiffs have not alleged specific psychiatric injuries, although they do allege
that they are receiving medical treatment. The plaintiffs’ characterization of their emotional
injuries does not necessarily place them in the realm of “unusually severe emotional distress.” See
Winstead, 315 F.R.D. at 615 (finding that allegations of “emotional distress, mental pain and
suffering . . . mental anguish, [and] loss of enjoyment of life . . . are still inside the garden, though
they may be edging towards the gate”). However, the plaintiffs do allege that their emotional and
mental distress is ongoing and will require future treatment. The plaintiffs also state that they will
support their claims with expert testimony. These allegations—and the fact that the plaintiffs do
not argue they have not put their mental health in controversy—are a sufficient basis on which to
find that the plaintiffs’ mental condition is sufficiently disputed for purposes of Rule 35’s “in
controversy” requirement.
24
The Court must next determine if MNPS has shown “good cause” for the examinations by
articulating “specific facts that demonstrate the need for the information sought and lack of means
for obtaining it elsewhere.” Hill, 229 F.R.D. at 568 (citing Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118). MNPS
argues that a Rule 35 mental examination “is mandated by rights afforded to every litigant under
the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.” (Id. at PageID# 202.) It states that the plaintiffs
“cannot be allowed to offer one-sided proof of [their] injuries and then refuse to allow the
Metropolitan Government the opportunity to refute that proof.” (Id.) Citing authority that
addresses the right of criminal defendants to present exculpatory proof at trial, MNPS argues that
“[t]here is no legitimate state interest in denying Metro an opportunity for a full presentation of
the issues at trial, and such a one-sided process serves as a violation of its rights to due process.”
(Id.)
By MNPS’ reasoning, a Rule 35 examination would be appropriate in any case in which
the plaintiff alleged physical or emotional harm, obviating the need for the Rule’s “in controversy”
and “good cause” requirements or any “discriminating application” of its terms by the Court.
Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 121–22 (noting that, although the Rules should be “liberally construed
. . . they should not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations”). Rule 35 plainly
does not support such a broad application. Allowing routine authorizing of physical and mental
examinations is the “untoward result” Schlagenhauf found that Rule 35’s plain language guards
against. Id.at 122.
What does establish good cause and authorizes a Rule 35 examination in this case is the
plaintiffs’ stated intent to prove their emotional injuries with the testimony of a retained expert.
Winstead, 315 F.R.D. at 616 n.3 (citing “near-universal agreement” on this point); Duncan v.
Upjohn Co., 155 F.R.D. 23, 26 (D. Conn. 1994) (“The plaintiff intends to prove his claim at trial
25
through the testimony of his own expert witness, which also constitutes good cause for permitting
the defendant to conduct its own psychiatric examination of the plaintiff.”); Tomlin v. Holecek,
150 F.R.D. 628, 630 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding good cause in plaintiff’s “stated intent to prove [his
claim of psychological injury] through the elicitation of expert psychological testimony”). As the
Winstead court noted, there is a distinction between a plaintiff who seeks treatment for emotional
harm and should not be punished for doing so and a plaintiff who elects to be examined by an
expert to support her litigation position. Winstead, 315 F.R.D. at 616 n.3. In the latter circumstance,
“[f]orcing such a plaintiff to submit to a similar examination conducted by a different expert . . .
is not a punishment, but a leveling of the playing field.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS MNPS’ motion to take Rule 35 examinations of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that a Rule 35 examination by MNPS’ expert cannot be used as an
“end run” around the Court’s limitations on discovery of the plaintiffs’ sexual histories. (Doc. No.
29, PageID# 209.) The Court agrees. The terms of the protective order entered regarding discovery
of the plaintiffs’ sexual histories shall apply to the examinations conducted by either party’s expert.
The examinations shall be taken in Nashville at a date and location mutually convenient to the
parties.
