Norfleet v. Renner et al
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 8/29/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DANIEL B. NORFLEET,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEATHER ANN RENNER, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:17-cv-01232
CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Daniel B. Norfleet alleges that Tennessee Probation Officer Heather Renner swore out an
affidavit void of any facts to support probable cause for his arrest. Houston County, Tennessee,
Commissioner Judy Farris issued the allegedly facially invalid warrant and City of Waverly,
Tennessee, officers arrested Norfleet. 1 He spent six months in jail without a hearing before a
Houston County Circuit Court judge found the warrant invalid and dismissed it. Norfleet brings
this action against Renner, Commissioner Farris, Houston County and its Sheriff’s Office, and
Houston County Sheriff Kevin Sugg in his individual and official capacity. (Doc. No. 1.)
Before the Court is Farris’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 33) and the
Houston County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 49). 2 Because the Houston County
1
The Complaint refers to Farris as a “county magistrate.” (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 38) refers to Farris as a “county magistrate and judicial commissioner.”
(Doc. No. 38.) In Tennessee, the difference between a “magistrate” and “judicial commissioner” is only the size of
the county in which they serve. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-111(a) with (g) and (h). Based on its county size,
Houston County is authorized by statute to utilize “judicial commissioners,” not “magistrates.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-1-111(a). Of course, the statute recognizes that sometimes judicial commissioners will be referred to by their
colloquial name as “magistrates.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-106. The Court will refer to Farris by her proper title as a
judicial commissioner.
2
The Court previously granted the City of Waverly officials’ unopposed Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that Norfleet’s claims against them were time-barred. (Doc. No. 29.) Renner has not appeared and is currently in
default (Doc. No. 63), so she also is not a party to the instant motions.
Defendants have filed an Answer (Doc. No. 26), the Court construes their Motion as a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 n.1
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer “may properly be considered
as one for judgment on the pleadings under [Rule] 12(c)”). For the following reasons, Farris’
Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the Houston County Defendants’ Motion is
granted.
I.
Allegations
On January 15, 2015, the Houston County Circuit Court placed Norfleet on probation for
six years. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) One condition of his probation was that he “will not engage in any
assaultive, threatening, or intimidating behavior. Nor will [he] participate in any criminal street
gang activities as defined in TCA 40-35-121. [He] will not behave in a manner that poses a threat
to others or [himself].” (Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.) On September 7, 2016, Renner signed
a Violation of Probation Affidavit (the “Affidavit”), stating only that Norfleet “is a threat to himself
at this time.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.) The same day, Farris signed a warrant for
Norfleet’s arrest based on the Affidavit (the “Warrant”). (Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.)
Waverly Police Department officers subsequently executed the Warrant and arrested Norfleet.
Farris denied Norfleet a bond, but instead ordered that he be held until his probation violation
hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at 5; Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.) He remained detained at the Houston County Jail
until his probation violation hearing on February 7, 2017. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6.) At the hearing, the
Houston County Circuit Court judge dismissed the warrant because it was signed by the county’s
judicial commissioner, not a circuit judge. (Id. at 6.)
2
II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings
after the pleadings have closed. The “standard of review for entry of judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c) is indistinguishable from the standard of review for dismissals based on failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Jackson v. Heh, 215 F.3d 1326, 2000 WL 761807, at *3 (6th
Cir. June 2, 2000) (table). Whether a motion proceeds under Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6) is merely a
function of its timing relative to the defendant’s filing of its answer. See Ziegler v. IBP Hog
Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the standard of review for 12(b)(6)
and 12(c) motions) (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1999)).
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must take all of the
factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). To survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation need
not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of
action sufficient. Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
III.
Analysis
The Complaint raises four causes of action: (1) a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search
and seizure claim; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment violation of due process claim; of (3) state law
3
claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision only against Houston County; and (4) a state
law claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. (Doc. No. 1.)
A. Commissioner Farris
Farris moves for judgment on the pleadings based on quasi-judicial immunity (Doc. No.
34 at 4), or alternatively, qualified immunity (Doc. No. 34 at 11).
1. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Farris argues that she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was acting in a
judicial capacity. (Doc. No. 34 at 4.) Norfleet disagrees because Farris’ action of signing the
probation violation warrant falls under the limited exception to quasi-judicial immunity for
situations in which a judicial actor acts in “clear absence of jurisdiction.” (Doc. No. 38 at 5.)
