Rollins v. Social Security Administration

Filing 16

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 13 MOTION for Judgment on the Record filed by Jennifer L. Rollins. For the above stated reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record (DE 13) be DENIED and the C ommissioner's decision be AFFIRMED. OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation or further appeal is waived. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Gregory Wehrman on 2/28/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JENNIFER L. ROLLINS
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

To:

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)
)
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No. 3:18-0252

The Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative record.
See Docket Entry (“DE”) 13. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”). At issue is whether the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that
Plaintiff was “not disabled,” and therefore not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) or
Supplement Security Income (“SSI”). (See Administrative Transcript (DE 12) at 7-9). 1 This matter
has been referred to the undersigned, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), for initial consideration and
a report and recommendation. See DE 4.
Upon review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties’ filings, I find no
error that would necessitate remand in this case and therefore recommend that Plaintiff’s motion
for judgment on the administrative record (DE 13) be DENIED.

1

The Transcript of the Administrative Record is hereinafter referenced by the abbreviation “Tr.”
followed by the corresponding page number(s) as denoted by the large black print on the bottom right corner
of each page.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on September 15, 2014 due back
and neck pain, arthritis, depression, and anxiety, with an alleged disability onset date of October
1, 2013. (Tr. 69-70, 143). Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 6970, 103-04). Pursuant to her request for a hearing before an ALJ, Plaintiff appeared with counsel
and testified at a hearing before ALJ Donald E. Garrison on November 15, 2016. (Tr. 41). On
February 1, 2017, the ALJ denied the claim. (Tr. 7-9). On December 4, 2017, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for a review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1-4). Therefore, the ALJ’s
decision stands as the final determination of the Commissioner.
As part of the decision, the ALJ made the following enumerated findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2015.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2013,
the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: lumbar and cervical
degenerative disc disease; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; obesity; and
panic disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant is limited to occasionally
climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. She is required
to exercise a sit/stand [option], alternating sitting and standing every 30 minutes.
She is limited to frequently reaching, and pushing and pulling using the hands and
arms. She is limited to occasional overhead work. She is limited to frequent
handling, fingering, and feeling. She cannot be exposed to irritable inhalants,
extreme wetness, and work hazards. The claimant can understand, remember, and
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carry out short and simple instructions and make judgments on simple work-related
decisions. She is limited to occasional contact with the public.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and
416.965).
7. The claimant was born on May 26, 1975 and was 38 years old, which is defined as
a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR
404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in
English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the
claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills
(See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969,
and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from October 1, 2013, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)).
(Tr. 12-26).
On appeal, Plaintiff submits two assertions of error: (1) that the ALJ failed to properly
consider the opinions of treating and examining sources; and (2) that the ALJ improperly
discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. DE 14 at 7, 11. Plaintiff therefore requests that this case be
reversed and benefits awarded or, alternatively, remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) for further consideration. Id. at 13.

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II.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review
On appeal, the Court is charged with determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere
scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)). If
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, that decision must be affirmed “even if there is
substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,
273 (6th Cir. 1997)). As explained by the Sixth Circuit:
The Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial
evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial
evidence standard presupposes that there is a “zone of choice” within which the
Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court
must affirm.
Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process in considering
whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). If the issue of disability can
be resolved at any point in the evaluation process, the ALJ does not proceed to the next step and
the claim is not reviewed further. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At step one, the claimant
must show that she is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time disability benefits
are sought; at step two, the ALJ considers whether one or more of the claimant’s alleged
impairments are “severe” in nature; at step three, the ALJ determines whether the impairments at
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issue meet or equal one of the Listings contained in the regulatory List of Impairments; at step
four, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines
whether the claimant can still perform past relevant work; and at step five, the burden of proof
shifts to the ALJ to assess whether the claimant, after establishing that past relevant work is no
longer possible, is capable of performing other types of work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
If the ALJ determines at step four that the claimant can perform past relevant work, the
claimant is deemed “not disabled” and the ALJ need not complete the remaining steps of the
sequential analysis. Id. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). “Past relevant work” is defined as work that
claimants have done within the past fifteen years that is “substantial gainful activity” and that
lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640,
643 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1)). If the claimant is incapable of performing
past relevant work, however, the ALJ proceeds to step five to determine whether, in light of the
claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other substantial
gainful employment and whether such employment exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ is required to consider the combined effect
of all of the claimant’s impairments, mental and physical, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B).
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to the record made during
the administrative hearing process. Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988). A reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence,
or decide questions of credibility. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (Myers v.
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Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ’s explicit
findings and determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s determination. Houston v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir.
1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
B. The Commissioner’s Decision
The ALJ resolved the current Plaintiff’s claim at step five of the five-step process.
Although Plaintiff was found to have met the first two steps, the ALJ determined at step three that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and
was therefore not presumptively disabled. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s RFC allowed her to
perform a range of light work with express limitations to account for her severe impairments, and
that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform despite such limitations. (Tr. 12-26).
C. Assertions of Error
1. The opinion evidence.
On August 26, 2015, Sarah Welch, a nurse practitioner, completed a “mental impairment
questionnaire” in which she diagnosed Plaintiff with non-specific mood and anxiety disorders and
opined that Plaintiff suffered from “moderate-to-marked” limitations in understanding and
remembering detailed instructions, performing activities within a schedule, completing a workday
without interruption from psychological symptoms, and performing at a consistent pace without
rest periods of unreasonable length or frequency. (Tr. 737-41). The ALJ accorded this opinion
6