C. Discovery of the Adult Plaintiffs’ Employment, Health, and Financial Records
In Sally Doe’s deposition, MNPS pursued a line of questioning regarding her financial
status. The plaintiffs seek a protective order against this line of inquiry on grounds that MNPS
seeks to dissuade the parents from appearing in court by requiring them to reveal private financial
information. The plaintiffs also argue that this information is not relevant to any claim or defense
because the adult plaintiffs have “no independent claims of [their] own, and [their] . . . financial
26
situation [does not] bear even a remote relationship to the facts in this case nor claims of the
victim[s].”
MNPS responds that the adult plaintiffs’ financial status is “incredibly relevant to their
motivation for bringing claims on their children’s behalf,” arguing that the adult plaintiffs have a
“financial stake” in the litigation. MNPS further argues that the adult plaintiffs’ “financial standing
. . . is also relevant to the issue of [the minor plaintiffs’] mental health and development.” In the
hearing, MNPS argued that this information is necessary because some of the trauma the minor
plaintiffs have experienced may be attributable to poverty and not to the sexual harassment they
allege. To find otherwise, MNPS states, would be “to suggest [the minor plaintiffs] grew up in a
vacuum.” Weighing the relevance of the requested information against the burden of its
production, the Court finds that that the balance tips in favor of protecting the adult plaintiffs from
this discovery.
MNPS’ theory that it must know the adult plaintiffs’ financial status to determine if the
minor plaintiffs have suffered emotional harm is based on a false equivalence between poverty
and trauma. Certainly, the collateral consequences of poverty may cause trauma to children who
experience them. See, e.g., P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV153726MWFPLAX, 2015
WL 5752770, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (describing trauma experienced by children who
grow up in high-poverty neighborhoods as stemming from “exposure to violence and loss, family
disruptions related to deportation, incarceration and/or the foster system, systemic racism and
discrimination, and the extreme stress of lacking basic necessities, such as not knowing where the
next meal will come from or where to sleep that night”). MNPS’ psychological expert may explore
such specific sources of emotional injury with the minor plaintiffs in the Rule 35 examinations.
But there is little to be learned about a child’s trauma from her parent’s bank statement. Nor, surely,
27
is there any argument that children who experience poverty are hardened to sexual harassment or
less deserving of redress when they experience it.
That leaves MNPS’ argument that the parents’ financial status is relevant to their
motivation in bringing these lawsuits on their children’s behalf. However, “[i]t is well-established
that in ordinary litigation . . . the plaintiff’s motive in bringing suit is not relevant to the subject
matter of the litigation and is not a matter for discovery.” Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141
F.R.D. 408, 414 (M.D.N.C. 1992); see also Rayfield Aviation, LLC v. Lyon Aviation, Inc., No.
1:11CV274, 2012 WL 3095332, at *2 (M.D.N.C. July 30, 2012) (finding motive for a suit is not
relevant to the claims raised in the case); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Sys. Indus., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 742,
743 (D. Mass. 1986) (collecting cases in which “the motive behind the institution of the action was
deemed not relevant to the subject matter involved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)); Foremost
Promotions, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 15 F.R.D. 128, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (“It is difficult to see
how an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the instigation of the action could affect the
substance of the claim.”). MNPS does not allege any defense to which this information would be
relevant. See Parsons, 141 F.R.D. at 415 (finding that motive may be relevant to unclean hands
defense if it has “an immediate and necessary relation” to the transaction at issue). The Court
therefore finds that discovery of the adult plaintiffs’ financial status is not relevant to the subject
of this litigation.