“The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is . . . well established.” Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from
[the] ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Absolute judicial immunity “has been extended to non-judicial
officers who perform ‘quasi-judicial’ duties.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 560 (6th Cir. 1986)). This so-called quasi-judicial
immunity “extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial
process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id. (citing
Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1989)). Tennessee’s judicial commissioners are
considered an “arm of the judicial officer who is immune” for the purposes of quasi-judicial
immunity. Jones v. Harris, 22 F. App’x 520, 521 (6th Cir. 2001).
However, quasi-judicial immunity does not apply when the commissioner’s actions were
“‘non-judicial’ in nature or if the [commissioner’s] actions are performed without any jurisdiction
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to do so.” Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554).
Signing a warrant is unquestionably judicial in nature, Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1441 (6th
Cir. 1997) (citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988)), and Norfleet does not
argue otherwise. (Doc. No. 38.) However, Farris’ action was performed without any jurisdiction
to do so.
Whether a commissioner acted without jurisdiction for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity
depends on whether the commissioner acted “in the clear absence of jurisdiction,” which is not
entitled to immunity, or in “excess of jurisdiction,” which is entitled to immunity. Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7
(1978)). The Supreme Court gave an example of the distinction between “absence of jurisdiction”
and “excess of jurisdiction”:
If a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal
case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be
immune from liability for his action; on the other hand if a judge of a criminal court
should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in
excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871)). There are two steps
in determining whether a judge acted in “clear absence of jurisdiction”: (1) determine whether the
judge served a court of limited or general jurisdiction; and (2)(a) if the judge served on a court of
general jurisdiction, whether there is a statute preventing the court from acting in the contested
manner, or (b) if the judge served on a court of limited jurisdiction, whether there is a statute
allowing it to act in the contested manner. Therefore, “[o]nly in the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction are judicial actors devoid of the shield of liability.” Stern, 262 F.3d at 607 (quoting
Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) (emphasis in original).
5
Here, Farris acted without any subject matter jurisdiction because when a “defendant has
violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court has the authority to revoke the probation.”
State v. Beard, 189 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-311). Under such circumstances, only the “trial judge shall have the power to
cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand a warrant for the arrest of the defendant as in any
other criminal case.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a). Because the statute permitting warrants to
be issued for probation violations require the warrants to be issued by the “trial judge,” Farris had
no subject matter jurisdiction whatsoever to sign the Warrant. 3 In other words, in applying the
Supreme Court’s example from Stump, Farris was more akin to the probate judge acting on a
subject matter on which the statute did not permit her to act rather than the criminal judge
exceeding her power to act on the subject matter for which she had jurisdiction. Farris acted in
“clear absence of jurisdiction” to sign the Warrant and is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Farris argues that because she has authority to issue arrest warrants, she acted in excess of
her jurisdiction rather than in the “clear absence” of her jurisdiction for issuing a probation
violation warrant. Her argument flies in the face of the explicit legislative directive in Tennessee
Code Annotated § 40-35-311(a). In any case, a judicial commissioner is not a “court,” it only has
limited jurisdiction conferred by statute. State v. Bush, 626 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1981). The Tennessee statute establishing judicial commissioners’ duties delineates those powers
depending on the population of the county at the time of the latest federal census. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-1-111. The Court takes judicial notice that at the last federal census, on April 1, 2010, Houston
County had a population of 8,426. United States Census Bureau: QuickFacts, Houston County,
3
Farris argues that because there is no controlling Tennessee case that holds that judicial commissioners
cannot sign probation violation warrants, it is not clearly established. However, it is more likely that there are no
published Tennessee cases on this issue because the statute, in the Attorney General’s words, is “clear.” Tenn. Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 04-054 (Mar. 26, 2004).
6
Tennessee,
available
at
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/houstoncounty
tennessee,tn/PST045217. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-1-111(a)(1)(A) applies to counties
“having a population of less than two hundred thousand.” Judicial commissioners of these counties
have the power to issue search warrants “and felony arrest warrants upon a finding of probable
cause and pursuant to requests from on-duty law enforcement officers and in accordance with the
procedures outlined in chapters 5 and 6 of this title.” Id. at (a)(1)(A)(i). Violations of probation are
not felonies and do not fall within Farris’ limited jurisdiction conferred by statute. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-311 (probation violation statute). Farris is not entitled to absolute immunity.