“some weight” based on his conclusion that the medical evidence did not support a finding that
Plaintiff experienced more than moderate mental limitations. (Tr. 16).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the opinion of her
“treating source,” Ms. Welch, regarding the severity of her alleged mental impairment. DE 14 at
7-10. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to “give good reasons for
disregarding Ms. Welch’s opinion.” Id. at 9.
Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. It is true that pursuant to the so-called “treating
physician rule,” which applies to claims filed before March 27, 2017, such as the instant one, the
ALJ is required to accord controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician if that opinion
is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2). A nurse practitioner, however, is not an “acceptable medical source” and therefore
Ms. Welch’s opinion is not subject to the scrutiny of the treating physician rule. See SSR 06-03p,
2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (August 9, 2006) (noting nurse practitioners are “other sources” that
cannot establish the existence of medically determinable impairment). 2 While opinions from such
sources are probative with respect to the severity of a condition, Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502
F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2007), they cannot be given controlling weight, nor are they “entitled to
any special deference.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff’s reliance on Sixth Circuit case law pertaining to opinions from treating physicians is
therefore misplaced.

2

SSR 06-03p was rescinded effective March 27, 2017, but applied at the time of Plaintiff’s
application and the ALJ’s decision.
7

Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for relying on reports from consultative examiner
Jeffrey Viers and two state agency physicians because these opinions were issued prior to the
completion of Ms. Welch’s “mental impairment questionnaire.” DE 14 at 9-10. Citing the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009), Plaintiff argues
that according greater weight to opinions from non-treating and non-examining physicians whose
opinions pre-date one “from another source [] who did not have access to the entire record[] is not
appropriate.” DE 14 at 10. Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing for multiple reasons, one of which is
that her facile interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion would require the ALJ to dismiss any
non-examining physician’s opinion if it preceded one from a subsequent physician given that the
former individual would, by definition, “not have access to the entire medical record.” The Sixth
Circuit has instead specifically noted that “[t]here is no categorical requirement that the nontreating source’s opinion be based on a complete ... case record. The opinion[] need only be
supported by evidence in the case record.” Helm v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 405 F. App’x
997, 1002 (6th Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit has also directly rejected Plaintiff’s position. See
Kepke v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 636 F. App’x 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that Blakley is “far
more limited” and contains no “blanket prohibition on an ALJ’s adoption of a non-examining
source opinion, where that source has not reviewed the entire record”).
Additionally, Blakley reversed an administrative opinion based on the subject ALJ’s failure
to comply with the treating physician rule, which, as discussed supra, is not applicable in this
matter. See Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:14-cv-291, 2015 WL 1119751, at *11 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 11, 2015) (“An ALJ’s unsupported rejection of a treating source and reliance on nonexamining sources without full access to the record appeared to be the overriding danger that
8

