Sims v. McCarter et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 3/2/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JARED RANDALL SIMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DUSTIN McCARTER et al.,
Defendants.

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NO. 3:18-cv-0072
CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jared Randall Sims is an incarcerated at the Sumner County Jail in Gallatin, Tennessee.
Before the court is Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and his
Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 4). In addition, Plaintiff has filed a complaint for
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Tennessee Department of
Corrections (TDOC) Probation and Parole Officers Dustin McCarter and Taylor Key, and
Sumner County Sheriff’s Officer Dustin Hood, which is before the court for an initial review
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may be

permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee of $350 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
Because it appears from Plaintiff’s submissions that he lacks sufficient financial resources from
which to pay the full filing fee in advance, the application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted.
Nevertheless, under § 1915(b), Plaintiff remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides
prisoner-plaintiffs’ the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay

the remainder in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be assessed the full $350 filing fee, to
be paid as directed in the order accompanying this memorandum opinion.
II.

INITIAL REVIEW
Under the PLRA, the court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought

by a prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from
government entities or officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner’s conditions of
confinement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion thereof that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to
state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in
Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny
on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, “a district
court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all wellpleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards
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than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that on October 30, 3017, Defendants McCarter and Key came to the
location where he was living looking for a parolee named Felicia Hurt, who was visiting
Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1.) At the time of the events underlying his complaint, Plaintiff was living
in Room 119 at the Country Inn in Bethpage, Tennessee. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that instead of
just taking Ms. Hurt and leaving his room, Defendants McCarter and Key pushed into his room,
over his objections, “took possession” of his room to interview and drug test Ms. Hurt and
refused to leave. (Id.) Additionally, Defendants McCarter and Key searched through Plaintiff’s
possessions “based on the fact that [he] was on misdemeanor probation in another county
although [his] probation order contains no search clause.” (Id.) When Plaintiff refused to
cooperate Defendants McCarter and Key contacted Defendant Hood at the Sumner County
Sheriff’s Office. (Id.) Defendant Hood came to Plaintiff’s room “and based on information
from the illegal warrantless search,” Defendant Hood applied for and received a search warrant.
(Id.) Plaintiff’s room was searched again and he was eventually charged with several crimes and
transported to the Sumner County Jail. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he “is still incarcerated facing
trumped-up charges as a result of the defendants disregard for his constitutional rights.” (Id. at
Page ID# 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants McCarter, Key and Hood violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. As relief, he seeks monetary damages.
B. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants illegally searched his room and based on that search
arrested him. He asserts that he is incarcerated and is “facing trumped-up” charges.
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Section 1983 creates a private right of action “against officials who, under the color of
state law, deprive individuals of their constitutional rights.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447,
457 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A person who has been the victim of “an unlawful
arrest or wrongful seizure under the color of law has a claim based on the Fourth Amendment
guarantee that government officials may not subject citizens” to unreasonable searches and
seizures. Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2000)). While it appears that Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, under the
doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court must abstain from hearing
Plaintiff’s claim.
Under Younger abstention, federal courts should abstain from deciding a matter that
implicates pending state-court criminal proceedings. Id. at 43–45. Stated generally, Younger
abstention is a legal doctrine that guards against federal court interference with pending state
judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 45. The Younger doctrine is
based on principles of equity and comity, “and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.” Id. at 44. In accordance with the Younger doctrine, this Court
should abstain from deciding a case where “there are state proceedings that are (1) currently
pending; (2) involve an important state interest; and (3) will provide the federal plaintiff with an
adequate opportunity to raise his or her constitutional claims.” Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331
F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Federal courts may raise abstention sua sponte. See Hill v.
Synder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 n.3 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10
(1976).
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The three factors that support Younger abstention are present in this case. First, Plaintiff
alleges that he is “incarcerated and is “facing trumped-up charges.” Thus, there is an ongoing
state criminal proceeding which was pending when Plaintiff filed his complaint. See Federal
Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 925 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that “the
pendency of a state proceeding for the purposes of Younger is determined at the time the federal
action is filed.) Accordingly, the first Younger factor is satisfied.
Second, as a matter of course, state criminal proceedings involve important state
interests. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (recognizing that when the state proceeding is criminal in
nature, the policy against federal interference is “particularly” strong); see also Parker v. Turner,
626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when there are
pending state criminal proceedings.”). For this reason, “a federal court should be loath to assume
jurisdiction to interfere with state criminal proceedings, including postconviction proceedings.”
Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44; Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 726 (1991)). As such, the second Younger factor is satisfied.
Third, the state court proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges. See e.g., State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 37-38 (Tenn. 2017) (concluding that trial
court’s erroneous admission of the defendant’s statement violated the Fourth Amendment,
however, the admission of such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
Richards, 286 S.W.3d 873, 881-82 (holding that the warrantless search of the defendant violated
the Fourth Amendment and affirming the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the evidence
should have been suppressed after the trial court denied the defendants motion to suppress); State
v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626. 633 (1997) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in connection
with an investigatory stop after trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress). Moreover,
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“[a]bstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional
claims.” Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp. v. Columbus Bar Ass'n, 498 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir.
2007) (emphasis in original). There being no clear bar to Plaintiff raising his Fourth Amendment
claim in state court, the third Younger factor is satisfied.
Although all three Younger requirements are met, extraordinary circumstances such as
“bad faith, harassment, or flagrant unconstitutionality” may still render abstention inappropriate.
Id. at 335 (citation omitted). Courts have interpreted these exceptions narrowly. Zalman v.
Amrstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986). Notably, the “flagrantly unconstitutionality”
exception is extremely narrow: “[T]he Supreme Court has never found it to be applicable since
it first announced the exception in Younger.” Goodwin v. Cty. Of Summit, Ohio, 45 F.Supp.3d
692, 703 (N.D. Ohio 2014). In order to overcome the bar of Younger abstention, a plaintiff must
do more than set forth mere allegations of bad faith or harassment. See Amanatullah v. Colorado
Board of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir.1999) (citing Phelps v. Hamilton,
122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir.1997)). Plaintiff’s allegations do not implicate any of the Younger
exceptions.
Where the defendant seeks only legal relief, in the form of damages, the Court must stay
the case instead of exercising its discretion in deciding to dismiss the case. See Nimer v.
Litchfield Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 707 F.3d 699, 702 (6th Cir. 2013). “This is because the United
States Supreme Court has held that ‘[u]nder our precedents, federal courts have the power to
dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is
equitable or otherwise discretionary.’” Id. (citing Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996). See
also Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1079 (finding that “[w]hile Quackenbush
involved Burford abstention, its reasoning applies with equal force to Younger abstention.”).
Because the defendant seeks only legal relief, the Court will stay the case pending the conclusion
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of the Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings.
III.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Plaintiff has requested a court-appointed attorney. Indigent parties in civil cases have no

constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65
F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993). The
Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court’s discretion. AbdurRahman, 65 F.3d at 492; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-05; see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S.
296 (1989).
Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances.
In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the
issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff’s apparent ability to prosecute the action
without the help of counsel. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606. The Court has carefully considered
these factors and determines that, at this stage of the case, the assistance of counsel does not
appear necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff’s request for

appointment of counsel will be denied without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to request
appointed counsel, if necessary, in the future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this action will be stayed and the case administratively
closed pending the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s pending state criminal proceedings as described
in the accompanying order.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.

____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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