2. Qualified Immunity
Farris alternatively argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for two reasons: (1) it
was objectively reasonable to believe she had subject matter jurisdiction to sign the warrant; and
(2) it was objectively reasonable for her to believe that the Affidavit contained sufficient facts to
support a finding of probable cause. (Doc. No. 34 at 12-13.) Again, her argument must be rejected
based on established precedent.
The Supreme Court set forth the standard for analyzing whether a government official is
entitled to qualified immunity:
In [Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)], this Court mandated a
two-step sequence for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims.
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of
a constitutional right. 533 U.S., at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Second, if the plaintiff has
satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly
established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Ibid. Qualified
immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right. Anderson, at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
7
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The Court has discretion to decide “which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236.
Here, Norfleet alleges that Farris violated his clearly established rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by issuing a warrant for his arrest and denying bail.
(Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Norfleet further alleges that Farris violated his procedural and substantive due
process rights, presumably under the Fourteenth Amendment, although it is unclear, by illegally
issuing the probation violation warrant and denying bail. (Doc. No. 1 at 9.)
a. Fourth Amendment
“[I]t is well established that any arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth
Amendment.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Klein v.
Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001)). For the judicial commissioner to have probable cause to
issue a warrant, there must be “facts and circumstances within the [commissioner’s] knowledge
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an
offense.” Id. (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). “The probability of
criminal activity is assessed under a reasonableness standard based on ‘an examination of facts
and circumstances within [the commissioner’s] knowledge at the time of an arrest.’” Id. (quoting
Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Here, the Court is evaluating a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, so it relies on the
information in the pleadings. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677. The Complaint does not indicate that
Farris relied on any information outside of Renner’s Affidavit. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Further,
Tennessee law requires that all information upon which a judicial commissioner relies be reduced
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to writing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-5-105. In support of the assertion that Norfleet violated his term
of probation that he “will not behave in a manner that poses a threat to others or [himself,]”
Renner’s Affidavit stated in full, “Subject is a threat to himself at this time.” (Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.)
Farris’ Warrant duplicated that averment. (Id.)
The Warrant only recited the applicable probation condition that Norfleet violated, and was
void of any facts regarding how he violated that condition. This situation is similar to Webb v.
Greene County Sheriff’s Office, 494 F. Supp. 2d 779 (S.D. Oh. 2007), in which a detective swore
to an affidavit reciting the elements of receiving stolen property and theft and that the defendant
met those elements, but did not explain how the defendant met those elements. 494 F. Supp. 2d at
789 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, Wy. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971)). The court
held that the warrant was “facially invalid” because it only included a “bare bones” recitation of
facts. Id. at 792. The Warrant here is similarly a “bare bones” warrant, relying not even a “bare
bones” affidavit. Taking the pleadings in the light most favorable to Norfleet, no reasonable person
in the position of Farris would have believed probable cause existed to arrest Norfleet. See Peffer
v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256. 263-64 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that the key inquiry is whether a jury
could possibly make a ‘reasonable determination’ that probable cause existed) (quoting Yancey v.
Carroll Cty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)), pet. for cert. filed, No. 17-1587 (S. Ct. May
23, 2018). Norfleet’s arrest pursuant to the invalid warrant violated his clearly established Fourth
Amendment rights.
b. Fourteenth Amendment
Farris does not mention Norfleet’s Fourteenth Amendment claim in her qualified immunity
arguments. (Doc. No. 34 at 11-13.) However, there is no cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim
for pretrial seizure and detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (holding that
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claims challenging pretrial seizure and detention should be brought under the Fourth Amendment).
Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. See Thomas v. Noder-Love, 621 F. App’x 825, 833 (6th Cir.
2015) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of non-moving parties when the facts and law
supporting dismissal were the same as those of the moving defendants).
3. State Law Claim Against Farris
Norfleet brings a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against Farris. (Doc. No.
1.) Farris moves to dismiss this claim because Houston County is immune under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 39-20-205. (Doc. No. 34 at 14.) Farris further argues that under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 39-20-310(b), if Houston County is immune, Farris, its employee, is also immune.
(Doc. No. 34 at 14.) Norfleet does not respond to this argument, and therefore does not oppose
dismissal of this claim. (Doc. No. 38); M.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.01(b) (failure to respond to a motion
indicates no opposition to that motion). Accordingly, the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim against Farris is dismissed.
