Thompson v. Cheatham County Jail et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Because it is apparent from Plaintiff's submission that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee in advance, his 2 application to proceed IFP is GRANTED. Plaintiff is nonetheless assessed the $350.00 civil filing fee. The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the Warden of the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex. The Cheatham County Jail and all claims against it are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Consequently, the Clerk is instructed to se nd Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons and USM 285 form) for Sheriff Breedlove. Upon return of the service packets, PROCESS SHALL ISSUE to Sheriff Breedlove. This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge. Signed by District Judge Willia m L. Campbell, Jr on 4/24/2018. (xc: Order and 1 blank service packet to pro se party by regular mail. Order to Warden of Bledsoe County Correctional Complex by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOSHUA P. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHEATHAM COUNTY JAIL and SHERIFF
BREEDLOVE,
Defendants.

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NO.

3:18-cv-00227

JUDGE CAMPBELL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joshua P. Thompson, a prisoner formerly confined in the Cheatham County Jail
and currently incarcerated at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex in Pikeville, Tennessee, 1
has filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), along with an
application to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs. (Doc. No. 2.) The case is
before the Court for a ruling on the application and for an initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for

permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee of $350 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
Such an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) must be accompanied by a “certified copy
of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint . . ., obtained from the appropriate official

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Plaintiff filed a notice of his relocation from the Cheatham County Jail on March 29,
2018. (Doc. No. 4.)

of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff’s
application does not include the required trust fund account certification. However, in the section
of his application where this certification is to be made, Plaintiff states that his jailors “refused to
complete this part for me or give me a print out of trust fund.” (Doc. No. 2 at 2.) He further states
that: “The one’s over comissarry [sic] said they never got my request and sometimes the requests
were intercepted. They’ve done all they can to keep me from filing this[.]” (Id.)
If a jail does not maintain inmate trust fund accounts, or if jail officials refuse to cooperate
with an inmate’s efforts to get his application notarized and his inmate account statement certified,
the inmate may submit a signed statement detailing his attempts to meet these statutory
requirements in lieu of a certified inmate trust fund account statement. See Michael Kilpatrick v.
James O’Rouke, No. 3:16-cv-01840 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (Sharp, J.) (Doc. No. 3 at 1–2). In light
of Plaintiff’s statements concerning his unsuccessful attempts to obtain a certified inmate trust
fund account statement from the Cheatham County Jail (which appear on the same page as his
signed declaration that his allegations of poverty are true), and in view of his recent transfer from
that facility, the Court finds that his IFP application is adequately supported under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2).
Because it is apparent from Plaintiff’s submission that he lacks the funds to pay the entire
filing fee in advance, his application to proceed IFP is GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), Plaintiff is nonetheless assessed the $350.00 civil filing fee. The warden
of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of Plaintiff’s trust account, is
DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a) 20% of the
average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average monthly balance
to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly
income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when the balance in his
account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350.00 filing
fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the Warden of the Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to
the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the
custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of confinement,
for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order must be
submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203.
II.

Initial Review of the Complaint
A.

PLRA Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any IFP complaint that is
facially frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, Section 1915A
provides that the Court shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, and shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof
if the defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under both statutes, this initial review
of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the Court must view the complaint in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff and, again, must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro se pleadings must
be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
B.

Section 1983 Standard

Plaintiff seeks to vindicate alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state
a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
C.

Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of mental health care by a qualified provider during his
confinement as a pretrial detainee at the Cheatham County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 5.) He alleges
that he had been receiving a disability check on account of his mental illness prior to his
confinement, and that his treating psychiatric nurse practitioner faxed his treatment records to the
jail, establishing his diagnoses of “Bipolar I disorder, Anxiety disorder, severe anxiety panic