Because MNPS has not articulated a theory of relevance that would make the parents’
financial health a proper subject of discovery, the plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order against
this line of questioning is GRANTED. 6
6
Because the Court finds the information sought during Sally Doe’s deposition not relevant,
MNPS’ motion to reopen her deposition is now moot. However, the Court notes that the instruction
of plaintiffs’ counsel to Sally Doe not to answer questions related to her financial health in her
28
D. Discovery of MNPS Investigative Files 7
The plaintiffs seek to discover “investigative files and disciplinary records for events
involving sexual harassment, sexual pictures and videos, and other inappropriate sexual behavior
that occurred at [MNPS] secondary schools.” The plaintiffs argue that, to prove that MNPS has
been deliberately indifferent to harassment, they must show that MNPS has responded to known
circumstances in an unreasonable manner. Whether MNPS had notice of other incidents of sexual
harassment in its schools and how it responded, they argue, is relevant to that element of their
claims. MNPS argues, in response, that evidence as to how it addressed incidents of sexual
misconduct not involving these minor plaintiffs is not relevant in this litigation. MNPS further
argues that producing these files would be overly burdensome.
The plaintiffs cite Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, 231 F.3d 253 (2000),
in support of their position. In Vance, the Sixth Circuit held that, “[w]here a school district has
actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same
methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of known circumstances.”
Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. MNPS argues that Vance stands only for the proposition that “evidence
of previous sexual misconduct at school against the same plaintiff could be relevant to
determining whether the school’s previous remedial actions were so ineffective to curb harassment
against that plaintiff” and terms it “a logical leap” to suggest that Vance makes MNPS’ response
to unrelated incidents relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims.
deposition was not appropriate under Rule 30(c)(2), which allows counsel to instruct a deponent
not to answer only when privilege is invoked. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2).
7
In the parties joint motion, the plaintiffs state that they are also seeking records from the
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. In the Court’s hearing, the plaintiffs clarified that they
are only seeking MNPS records.
29
This Court has previously grappled with the reach of Vance and other Sixth Circuit
decisions regarding a Title IX funding recipient’s knowledge of prior acts of harassment in
determining liability. See Doe, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 805–06; Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and
Davidson Cnty., 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 915 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). In Lopez, the Court found that Title
IX liability is not limited “to a federal education funding recipient’s knowledge of, and deliberate
indifference to, the alleged harassment of a particular individual, but instead . . . Title IX claims
could be based on the recipient’s knowledge of, and deliberate indifference to, a particular
harasser’s conduct in general.” Lopez, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Staehling v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., No. 3:07-0797, 2008 WL 4279839, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2008)). In Doe v. University of Tennessee, the Court drew upon Lopez
and Staehling to find that that the plaintiffs had stated a viable Title IX claim based on allegations
that the defendant university had knowledge of prior harassment, not by a specific individual, but
by a particular group of students. Doe, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 806 (finding adequate allegations that
the university “had actual knowledge of prior incidents of sexual assault by UT football and
basketball players that were sufficient to put UT on notice of the risk to the plaintiffs, yet UT was
deliberately indifferent in facility to adequately address this risk, including failing to change its
remedial measures which were not effective”). The Court also found that liability could arise from
the university’s “handling [of] athlete discipline . . . and lack of sexual harassment training,”
among other policies. Id. at 807.
Here, the plaintiffs allege that MNPS created an environment that was hostile to female
students by failing to train its employees, allowing improper sexual conduct among students to
take place, failing to impose adequate disciplinary measures for that improper sexual conduct, and
failing to take action to address a system-wide practice of exposing. The records that the plaintiffs’
30
seek are relevant to those allegations and to showing what, if any, improper conduct was known
to MNPS before the plaintiffs experienced the harm they now allege and how MNPS responded to
it. It will ultimately fall to the plaintiffs to show that any prior incidents are sufficiently tied to
their claims as to give rise to MNPS’ liability but, at this juncture, the records of prior disciplinary
incidents are discoverable.
Since the Court’s hearing, MNPS has determined that producing these records will not be
as burdensome as it once imagined. After performing a keyword search of its disciplinary incident
database, MNPS states that it is prepared to manually redact and produce up to 1,000 identified
records. If the plaintiffs seek more than 1,000 records, MNPS asks that the cost of redaction be
shared. Because the parties have not had an opportunity to consult as to the relevant search terms
or the breadth of relevant discovery, the Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer to agree
upon search terms and to determine the number of records those terms will identify. The parties
shall also address any cost sharing in their conference. If they are unable to resolve that issue,
MNPS may raise it in a telephone conference with the Magistrate Judge.