B. Houston County Defendants
Sugg seeks to dismiss the claims against him because Norfleet does not allege any
constitutional violation against him in his individual capacity. (Doc. No. 50 at 5.) The Houston
County Sheriff’s Office seeks to dismiss the claims against it because it is not a separate entity
from Houston County (Doc. No. 50 at 6.) Houston County seeks dismissal of the federal claims
because it does not have an unconstitutional policy or custom that caused any deprivation of rights
(Doc. No. 50 at 6-11) and the state law claims because it is immune. (Doc. No. 50 at 11-17.) The
Court will consider the claims against Houston County, the Houston County Sheriff’s Office, and
the official capacity claims against Sugg all as claims against Houston County. See Matthews v.
Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a suit against the police department or an
10
individual in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the county) (citing Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989)).
The Complaint only asserts official capacity claims against Sugg. The only allegation
against Sugg is that he is “the policymaker for the Houston County Jail and creates [ ] policy
procedures and practices [sic] employed at the jail and by the employee jailers.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8.)
Norfleet alleges that no intake officer reviewed the facially invalid warrant (id. at 7), and the
Sheriff’s Office should have had a policy requiring the intake officers to review warrants of those
they accept into the jail (id. at 8).
The Sixth Circuit has addressed the difference between an individual and official capacity
claim:
In a case such as this, where the supervisor is also the policymaker, an individualcapacity claim may appear indistinguishable from an official-capacity or municipal
claim, but these failure-to-train claims turn on two different legal principles. For
individual liability on a failure-to-train or supervise theory, the defendant
supervisor must be found to have “‘encouraged the specific incident of misconduct
or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d
531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant supervisor “‘at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending officers.’” Id. (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300). A mere
failure to act will not suffice to establish supervisory liability. Gregory v. City of
Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006).
The individual capacity claim is contrasted with a failure-to-train or supervise claim against the
municipality, in which a plaintiff would have to establish “that the municipality, though its
policymakers, failed to train or supervise employees despite: 1) having actual or constructive
knowledge of a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees, or 2) that the
constitutional violation alleged was a patently highly predictable consequence of inadequate
training.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-09 (1997))
(internal quotations omitted).
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Here, the claim is that the Houston County jail did not have a policy in place to prevent
Norfleet’s illegal detention, and Sugg, as the policymaker, should have enacted such a policy. This
is a “mere failure to act” by Sugg, which is not cognizable as an individual capacity claim. Gregory,
444 F.3d at 751. Instead, the claim is against the municipality, which does “not require direct
participation in or encouragement of the specific [actor]; rather, [it] may be premised on a failure
to act.” Essex, 518 F. App’x at 355 (citing Heyerman v. Cty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 2012)). Therefore, the Complaint does not allege an individual capacity claim against Sugg.
1. Unconstitutional Policy at the Houston County Jail
Municipalities are “persons” for the purposes of § 1983 liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, municipalities cannot be held
liable pursuant to § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691; Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a
municipality under § 1983 [is required] to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused
the plaintiff’s injury.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 403. The plaintiff must demonstrate that, “through its
deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Id. at 404.
“That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of
culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.” Id. Without an underlying constitutional violation, the municipality
cannot be liable. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Therefore, the Court first determines whether there
is an underlying constitutional violation committed by Houston County agents.
Norfleet alleges that the Houston County Jail intake officers should not have accepted
Norfleet at the jail because the City of Waverly officers arrested him while executing a facially
12
invalid warrant. Because the Waverly police officers were the arresting officers, the Houston
County intake officers could only be liable for a Fourth Amendment continued detention, or
“malicious prosecution,” claim. Gregory, 444 F.3d at 749. To state a claim of malicious
prosecution, Norfleet must allege: (1) “a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff
and [ ] the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute”; (2) there “was
a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution”; (3) “as a consequence of the legal
proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, as understood in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure”; and (4) “the criminal proceeding must have been
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010).
No Houston County officer “made, influenced, or participated” in the decision to prosecute
Norfleet. To make, influence, or participate in the decision to prosecute, the officer must be
“responsible for his continued, unreasonable pretrial detention.” Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723
F.3d 91, 100 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)). The
United States Courts of Appeals are in agreement that to be “responsible for” a pretrial detention,
an officer must generally “(1) ‘lie[ ] to or [mislead] the prosecutors’; (2) ‘fail[ ] to disclose
exculpatory evidence’; or (3) ‘unduly pressure[ ] the prosecutor to seek the indictment.’” Id.