existed in Blakley, is not similarly present here.”) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit also
emphasized the “volume and type of records that the consultants failed to review,” which included
over 300 pages of additional office visits with treating physicians. Curry v. Colvin, No. 4:13-cv00312, 2013 WL 5774028, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Blakley 581 F.3d at 409). In
contrast, Plaintiff cites generally to 265 pages of therapy notes at the Guidance Center (DE 14 at
10), which primarily document medication management visits that took place prior to issuance of
the opinions from the state physicians and the consultative examiner. (Tr. 94, 114, 571, 606-736,
766-901). In fact, the only specific visits referenced by Plaintiff involve encounters with Ms.
Welch between May of 2013 and July of 2014 (DE 14 at 8), all of which took place before these
reports were completed. (Tr. 94, 114, 571, 648, 654, 661, 667, 693, 700). Plaintiff’s own brief thus
moots any application of Blakley.
The only other evidence cited by Plaintiff to support her argument regarding Ms. Welch’s
opinion is a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 50 assigned in December 2012 and
August 2015 (Tr. 618, 737). A GAF score is a “clinician’s subjective rating, on a scale of zero to
100, of an individual’s overall psychological functioning.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167
F. App’x 496, 503, n.7 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by “completely
ignor[ing] the consistency” of these two GAF scores, which purportedly indicate “serious
symptoms ... or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning[.]” Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed., Text
Revision 2000). While Plaintiff correctly notes that the undersigned “can certainly consider the
Plaintiff’s GAF scores” (DE 14 at 9), such scores do little to bolster her argument given that GAF
scores are not considered relevant to a determination of disability. See Kornecky, 167 F. App’x at
9

511 (“[W]e are not aware of any statutory, regulatory, or other authority requiring the ALJ to put
stock in a GAF score in the first place.”). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that “failure to reference
a [GAF] score is not, standing alone, sufficient ground to reverse a disability determination,”
DeBoard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 211 F. App’x 411, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Howard v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)), and has additionally indicated that irrespective of
the applicability of a GAF score in a social security context, the current Plaintiff’s score is
inadequate to demonstrate the presence of a disabling condition. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Even assuming GAF scores are determinative, the record
supports a GAF in the high 40s to mid 50s, which would not preclude her from having the mental
capacity to hold at least some jobs in the national economy.”).
Finally, Plaintiff tacks on a perfunctory assertion that the ALJ erred by assigning little
weight to the opinion of Dr. Barry Workman (Tr. 21), a consultative examiner who provided an
opinion regarding Plaintiff’s physical condition on November 8, 2014. (Tr. 576). Dr. Workman
opined that, during an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff’s back pain would limit her to “occasional”
standing, “frequent” sitting, “occasional” walking, and “occasional” lifting and carrying of less
than five pounds. (Tr. 581). The ALJ based his decision to discount this opinion on inconsistency
with other medical evidence, including Dr. Workman’s own examination findings, and the fact
that his proffered functional limitations appeared to stem from Plaintiff’s own subjective
complaints. (Tr. 21).
In support of her claim that Dr. Workman’s opinion is supported by medical evidence,
Plaintiff identifies a single physical therapy note from October 21, 2013 documenting her alleged
difficulty with activities of daily living. DE 14 at 10. Plaintiff brazenly contends that there is “no
10

evidence in the record which suggests that [she] experienced any significant improvement in her
physical symptoms after this date” (id.), despite the fact that the same physical therapist noted
“significant improvement” in Plaintiff’s condition just two days later. (Tr. 407). Plaintiff in fact
demonstrated consistent improvement with her physical symptoms following the October 21
encounter (Tr. 418, 423, 430, 433, 436), and noted a “significant increase” in her daily activity on
November 18, 2013. (Tr. 431). Her final encounter with the therapist documents an ability to
complete all exercises without any increase in pain and “no difficulty with daily activities.” (Tr.
446). In short, Plaintiff’s argument is entirely unpersuasive.
The ALJ appropriately discounted the opinions of Ms. Welch and Dr. Workman after
discussing their inconsistency with other evidence, including mild examination findings and the
inconsistency of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the severity of her symptoms. (Tr. 1416, 20-21). In addition to mischaracterizing Ms. Welch as a provider whose opinion is subject to
the “treating physician rule,” Plaintiff conveniently ignores the relatively normal physical findings
derived from imaging studies, which repeatedly demonstrated “only mild” degenerative disc
disease.” (Tr. 580, 950, 1028). Indeed, Plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence that undermines
the ALJ’s conclusions, as is her burden. See Peterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 552 F. App’x 533,
540 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that it is the claimant’s burden to “demonstrate that the ALJ’s
determination that [she] was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence”). This assertion
of error must therefore be rejected.
2. Credibility.
Plaintiff’s next assertion of error involves the ALJ’s determination that her allegations
regarding the severity of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence contained
11