E. Discovery of the Minor Plaintiffs’ Social Media Profiles
MNPS asks the plaintiffs to identify the social media platforms that they use and their
usernames on each platform and to produce all information related to contacts with the alleged
perpetrators and witnesses, the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, and “harassment, threats or distribution
of the video that is the subject of the case.” MNPS also seeks “all pictures or videos taken since
the beginning of the calendar year in which the incident occurred” and a downloaded copy of the
plaintiffs’ social media accounts in full. The plaintiffs respond that MNPS’ request for all of the
content of their social media accounts is overbroad because it would allow MNPS access to nonpublic information without limitation.
31
There is a distinction between discovery of social media postings that are available to the
general public and those that the user has restricted from view. “[I]nformation posted on a private
individual’s social media ‘is generally not privileged, nor is it protected by common law or civil
law notions of privacy.’” Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01180, 2013 WL
1176504, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278
F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012)). However, a party does not have “a generalized right to
rummage at will through information that [an opposing party] has limited from public view.” Id.;
see also Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11–CV–1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 1, 2012) (“The fact that the information defendants seek is in an electronic file as opposed to
a file cabinet does not give them the right to rummage through the entire file.”). To obtain
discovery of non-public social media, a party must show that the information sought is reasonably
calculated to be relevant to the claims and defenses in the litigation. See, e.g., Doe v. Rutherford
Cty., Tenn., Bd. of Educ., No. 3:13-0328, 2014 WL 4080159, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2014);
Holder v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-0076, 2013 WL 5817575, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2013);
Potts, 2013 WL 1176504, at *3.
The production of a social media account’s contents in full will therefore rarely be
appropriate. Every relevant communication may be buried in a thicket of unrelated musings,
“likes,” gifs, selfies, and emoticons that are not appropriately discovered. Nor does the fact that a
plaintiff’s mental or emotional state is at issue automatically justify sweeping discovery of social
media content. See Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 115
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); Johnson, 2013 WL 4508128, at *2; Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 CIV.
2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006). Social media may make a daily
record of a party’s thoughts and feelings available at the click of a mouse (or at least those thoughts
32
and feelings the party determines are worthy of sharing with a virtual community of “friends”).
But just as “[n]o court would have allowed unlimited depositions of every friend, social
acquaintance, co-employee or relative of a plaintiff to inquire as to all disclosures, conversations
or observations,” the party seeking to discover those thoughts and feelings via social media must
still make a showing of relevance and proportionality to the claims of the litigation. Gordon v.
T.G.R. Logistics, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 401, 403 (D. Wyo. 2017); see also Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at
116; Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012-0307 ILG MDG, 2012 WL 6720752, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012); E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 430 (S.D.
Ind. 2010).
The plaintiffs concede that MNPS may discover their publically available social media
postings, and so the plaintiffs are ORDERED to identify all social media platforms they use and
their usernames on each platform so that MNPS may access their public postings. With regard to
non-public information, the plaintiffs have agreed to produce all private social-media
communications regarding the incidents that form the basis of their claims, except those covered
by privilege. Because the plaintiffs allege ongoing harassment, MNPS states that it also seeks
information regarding any harassment that the plaintiffs experienced after the alleged incidents
and any harassment taking place up to two months before the alleged incidents occurred. The Court
finds that these proposed limits sufficiently narrow the scope of discovery to information relevant
to the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs are therefore ORDERED to produce all non-public social
media content regarding the alleged incidents of harassment and any harassment taking place from
two months before the incidents alleged in each plaintiff’s complaint to the present.