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disorder, PTSD, Hypertensive disorder, and viral Hep[atitis] C.” (Id.) He alleges that he has
several medications that he has to take, but which were not given to him at the jail. (Id.) He further
alleges as follows:
I’m supposed to be screened within 48 hours by a [qualified] p[sych]iatric provider
before I was moved to G.P. (Didn’t happen) They have two nurses and a (LPN)
that comes once a week, neither of the 3 are [qualified] in p[sych]iatry. After 35
days they finally gave me one pill (risperdol) its for (paranoid [schizophrenia]) I’m
not that and they are not [qualified] to change my medication by law. My family
drove 3 hours to bring my meds after they asked me to get them 4 different kinds.
They accepted them, then refused to give them to me. Then nurse Sabrina told my
mother I couldn’t have narcotics. There’s not one narcotic in the bunch. . . . They
have people here taking (hydol) and other strong [psychiatric] meds a lot stronger
than mine, they don’t even know where they are at. Its clearly discrimination of
some kind against me[.]
(Id. at 5–6.)
Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances on January 12, 17, 19, 28, and 31 of this year, and
that all grievances were marked “grievance substan[t]iated” without holding any grievance
hearing. (Id. at 6.) His complaint also indicates that the jail responded to his grievances by stating
that “Medical has policies they must follow & if they say I need certain meds I’ll get them.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff alleges that “TCA 1400-01-13 Medical Services (8)(9)(10)(12)(18)(21) and (23)
all apply to [his] case.” (Id. at 6.) He claims that he has “been suffering since Jan. 3, 2018,” and
seeks one million dollars in damages. (Id. at 7.)
D.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied appropriate medical care implicates his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. As a pretrial detainee,
Plaintiff is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause from conduct that the
Eighth Amendment would prohibit as against “individuals who have been tried, convicted, and

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sentenced.” Richko v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit
“has made clear that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees are ‘entitled to the same
Eighth Amendment rights as other inmates.’” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Cty. of Medina, Ohio, 29
F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994)). “Eighth Amendment jurisprudence clearly establishes that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain that is violative of the Constitution.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361,
367 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 105) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“For this reason, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983,” id., whether the prisoner is a convict proceeding under the Eighth
Amendment or a detainee proceeding under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In order to succeed in bringing a deliberate indifference claim in the medical context,
Plaintiff must allege the deprivation of a “sufficiently serious” medical need by a Defendant who
acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 367–68 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Plaintiff’s allegations that his outside mental health provider faxed his
treatment records to the jail; that he did not receive any medications to treat his disabling bipolar
and anxiety disorders for 35 days; and, that he was thereafter given “one pill” that had not
previously been prescribed to treat his mental disorders, sufficiently allege the deprivation of a
serious medical need. See id. at 368 (“Our precedents make it clear that neglecting a prisoner’s
known medical needs may constitute deliberate indifference. Even relatively short periods of
delay or neglect have sufficed.”); Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 292 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Constitution protects against deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs)
(citing, e.g., Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)).
It is a somewhat closer question whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was so

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deprived by a proper Defendant acting with the requisite culpability. Plaintiff’s complaint names
two Defendants: Sheriff Breedlove and the Cheatham County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 2.) The
Cheatham County Jail, “like any other jail or workhouse, is a place; it is not a ‘person’ that can be
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Tucker v. Salandy, No. 3:17-CV-00671, 2017 WL 2438401, *2
(M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2017) (citing cases). Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim against the Cheatham
County Jail.
As for Sheriff Breedlove, he is not alleged to have been personally involved in Plaintiff’s
medical care, but is sued in his official capacity only. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) 2 The suit against him is
therefore the equivalent of a suit against Cheatham County, the governmental entity he represents.
See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985)). While counties and other municipal defendants are “persons” subject to suit
under Section § 1983, municipal liability may only be established if the plaintiff’s harm is alleged
to have been caused by the execution of an official policy or custom of the municipality, rather
than simply the misdeeds of municipal employees. Id. at 814–15. “A plaintiff seeking to impose
liability under § 1983 must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was
the moving force behind the injury alleged,” such that there is a “direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Burns v. Robertson Cty., 192 F. Supp. 3d

