Fentress v. Tennessee Department of Correction
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 7/24/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DONALD FENTRESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, 1
Defendant.
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No. 3:18-cv-00453
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald Fentress, an inmate at DeBerry Special Needs Facility in Nashville, Tennessee,
filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee Department of
Correction. The plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and a
motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 3).
I.
Application to Proceed as a Pauper
The court may authorize a prisoner to file a civil suit without prepaying the filing fee. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from the plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application that he
lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance, his application
(Doc. No. 2) will be granted. The plaintiff must nonetheless pay the $350.00 filing fee, so the fee
will be assessed as directed in the accompanying order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
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The docket reflects that DeBerry Special Needs Facility (“DSNF”) is also a defendant in this action. Upon review of
the complaint, however, the plaintiff lists DSNF as the address of the Tennessee Department of Correction, not as an
additional defendant. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Accordingly, the Clerk will be directed to update the docket to reflect that the
Tennessee Department of Correction is the only defendant in this case.
II.
Motion to Appoint Counsel
As discussed below, this action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 3) will be
denied as moot.
III.
Initial Review
Under the screening requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the court
must conduct an initial review and dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The
court must also construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
A.
Factual Allegations
The plaintiff’s handwriting is nearly illegible. For the purpose of initial review, however,
the court has established the following transcription of plaintiff’s statement of facts, in full and
unaltered:
Plaintiff claims in year 1987, March, that he was poison by correction officer at
Turney Center, which resulted in loss of right (kidney)). Also in March 1987,
Plaintiff claims he was injection by a nurse at Turney Center, which resulted in loss
of (rib cage)).
(Doc. No. 1 at 7.) The plaintiff requests monetary damages and release from prison. (Id. at 8.)
B.
Standard of Review
To determine whether a prisoner’s complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted” under the PLRA’s screening requirements, the court applies the same standard as under
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th
Cir. 2010). The court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and]
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not, however, extend to allegations
that consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). A pro se
pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
C.
Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when
favorably construed, establish: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Baynes v. Cleland,
799 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th
Cir. 2006)). Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 for at least three reasons.
First, the only defendant in this action is the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”). The TDOC, however, is not a proper defendant because it is an administrative
department of the state of Tennessee, “not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Hix v. Tenn.
Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)). Second, the plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred in March 1987, over
thirty years ago. Tennessee has a one year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Jordan v. Blount
Cty., 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)). Thus, the
plaintiff’s claims are clearly untimely. And third, part of the relief that the plaintiff seeks is release
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from prison. This relief is not available under § 1983, as a prisoner seeking “immediate release or
a speedier release” must do so “through a writ of habeas corpus, not through § 1983.” Wershe v.
Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).
IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) will
be granted, his motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 3) will be denied as moot, and this action will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A,
1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The court will also certify that any appeal in this matter
would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). The court, therefore, will not grant the
plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on any appeal.
The court will enter an appropriate order.
ENTER this 24th day of July 2018.
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ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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