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F. MNPS’ Interviews of Students During the School Day
The plaintiffs seek supplemental discovery regarding several incidents in which they allege
MNPS lawyers called potential student witnesses to the principal’s office during the school day
and interviewed them regarding this litigation without notifying their parents. The plaintiffs argue
that this practice may unduly coerce minor students into being interviewed against their will, and
that this may violate the targeted students’ constitutional protections. See Williams v. County of
San Diego, No. 17CV815-MMA (JLB), 2017 WL 6541251, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017)
(finding, in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings, that a social worker “interviewing minors
at school without parental consent can violate constitutional rights”) (collecting cases). The
plaintiffs’ motion seeks “full disclosure pertaining to what Metro [L]egal is doing with the student
witnesses and what authority they have to pull the students from class without the consent of their
parents and compel them to sit for a private interview with Metro [L]egal.”
By affidavit, MNPS states that, in an interview apparently taking place under these
circumstances, counsel asked the student if he was Sally Doe’s boyfriend to determine if he was
the plaintiffs’ witness and if the plaintiffs’ counsel should be contacted to set up a deposition and
for his parent’s contact information to use in setting up an interview or deposition. (Doc. No. 36,
PageID# 250.) MNPS now proposes that it be able to obtain contact information for student
witnesses from MNPS databases and to contact the students’ parents or guardians to request an
interview. If the parent or guardian declines, MNPS states that it will issue a subpoena with notice
to opposing counsel. Any student witness may be accompanied by a parent or guardian in an
interview or deposition. (Doc. No. 41, PageID# 281.) MNPS will provide contact information to
the plaintiffs for any student witnesses they wish to interview “after FERPA notices have been
sent.” (Id. at PageID# 281 n.1.)
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It is not apparent from the plaintiffs’ motion that they sought the discovery they now
request from MNPS before bringing the issue to the Court’s attention or that the parties have met
and conferred regarding this issue or MNPS’ proposed solution. Accordingly, the parties are
ORDERED to meet and confer regarding the plaintiffs’ request for information and MNPS’
proposed procedure for interviewing student witnesses. If any issues remain for the Court’s
determination after the parties’ meeting, the parties may raise them in a telephone conference with
the Magistrate Judge.
G. Order Authorizing Release of the Minor Plaintiffs’ Medical Records
Finally, MNPS asks the Court to enter an order that would authorize it to obtain the minor
plaintiffs’ medical records from any medical provider to whom it is produced. The proposed order
requires that notice be given to the plaintiffs’ counsel and does not permit ex parte communications
between the plaintiffs’ health care providers and MNPS’ counsel. The proposed order also contains
a protective order limiting to whom the produced information may be disclosed. The plaintiffs
oppose entry of this order on grounds that MNPS has been able to obtain the medical records it
needs through releases executed by the plaintiffs and subpoenas.
The origin of this dispute appears to be trouble MNPS encountered in obtaining records
from Centerstone, a mental health provider, which required a more comprehensive release form
than what the plaintiffs had provided. Instead of executing the required release for MNPS, the
plaintiffs’ counsel obtained the records and produced them to MNPS. MNPS argues that the
plaintiffs cannot be the custodians of their own records and that MNPS should be able to obtain its
own copy of the records directly from the provider.
The Court finds that MNPS has articulated sufficient grounds for access to the minor
plaintiffs’ medical records; however, the requested blanket release order is a broader remedy than
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what the circumstances require. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART. The plaintiffs are ORDERED to execute the necessary release for MNPS to obtain
medical records directly from Centerstone and any other provider from whom they seek records,
if the plaintiffs do not object to production of the records on other grounds. The parties may
negotiate the terms of a protective order as necessary to prevent unnecessary disclosure of the
plaintiffs’ health information.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, MNPS’ motion to take Rule 35 psychiatric examinations is
GRANTED, subject to the limitations detailed above; MNPS’ motion for an order authorizing
release of the minor plaintiffs’ medical records is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
the plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for discovery regarding MNPS’ contact with student witnesses
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal; the parties’ joint motion for resolution of
multiple discovery issues is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set out in the
Court’s opinion; and MNPS’ motion to expedite a ruling on the discovery issues is FOUND
MOOT.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
Alistair E. Newbern
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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