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Plaintiff affirmatively indicates that he is suing Sheriff Breedlove in his official
capacity, and does not indicate whether or not he is pursuing an individual capacity claim. (Doc.
No. 1 at 2.) Sheriff Breedlove is not specifically mentioned in the complaint’s factual allegations,
which simply refer to the wrongdoers as “they” after noting that the response to his grievances had
been that “Medical has policies they must follow & if they say I need certain meds I’ll get them.”
(Doc. No. 1 at 5–6.) In his request for relief, Plaintiff states as follows: “Sheriff Breedlove I want
him to follow the law when it comes to inmates with mental illnesses[.] Cheat[h]am County Jail
as a whole I want $1,000,000.00 from and I deserve every penny.” (Id. at 7.) The Court does not
find any indication in the complaint that Sheriff Breedlove is being sued individually. See Moore
v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772–75 (6th Cir. 2001).
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909, 920 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The heart of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he was denied medications and other specialized
treatment which he needed to control the symptoms of his disabling mental disorders “after [his]
mental health doctor in free world ha[d] faxed them paper work proving [his] mental health issues
& diagnosis & that [he gets a] gov’t check for these mental health issues.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) As
previously mentioned, Plaintiff stated in another section of his complaint that the response to his
internal grievances was that “Medical has policies they must follow & if they say I need certain
meds I’ll get them.” (Id.) Liberally construing these allegations of the pro se complaint together,
the lack of attention to Plaintiff’s serious mental health conditions is alleged to have been caused
by adherence to the jail’s policy on evaluating inmates’ mental health needs, even though notice
of a pressing need for treatment had been provided in the form of faxed medical records and a
conversation between his family members and jail medical personnel. This is sufficient at this
early stage of the litigation to state a deliberate indifference claim against the County. See Burns
v. Robertson Cty., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 921–22 (noting, in case of alleged improper screening for
suicidal tendencies, that Sixth Circuit has consistently recognized prisoners’ constitutional right to
medical care once suicidal tendencies are known, and holding that county could be found
responsible for knowing such tendencies and providing appropriate care based on three telephone
calls made to the jail by prisoner’s family members and attorney).
The jail’s alleged failure to employ any health care providers who are qualified or
specialize in psychiatry, and the failure to have such a qualified provider perform Plaintiff’s mental
health screening prior to moving him to the jail’s general population, are also construed as stating
a deliberate indifference claim against the County.

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These allegations identify staffing and

procedural policies which contributed to the failure to provide Plaintiff with any psychotropic
medications for 35 days. “Systemic deficiencies in staffing which effectively deny inmates access
to qualified medical personnel for diagnosis and treatment of serious health problems have been
held to violate constitutional requirements. . . . [W]hen inmates with serious mental ills are
effectively prevented from being diagnosed and treated by qualified professionals, the system of
care does not meet the constitutional requirements set forth by Estelle v. Gamble, supra, and thus
violates the Due Process Clause.” Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762–63
(3d Cir. 1979), cited with approval in Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 292 (6th Cir.
2006).
As to the provision of medications once Plaintiff’s need for them was recognized, Plaintiff
fails to allege that any harm he suffered was the result of a county policy or custom. In fact, he
specifically alleges “discrimination of some kind” against only himself, since other inmates were
receiving strong psychiatric medication. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to
recover for this alleged discriminatory treatment against his individual care providers, he must
amend his complaint to include claims against these individuals and name them as defendants.
III.

Conclusion
As explained above, the Court finds that the complaint states colorable Section 1983 claims

of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs against Sheriff Breedlove in his
official capacity, insofar as Plaintiff was denied appropriate care for his mental health conditions
pursuant to policies in place at the Cheatham County Jail. These claims survive the required PLRA
screening and shall proceed for further development of the record.

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However, the complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted
as to the claims against the jail itself. Therefore, the Cheatham County Jail and all claims against
it are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Consequently, the Clerk is instructed to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons
and USM 285 form) for Sheriff Breedlove. Plaintiff will complete the service packet and return it
to the Clerk’s Office within twenty (20) days of the date of receipt of this Order.
Upon return of the service packets, PROCESS SHALL ISSUE to Sheriff Breedlove.
Plaintiff is forewarned that the failure to return the completed service packet within the time
required could jeopardize his prosecution of this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), this action is REFERRED to the
Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or
recommend disposition of any pre-trial, non-dispositive motions, to issue a Report and
Recommendation on all dispositive motions, and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary,
under Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and the Local Rules of Court.
It is so ORDERED.

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WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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