in the record. (Tr. 19). 3 When a claimant alleges the existence of disabling symptoms, the ALJ
must examine whether medical evidence supports a finding of an underlying medical condition
and, if so, determine whether the condition is of such a severity that it could reasonably be expected
to produce the alleged symptoms. Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853
(6th Cir. 1986). If the claims are not substantiated by medical evidence, the ALJ is required to
evaluate the consistency of the claimant’s allegations based on the record. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL
1119029, at *2 (March 16, 2016). An ALJ’s determination regarding a claimant’s credibility may
not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” See Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1987)). Even
if the determination is based partially on invalid reasons, it “will be upheld as long as substantial
evidence remains to support it.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 535 F. App’x 498, 507 (6th Cir.
2013).
Plaintiff’s lone assertion is that the ALJ improperly considered evidence that she regularly
shops at a grocery store and that she hosted a Super Bowl party in 2015. DE 14 at 11-12. Plaintiff
notes that despite such evidence, she testified that grocery shopping is “very hard” due to anxiety
(Tr. 56) and a therapy note documents her complaint that it was difficult to host the Super Bowl
party. (Tr. 894). Even assuming that such evidence weighs in her favor, there is ample evidence to
support the ALJ’s credibility assessment and thereby negate her argument. See Longworth v.

3

This determination was formerly known as a “credibility” finding. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996). SSR 16-3p, which replaced SSR 96-7p and was in effect at the
time of the administrative hearing, removes the term “credibility” and directs the ALJ to consider a
claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms,” and “evaluate
whether the statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 2016 WL
1119029, at *6. Nevertheless, the differences between the two rulings appears to be mostly cosmetic as
case law pertaining to “credibility” assessments remains applicable.
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Comm’r Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, this Court will defer to that finding even if there is substantial evidence
in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). For example, the ALJ noted that while Plaintiff alleges that she stopped working
“because of [her] condition(s),” including “really bad” neck pain (Tr. 50, 255), she previously
reported that the plant where she last worked had relocated and that she had been “laid off.” (Tr.
18, 20, 573, 577). Such evidence tends to support the ALJ’s evaluation. See Mendiola v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 3:15-cv-0995, 2016 WL 5800470, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016) (“An individual
who leaves the last job for reasons unrelated to any disability casts doubt on the reasons they are
not working.”) (citing Workman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The ALJ also highlighted Plaintiff’s decision to continue smoking despite being diagnosed with
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) and being prescribed medication to help with
cessation, (Tr. 18, 22, 1097, 1099), which similarly bolsters his determination. See Marshall v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-14255, 2015 WL 777940, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2015)
(noting that the Sixth Circuit “considers whether a claimant has followed a physician’s advice to
quit smoking to be a relevant factor in evaluating the claimant’s credibility”) (collecting cases).
The ALJ’s credibility discussion also included references to Plaintiff’s inconsistent
allegations regarding the use of a cane and side effects allegedly stemming from her medication
(Tr. 19, 22), as well as normal examination findings and the overall conservative nature of her
treatment (Tr. 19-21), as was appropriate. See Peters v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-217, 2016 WL
4965114, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
4921031 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2016) (affirming ALJ’s credibility determination because
13

conservative treatment “suggests the absence of a disabling condition.”) (quoting Branson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2013)). The ALJ even noted that despite
testifying in November of 2016 that she never visits people, never goes to public places, and
partakes in no extracurricular activities (Tr. 56), Plaintiff reported to Ms. Welch that she was in
Colorado less than two months earlier. (Tr. 22, 873). Plaintiff’s narrow focus on grocery shopping
and party-hosting does little to overcome the substantial evidence cited by the ALJ in support of
his determination. This assertion of error is therefore rejected.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
administrative record (DE 13) be DENIED and the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation or further
appeal is waived. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Poorly drafted objections, general objections, or
objections that require a judge’s interpretation should be afforded no effect and are insufficient to
preserve the right of appeal. See Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509
(6th Cir. 1991). A party may file a response to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 72(b).

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