Post v. White

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/28/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANIEL POST,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRYAN WHITE – TENNESSEE
HIGHWAY PATROL,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:18-cv-0132
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Daniel Post has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint in this court asserting
violations of his constitutional rights. Because the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court
is required to conduct an initial review of the Complaint and to dismiss it if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.

Factual Allegations
As grounds for filing suit, the plaintiff states that he has “been damaged by Bryan

White,” a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol, in violation of his rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. No.
1, at 1.) The plaintiff does not actually explain in the Complaint what actions White took that
violated the plaintiff’s rights. Based on the documents attached as exhibits to the Complaint, the
court understands that White issued the plaintiff traffic citations on January 17, 2017 for driving
with an expired Texas license plate and then failing to provide proof of insurance. (See Doc. No.
1-4.) In August 2017, the plaintiff received a Notice of Proposed Suspension from the Tennessee

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Department of Safety and Homeland Security. According to the Notice, the Department had been
notified by the City Court of Lebanon, Tennessee that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the
citation for lack of proof of insurance issued to him in January 2017 and that his driver license,
driving privileges, and privilege to obtain a license would be suspended effective 30 days from
the date of the Notice if he failed to satisfy the citation within that 30 days. (Doc. No. 1-2, at 1.)
The plaintiff responded to the citation and the Notice of Proposed Suspension by sending
letters and demands to Tennessee Secretary of State Tre Hargett, Judge James Flood, Tennessee
Attorney General Herbert Slatery III, and Prosecutor Andy Wright, asserting that he is a
sovereign citizen, that he does not use the public byways of the State of Tennessee for
commercial purposes, and that the State does not have the authority to require him to provide
proof of insurance or to suspend his driver license or right to drive. In his Complaint in this
court, he contends that his “right to due process was not respected” and that he has exercised
“due diligence in attempting to verify the State of Tennessee’s . . . authority and subsequent
jurisdiction over [him], to no avail.” (Doc. No. 1, at 2.) For relief, the plaintiff demands that the
defendant recognize his “inalienable right to freely travel and not confuse it with a privilege to
drive,” to “stop assuming” that he is a “U.S. citizen” when he is, instead, “a man”; and that the
“agents of the corporate fiction of the State of Tennessee” stop the harassment of his body. (Doc.
No. 1, at 3.)
II.

Standard of Review
To determine whether a litigant’s complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted” under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). The
court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s]

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the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not, however, extend to allegations that
consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). A pro se
pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
III.

Discussion
Although the plaintiff does not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute alone provides a

private right of action for the violation of federal constitutional rights. The court liberally
construes the pro se Complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish
(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused
by a person acting under the color of state law.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543,
549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)).
A Tennessee state trooper, acting in his individual capacity during the course and scope
of his employment, acts under color of state law for purposes of a claim under § 1983. The
question is whether the Complaint alleges facts suggesting that the defendant deprived the
plaintiff of any right secured by the United States Constitution.
The answer to that question is no. The plaintiff does not allege that he was stopped
without reasonable suspicion or arrested without probable cause. He does not contest the bases
for the citation—that his Texas license plate was expired and that he did not have with him proof

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of insurance. He does not allege that he was subjected to the use of excessive force. He does not
allege that he was taken into custody or incarcerated or that he appeared in City Court to demand
a jury trial. In short, the Complaint does not contain any allegations suggesting a violation of his
constitutional rights by Trooper Bryan White, whether under the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Fourteenth or any other Amendment.
Insofar as the Complaint might be construed as asserting that the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights were violated because he is a sovereign citizen over whom the State of Tennessee lacks
jurisdiction, he fails to state a colorable claim for which relief may be granted under § 1983 or
any other law, against White or anyone else. The suggestion that the plaintiff’s status as a socalled sovereign citizen (or “a man” (Doc. No. 1, at 3) or “a representative of the popular
sovereignty” (Doc. No. 1-1, at 2)) insulates him from being issued a traffic citation is simply
nonsense, as is the plaintiff’s contention that a traffic citation is an “offer to contract.” (Doc. No.
1-1, at 1.) Moreover, the plaintiff is simply incorrect in asserting that he was not a “driver” or
“operator” of a “motor vehicle” because he was not transporting goods or persons and was not
using his vehicle “in commerce” and, therefore, that the law requiring proof of insurance does
not apply to him. (Doc. No. 1-1, at 2.) The relevant definitions are contained in the Tennessee
Financial Responsibility Law of 1977, which defines “motor vehicle” as “every self-propelled
vehicle that is designed for use upon the highway,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-102(6), and
defines “operator” as “every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle whether
or not licensed as an operator or chauffeur under the laws of this state.” Id. § 55-12-102(10)(A).
The Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal with prejudice.1

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The court also notes that that the relief requested by the plaintiff is for prospective
injunctive and equitable relief that is not within the power of White to grant and that the plaintiff
has not named as defendants the individuals he claims are “harassing” him. Moreover, the

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An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

abstention doctrine established by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), requires the target of
an ongoing state prosecution to raise any and all constitutional claims as defenses to that action
and prevents the state court defendant from filing a collateral federal action raising the same
claims. To the extent the plaintiff is the target of ongoing state prosecution in connection with
the traffic citation, he must assert any constitutional bars to those charges in the state court, not
here. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has already been convicted in state court on the basis of
the traffic citations, and the conviction is final, not having been appealed, then any claims
challenging that conviction on constitutional grounds in this court would be barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), so long as any award in the plaintiff’s favor in this court would
“necessarily imply” the invalidity of his conviction in state court. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
521, 522 (2011) (citations omitted).