(compiling cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits) (quoting Evans, 703 F.3d at 647-48); see Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308-09 (discussing the
elements of a malicious prosecution claim). The Houston County intake officers’ actions did not
come near meeting this requirement. Norfleet only alleges that the intake officers accepted him
into the jail after different officers arrested him when executing an invalid warrant. However, he
cites no case that holds that every officer who accepts custody of him must separately evaluate a
judicial commissioner’s finding of probable cause. The same is not true for a non-arresting officer
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like the Houston County intake officers. Because Norfleet does not establish that the Houston
County intake officers participated in his prosecution, they did not violate his constitutional rights.
Without an underlying constitutional violation by its officers, Houston County cannot be liable. 4
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 900 (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799). Accordingly, the claim against
Houston County for having an unconstitutional policy regarding its intake officers is dismissed.
2. Failure to Train
Norfleet also argues that he properly asserts a failure to train claim against Houston County.
(Doc. No. 54 at 9.) He argues that Houston County failed to train judicial commissioners that they
should reject facially invalid warrants. (Id.) He relies on his allegation that “Houston County did
not provide any training of any nature that would equip Defendant Judy Farris with the knowledge
required to carry out the magistrate function.” (Id. (citing Doc. No. 1 at 10)).
To sufficiently plead a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the training or
supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the
municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually
caused the injury.” Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 394 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)). To
establish deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct
demonstrating that the municipality has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that
training or supervision was deficient and likely to cause injury.” DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks and
Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1085 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (Trauger, J.) (citing Marcilis v. Twp. of
Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 605 (6th Cir. 2012)). In DeSoto, the court granted the defendant’s motion
4
The lack of an underlying constitutional claim against the intake officers would also be fatal to any
supervisory liability claim against Sugg in his individual capacity, if it were properly alleged. Peatross v. City of
Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).
14
to dismiss when the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to show prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 1085-86. Here, Norfleet does not allege any prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct. There is not even a conclusory allegation that Houston County was
deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, the failure to train claim is dismissed.
3. Fourteenth Amendment
The Houston County Defendants move to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claims
because the Supreme Court held that all pretrial detention search and seizure claims are properly
brought under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 50 at 9-10
(citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111). Norfleet does not disagree that the holding in Gerstein forecloses
his Fourteenth Amendment claims, but asks the Court to rely on the dissent in Gerstein to hold that
there may be other Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detention claims. (Doc. No. 54 at 8-9.) The
Court cannot rely on a dissent over a binding United States Supreme Court holding. Hadix v.
Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment claims
are dismissed.
4. State Law Claims Against Houston County
Last, the Houston County Defendants argue that Norfleet’s state law claims should be
dismissed. (Doc. No. 50 at 11-16.) Norfleet brings both a failure to train state law claim and a
negligent infliction of emotional stress claim against Houston County. (Doc. No. 1.) The state law
claims allege that Houston County had a duty to train Farris, and its failure to do so caused
Norfleet’s unjustified pretrial detention and inflicted emotional distress. (Doc. No. 1 at 10-11; Doc.
No. 54 at 9-12.) However, “[c]ounties have no duty to train magistrates. . . . The imposition of
such a duty to train would do violence to Tennessee’s fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers.” Frost v. Hamilton Cty., TN, No. 1:04-cv-75, 2006 WL 228881, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Jan.
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30, 2006) (citing Tenn. Const. art. II §§ 1-2). In Frost, the plaintiff brought a claim against
Hamilton County, Tennessee, for failing to train its judicial commissioner with respect to setting
bond amounts. Id. at *3. The court dismissed the claim, holding that “regardless of whether
plaintiff can show a constitutional violation by [the judicial commissioner], a failure to train claim
against Hamilton County based on [the judicial commissioner’s actions] is improper.” Id. at *7.
Instead, the legislature has imposed certain requirements on the judicial commissioners to ensure
that they obtain training by other judges. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-111(f) (annual training
requirements for judicial commissioners). For example, judicial commissioners must take ten
continuing education courses sponsored or approved by the Judicial Commissioners Association
of Tennessee. Id. at (f)(1). It is not Houston County’s duty to train Farris, but rather it is Farris’
duty to ensure that she complies with the statute. Id. Because there is no duty to train judicial
commissioners, the state law claims for failure to train and negligent infliction of emotional
distress against Houston County are dismissed.
The Court will enter an appropriate order.
____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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